North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

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Because the Kim regime governs according to personal rather than organizational position, it is difficult to determine how much power people have without knowing their personal connections. Kim prefers to live and work outside of the limelight, and some of his closest aides keep out of the public eye as well. The analyst who studies North Korea must beware of a “window-dressing effect” whereby high ranking people (e.g., top generals) accompany Kim not because they have any real power, but because Kim believes that their presence confers legitimacy on his regime. Why else would these busy people follow Kim around and scribble notes of his passing thoughts? Kim seems to rely on a “kitchen cabinet” of trusted advisers, which presumably never convenes as a group but instead consists of individuals with whom Kim frequently consults and socializes. Most of the people believed to reside in this inner circle are of Kim’s generation; all are considered loyal to him and, under normal circumstances, would share his fate. Most hold positions of power in the military, party, and/or government. Some inner circle members are from Kim’s own family. Some are drinking buddies. A veritable cottage industry has grown up around speculation about the identity of these chosen few, and no two lists are the same. A recent report by the ROK’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) warns of the difficulty of identifying members of this group: Due to the closed nature of the society, information on the extent and make-up of Kim’s military inner circle is hard to obtain. Moreover, Kim’s self-righteous and impulsive leadership style makes it virtually impossible to make educated guesses about who might be among his favorites. The only thing one might conjecture with a degree of certainty is that the make-up of the inner circle can change at any time based on perceived loyalty to Kim. The report then goes on to list ten candidates for inclusion in Kim’s military inner circle. Other recent listings may be consulted as well. 26 26 “Kim Chong-il’s Inner Military Circle,” National Intelligence Service, August 17, 2003. FBIS KPP20030817000027. Kang Myong-to [a defector], “North Korea’s Power Men,” Chapter 5 in his Pyongyangun Mangmyongul Kkumggunda [Pyongyang Dreams of Exile/Defection], June 1, 1995, pp. 129-171. FBIS KPP20030831000019, and KPP20030528000012. Kwon Kyong-pok, “Who Are the People That Run North Korea with Real Power in Their Hands?” Chugan Choson, June 20, 2000, Internet version. FBIS KPP20000620000047. Chon Yong-u, “Kim Chong-il’s Men - Close ‘Power Elites’ Placed Everywhere,” Taehan Maeil, April 11, 2002, Internet version. FBIS KPP20020411000099. “National Defense Commission, Secretariat Have Kim Jong-il’s Ear in North Korea,” Yonhap, July 7, 2003, citing the ROK defense ministry’s biannual magazine. FBIS KPP20030707000066. An Yong-chol [a North Korean defector], “The Mystery of the Son’s Rivalry to Become Heir and Who is This No. 2 Man Kang Sang-chun - Kim Chong-il’s Group of Closest Confidants Wrapped in Veil of Secrecy,” Gendai, August 1, 2003, pp. 110-119. FBIS JPP20030710000005. Kim Kwang-il, “New Year’s Special: Ten Years of Kim Jong-il - Change of Close Aides,” Chosun ilbo, December 31, 2003, Internet version. FBIS KPP20031231000069. Bae Sung-in, “Recruitment Characteristics of Kim Jong-il’s Ruling Elite,” Vantage Point, Vol. 24, No. 1 (January 2001), pp. 44-53. Kenneth E. Gause, pp. 12-20. Kongdan Oh also compiled her own list in May 2003 (personal communication). III-10
How is power used to make policy decisions? 27 What is known about decision making in North Korea suggests that Kim does not go around dictating - at least not all of the time - although he is known to intervene in even the smallest of affairs if they come to his attention (for example, he may decide on where a particular high-level cadre should live or what kind of car he should drive). On important matters, Kim turns to his subordinates for policy suggestions, encouraging them to discuss and argue among themselves. These subordinates, presumably working within a single organization rather than communicating between organizations, then send their recommendations up to him to be evaluated in terms of what is good both for national and regime security. Once Kim makes a decision, it is official policy until he reviews it, and presumably no one can contest it. Two points are worth noting. First, Kim wants everyone to report up to him, not to each other. This is a prudent means to prevent the formation of factions. Early in his career, Kim began sending Three Revolution Team squads throughout the country to teach and to monitor what was going on. Over the years, Kim has developed an extensive reporting system that enables him to receive information from all sectors of society, without people in those sectors learning about what is happening in other sectors, but the exact nature of these channels is as difficult to discern as the nature of communication existing in, say, the U.S. government. Clearly, the North Korean intelligence services play an important role in this monitoring function. People are expected to report relevant information to Kim, and if he gets that information instead from another source, he becomes angry. The security services - MPS, SSD, and Security Command - have separate channels of upward communication, and in a sense are competitors who often spy on each other. 28 The people with the most power also may be the most carefully watched and the most completely isolated - the better to prevent them from plotting against Kim. A second important point is that because everyone’s personal security is dependent on pleasing - or at least not displeasing - Kim, self-censorship is a well-developed art. Psychological researchers in the United States have studied self-censorship and related “groupthink” phenomena in U.S. government and corporate policy making. 