North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

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Chang Chon Hwan was accused of sympathizing with the heretic position on the succession issue of the then-DPRK Vice-President Kim Tong-gyu. The elder Chang was summarily dismissed and exiled to the Jagang Province in late 1977. As a rule, observers tend to rule out several third-tier Kim families as viable alternatives to Kim Jong Il’s more direct successors from the first-tier and second-tier families. Kim Il Sung’s parents, father Kim Hyong Jik 12 (1894-1926) and mother Kang Pan Sok (1892-1932) had three sons – Kim Song Ju (a.k.a. Kim Il Sung, 1912-1994), Kim Yong-ju (born in 1920), and Kim Ch’ol-chu (who was killed by the Japanese in 1935), as well as a daughter Kim Hyong-sil. Kim Il Sung’s younger brother, the 84-year old Kim Yong-ju, 13 who is the middle son, is not known to have any legitimate children. Although on July 26, 1993, during the nation-wide celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the “DPRK’s Victory in the Great Fatherland Liberation War,” Kim Jong Il returned his uncle to public life from his two decades of political exile in the countryside, restored his full membership in the WPK Politburo in December 1993, and even asked him to serve as one of the honorary Vice-Chairmen of the Presidium of the SPA in September 1998, Kim Yong-ju is not believed to wield any real power or harbor any successionrelated ambitions. Kim Il Sung’s younger sister, Kim Hyong-sil, had three daughters: Kim Jong Il’s aunts – Kim Chong-suk (the same name as Kim Jong Il’s mother), Kim Sin-suk, and a third daughter who allegedly died as an unnamed infant. Kim Chong-suk was married to the now-deceased Ho Dam, a very influential party official, who rose to become the DPRK Foreign Minister in 1970- 1983. Kim Sin-suk married Yang Hyong-sop, who was born in 1925 and studied at the Moscow State University in the early 1940s together with Kim Yong-ju, Kim Il Sung’s younger brother. Yang Hyong-sop rose in the party education circles: in 1961, he was appointed Director of the WPK Central Party School, and in 1967, minister of education. Kim Sin-suk passed away in 1986. Yang Hyong-sop rose to become Chairman of the 10th Supreme People’s Assembly, and now he serves as one of the Vice-Presidents of the 11th SPA. 12 Kim Hyong Jik had two younger brothers, i.e., Kim Il Sung’s uncles – Kim Hyong-nok and Kim Hyong-gwon (died in 1936). Kim Se-hyong, the only known son of one of Kim Il Sung’s uncles, reportedly served as Deputy Commander of the First Army of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army and died in 1938, without leaving any children behind. 13 Kim Yong-ju took part in the anti-Japanese guerrilla activities in Manchuria together with Kim Il Sung in the late 1930s. He went to study in the Soviet Union in 1941. In 1945, he graduated from the Moscow State University with a degree in political economy and returned to Korea after liberation. He helped his brother purge the WPK from the South Korean Communist faction. He was elected a member of the WPK Central Committee in 1961. The highlight of his political career was the fact that Kim Il Sung delegated him to sign the North-South Joint Declaration on July 4, 1972. But, in 1974, when Kim Il Sung decided to make his son Kim Jong Il his heir apparent, Kim Yong-ju, who was regarded as a potential contender for the throne, all of a sudden disappeared for almost two decades. IV-18
Kim Sung-ae, who is Kim Il Sung’s second wife and Kim Jong Il’s hated step-mother, 14 is unlikely to resume her previously lost battle royale for the transfer of power to her eldest son and Kim Jong Il’s younger half-brother Kim Pyong Il, born in1953, let alone to her younger son and Kim Jong Il’s second half-brother Kim Yong Il, born in 1955. 15 Two daughters of Kim Song-Ae, who are Kim Jong Il’s half-sisters, and their respective children, have never been considered in contention for the supreme power mantle in Pyongyang. In specifics, the eldest daughter, Kim Sung-il (or Kyong-il), born in 1951, is married to a MOFA official, Kim Kwangsop, born in 1949, who served as the DPRK Ambassador in some African countries and Austria. The younger daughter, Kim Yong-ja, is married to a KPA general. Kim Jong Il’s eldest stepbrother, Kim Pyong Il, has been honorably exiled to serve as the DPRK Ambassador in various European countries, including Hungary, Finland, and Poland, since the early 1980s. Kim Pyong Il is not known to have legitimate male children. Besides, he has been overseas for so long that he has become so out of touch with the prevailing value system and power realities in Pyongyang that he can hardly mount any successful power transfer campaign of his own without mighty backing from some very influential force inside the DPRK power system. Everyone in the loop, however, knows that Kim Jong Il despises his half-brother and that “it is over between them for life.” Kim Jong Il’s youngest step-brother, Kim Yong-il, is rumored to have a serious drinking problem and has no official positions. It goes without saying that all extended family members are protected and watched over by the ballooning Secret Service (sometimes referred to as the MPAF Guards Command) whose ranks expanded from a few hundred at the time of the Great Leader’s death in 1994 to allegedly more than eight thousand a decade later. The Secret Service personnel – bodyguards, cleaning maids, cooks, technicians, chauffeurs, etc.