North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center
North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center
North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center
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domestic policy arena, the split is clear-cut between moderate economists and diplomats, who<br />
argue for greater reform and an opening up to the outside world, and conservative military and<br />
security cadre, who may still support reform, but at a more controlled pace. 35 These debates,<br />
however, should be understood within the larger context of <strong>North</strong> <strong>Korean</strong> politics. <strong>Policy</strong> debates<br />
are not between hawks and doves, but between ideologues, bent on adhering to principles, and<br />
pragmatists, who emphasize practicality. On issues of reform, debates do not seem to focus on<br />
the need for reform as much as on the pace of reform.<br />
Table 8 attempts to link various <strong>North</strong> <strong>Korean</strong> leaders to a particular policy line based on<br />
the author’s discussions with numerous <strong>North</strong> <strong>Korean</strong> watchers and some senior-level defectors.<br />
Kim Chong-il’s Measures for Neutralizing Factionalism<br />
Kim Chong-il has adopted several measures for blunting and neutralizing opposition<br />
within his regime. His basic power-building strategy is designed to maintain links with the<br />
various factions within the leadership. It is important to understand that factions are not standalone<br />
entities based on policy. The issue of power cuts across all the factions, thus neutralizing<br />
them in terms of their ability to coalesce as centers of opposition to Kim Chong-il. 36<br />
Another strategy employed by Kim Chong-il is the constant shifting of lines of<br />
demarcation between the various bureaucracies. This is characterized by the granting and taking<br />
away of authority. In this way, Kim Chong-il can keep potential rivals off balance. He even uses<br />
this strategy to keep his key allies in check. For example, Gen. Won Ung-hui, commander of the<br />
Security Command, is seen as a counterweight to powerbrokers in the military high command,<br />
such as Cho Myong-nok and Kim Yong-chun. Gen. Won reports directly to Kim Chong-il. Since<br />
the 1995 coup attempt, the Security Command has grown in influence, having been elevated in<br />
status from a bureau. 37 In recent years, it has been given authority to conduct operations and<br />
surveillance outside of the military sphere. This enhanced portfolio has come at the expense of<br />
35 Moderates at the forefront of policy debates include Hong Song-nam (and presumably now his successor, Pak<br />
Pong-chu), Pak Song-chol, Han Song-ryong, Kang Sok-ju, Yon Hyong-muk, Paek Nam-sun, Kim Yong-sun, and<br />
Chang Song-taek. Conservative spokesmen include Yi Ul-sol, Paek Hak-nim, Chon Byong-ho, and Kim Guk-tae.<br />
Cho Myong-nok and Kim Yong-chun appear to take a middle road between the two groups. Discussions with Lim<br />
Chae-hyong.<br />
36 In many respects, power within the <strong>North</strong> <strong>Korean</strong> system is a “zero-sum” game. If one faction gains, by default,<br />
another must lose. By creating a system that thrives on competition for influence, with Kim at the center, he is<br />
able to blunt the creation of a legitimate opposition, for this would violate the rules by which the system operates.<br />
37 This was an alleged coup attempt involving the Sixth Corps. For a detailed account of the coup attempt, see<br />
Joseph Bermudez, “Failed 1995 Military Coup in <strong>North</strong> Korea Revealed.” (self-published on the web, 1996). See<br />
also Joseph Bermudez, Shield of the Great Leader: The Armed Forces of <strong>North</strong> Korea. (Australia: Allen and<br />
Unwin, 2001).<br />
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