North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

ilateral discussions on the DPRK’s nuclear program, the item concluded that the delay in talks
was an excuse to “buy time for stepping up international pressure on and blockade against us.” In
a related development, a July 2 Nodong Sinmun article cited U.S. State Department spokesman
Richard Boucher as warning that countries should refrain from engaging in military cooperation
with the DPRK. 80 In this regard, the article denied that the DPRK’s export of missiles was illegal,
charged that the United States was the world’s largest weapons exporter (earning “nearly 50
billion dollars from 1997 to 2001”), and characterized the U.S. policy as a “collective siege”
against the DPRK. Two days later, KCBS cited a member of the “U.S. Defense Department
Policy Advisory Committee” as having advocated the creation of a “maritime network on our
east and west coasts to stop all suspicious North Korean boats and investigate all their shipped
goods.” 81 The news item warned that insofar as a maritime blockade of North Korea would
violate Article 2, Paragraph 15 of the Armistice Agreement, in the event of a blockade the KPA
would “immediately and decisively take strong and merciless retaliatory measures by mobilizing
all its potentials, completely free from the binding force of the Armistice Agreement.”
The two U.S. military issues that received the most news coverage in the domestic press
were the war in Iraq and the U.S. military’s psychological operations. North Korea saw the two
issues as closely related. As presented in the North Korean press, the story line on Iraq was
simple. The intrusive inspections that Iraq was forced to accept fatally weakened its defense
capabilities. In the words of a March 29 Nodong Sinmun article, “The Iraqi situation generates a
serious lesson that imperialists’ weapons inspections on a sovereign state lead to disarmament;
the disarmament turns into war . . . .” 82 The North Korean press said that in the face of a U.S.
attack, the Iraqi army quickly folded because it had been weakened by U.S. psychological
operations. The press further said that the U.S. attack came despite the wishes of the international
community; that in fact, the United States had intended to attack regardless of the outcome of the
inspections: “Since the United States pursued its goal to disarm and take over Iraq from the first,
it moved on to use armed forces, regardless of the inspection process or results.” 83 After the war,
according to this story line, it became clear that the original justification for going to war was
false, because no weapons of mass destruction could be found. 84 The North Korean press warned
80 KCNA, July 2, 2003, citing a Nodong Sinmun article of the same date. FBIS KPP20030702000067.
81 KCBS, July 4, 2003. FBIS KPP20030704000081.
82 As the North Koreans present it, the link between inspections and war is not altogether clear, because according to
their assessment, war was inevitable. KCBS, March 29, 2003; FBIS KPP20030329000036.
83 Ibid.
84 “There is growing opinion that the ‘information about the suspected production of weapons of mass destruction’
in Iraq might be faked up to invade it” and “the misinformation about Iraq’s ‘plan for purchasing uranium’ is
being brought to light.” KCNA, July 31, 2003; citing Nodong Sinmun on the same date. FBIS
KPP20030731000017.
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