- guard the Kims’ private residences, take them to 14 Kim Sung-ae, born in 1924, Kim Jong Il’s step-mother, had two sons and two daughters from Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung had lived with Kim Sung-Ae since 1952. They married in the summer of 1963. Kim Song-Ae’s power had been considerable between 1960 and 1973, when she was made the Chairwoman of the DPRK Democratic Women’s League. As a typical Korean step-mother, she treated her step-son rather badly, trying to do her best to disparage Kim Jong Il in the eyes of his father. She is rumored to have scolded him constantly, dressed him badly, and barely fed him. Kim Sung-Ae is rumored to have hated Kim Jong Il and had tried to position her own son, Kim Pyong Il, as Kim Il Sung’s successor. She encouraged the development of her own personality cult, by publishing books, giving “on-the-spot guidance” at public places and factories without Kim Il Sung, appearing on television next to the Great Leader and alone, greeting dignitaries, and trying to diminish the stature of Kim Jong Il’s deceased mother, Kim Jong Suk. In the early 1970s, Kim Jong Il vociferously protested to his father about the growing power of Kim Song-Ae and her brother, by arguing that there must not be different power centers and that all power must be centralized in the figure of his father Kim Il Sung. Kim Junior prevailed in 1973 when the Great Leader convened a conference of the WPK Secretaries and proposed the theory of unified Juch’e idea. Kim Song-Ae was finished and had to retreat back into the “women’s side of the house.” No wonder that at Kim Il Sung’s funeral, Kim Jong Il and his sister stood at the center of the podium, whereas Kim Song-ae was already located far away from the other members of the WPK Central Committee. 15 There is a disagreement among Korea observers over whether Kim Jong Il’s second step-brother’s name is Kim Yong Il or Kim Kyong Il. IV-19
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Nort
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES IDA
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CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & INTROD
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To write accurately about North Kor
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technocrats, provincial and county
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PREFACE This paper will examine in
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ABBREVIATIONS AGI CCSKA COMSEC DoD
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information streams, and from him t
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within the hands of a few individua
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and whether or not he will embarras
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to the lowest-levels of the KPA. As
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strengthening of all armed forces,
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esearch institutes and “think tan
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The primary missions of the Reconna
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communication that generally fall o
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of the State Security Department or
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maintaining strict control over the
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agencies in the ROK and Japan began
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The Guard and Security Commands, wh
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eports that are funneled up through
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Complicating the entire “Kim-cent
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Within the military, this dynamic c
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him that all significant orders and
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Until the 1990s, the electronic med
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II. THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP: SY
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TABLES 1. Key Family Members in the
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The factional struggles in North Ko
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A. INTRODUCTION By definition, a to
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C. THE TECHNOLOGY OF POWER A Party
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document control bureaus in each mi
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Originally implemented in 1994 and
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Table II-1. Key Family Members in t
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of associates who trace their relat
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September 9, 2003, showed a change
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Chart II-2: Secretariat 5. Kye Ung-
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Members 1. Yi Ul-sul 4. Yi Yong-mu
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Table II-6. Kim Chong-il’s Princi
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Table II-7. Kim Chong-il’s Person
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chance to unfold. In terms of syste
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domestic policy arena, the split is
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At the second echelon of power, Kim
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D. FLOW OF INFORMATION George Kenna
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about things that affect their care
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(ID) and External Liaison (ELD) dep
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For the rest of the North Korean le
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the focus for not only a significan
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At the 11 th Supreme People’s Ass
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There is little doubt that one of t
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decision-making process. Moreover,
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III. THE WELL-INFORMED CADRE RALPH
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY DEFINITIONS AND A
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greater access to first-hand inform
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The first question addressed by thi
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But this lack of enthusiasm is prob
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as the 1950s. 16 The security organ
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Another way to look at divisions wi
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Because the Kim regime governs acco
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guess is that anyone who rises in t
Page 132 and 133: But even though the media serve as
Page 134 and 135: Newspapers The DPRK’s premier new
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Page 138 and 139: Page 2: • Kim Jong-suk’s develo
Page 140 and 141: This selection of news items presen
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Page 146 and 147: also countries surrounding the Kore
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Page 152 and 153: eceived with little thought and has
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Page 156 and 157: cognitive dissonance, particular ca
Page 159: IV. INSIDE NORTH KOREA’S BLACK BO
Page 163 and 164: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The North Korean
Page 165 and 166: A. BETTER, MERRIER, MORE HOPEFUL LI
Page 167 and 168: In contrast, the optimists believe
Page 169 and 170: to the throne. The State Council us
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Page 175 and 176: Second, the principal objective of
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Page 181: also against the second-tier family
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Page 187 and 188: October 1980. Many of them (Yon Hyo
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Page 192 and 193: The advent of the “Songun Era”
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Page 196 and 197: Bearing in mind Kim Jong Il’s rec
Page 198 and 199: Table IV-2. Composition of the Nort
Page 200 and 201: Cabinet Posts 10 th SPA 11 th SPA R
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Page 204 and 205: Table IV-5. Leading Ideologues Insi
Page 206 and 207: Table IV-7. Regional Origins of Top
Page 208 and 209: “Foreign Wind” The “foreign w
Page 210 and 211: Table IV-10. Some of the Most Influ
Page 212 and 213: Table IV-11. The North-South “Han
Page 214 and 215: Song Sok Hwan Vice-Minister Cha Sun
Page 216 and 217: Table IV-13. Korean-American “Int
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Page 220 and 221: Northern security, military, and pa
Page 223: APPENDIX B TONGIL STREET FREE MARKE
Page 227: V. REACHING INTO NORTH KOREA DAVID
Page 231 and 232: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY North Korea is no
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message right to Kim Jong-il, and m
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isk escape from the hermit kingdom.
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Society is divided into three broad
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contradictions.” 17 This makes se
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Internet is not specifically mentio
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led to a training program for young
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North Korea’s exports from legiti
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een the biggest buyers of ivory ove
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worker who travels throughout North
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If we want to reach into North Kore
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conversations with the correct mix
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Although the future of cellular tel
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There are a host of other things on
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Each of the five papers in this col
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promotions) and punishments (e.g.,
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although presumably all calls are m
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cultural rules.” Given the “str
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Speaking of Kim, whom does he consu
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Terms of Reference: North Korean Po
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Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an intern
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APPENDIX C ASIAN VIEWS OF NORTH KOR
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In any case, the reforms provide a
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View from Seoul The single most imp
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