29 The groupthink effect is most powerful when the group knows - or believes it knows - the leader’s policy preferences. A good 27 Information on decision-making is fragmentary, because none of Kim’s close associates has defected. See Kenneth E. Gause, pp. 20-23. Also, Jinwook Choi. And Huh Moon-young, “The Foreign Policy Decision-Making Structure of the Kim Jong-il Regime,” Vantage Point, Vol. 22, No. 2 (February 1999), pp. 36-46. A few very enlightening paragraphs about Kim’s method of operation may be found in Choe Son-yong, “Why the Discrepancy between ROK, DPRK Joint Communiqué Regarding Military Authorities Talks,” Yonhap, April 8, 2002. FBIS KPP20020408000065. 28 Memoir by the defector Im Kyong-su, “The Inside of DPRK Ministry of Public Security: A Prison Empire of Corruption, Conspiracy, and Torture,” Wolgan Choson, June 1999, pp. 340-370. FBIS FTS19990614001666. 29 The original source is Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972. III-11
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Nort
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES IDA
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CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & INTROD
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To write accurately about North Kor
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technocrats, provincial and county
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PREFACE This paper will examine in
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ABBREVIATIONS AGI CCSKA COMSEC DoD
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information streams, and from him t
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within the hands of a few individua
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and whether or not he will embarras
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to the lowest-levels of the KPA. As
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strengthening of all armed forces,
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esearch institutes and “think tan
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The primary missions of the Reconna
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communication that generally fall o
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of the State Security Department or
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maintaining strict control over the
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agencies in the ROK and Japan began
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The Guard and Security Commands, wh
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eports that are funneled up through
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Complicating the entire “Kim-cent
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Within the military, this dynamic c
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him that all significant orders and
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Until the 1990s, the electronic med
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II. THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP: SY
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TABLES 1. Key Family Members in the
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The factional struggles in North Ko
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A. INTRODUCTION By definition, a to
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C. THE TECHNOLOGY OF POWER A Party
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document control bureaus in each mi
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Originally implemented in 1994 and
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Table II-1. Key Family Members in t
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Page 83 and 84: Members 1. Yi Ul-sul 4. Yi Yong-mu
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Page 89 and 90: chance to unfold. In terms of syste
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Page 95 and 96: D. FLOW OF INFORMATION George Kenna
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Page 101 and 102: For the rest of the North Korean le
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Page 105 and 106: At the 11 th Supreme People’s Ass
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Page 109 and 110: decision-making process. Moreover,
Page 111: III. THE WELL-INFORMED CADRE RALPH
Page 115 and 116: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY DEFINITIONS AND A
Page 117: greater access to first-hand inform
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Page 122 and 123: But this lack of enthusiasm is prob
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Page 126 and 127: Another way to look at divisions wi
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Page 132 and 133: But even though the media serve as
Page 134 and 135: Newspapers The DPRK’s premier new
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Page 140 and 141: This selection of news items presen
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Page 159: IV. INSIDE NORTH KOREA’S BLACK BO
Page 163 and 164: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The North Korean
Page 165 and 166: A. BETTER, MERRIER, MORE HOPEFUL LI
Page 167 and 168: In contrast, the optimists believe
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controlling some of North Korea’s
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also against the second-tier family
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Kim Sung-ae, who is Kim Il Sung’s
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“National Security Establishment
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October 1980. Many of them (Yon Hyo
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severe draught in 1988 and the dram
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The advent of the “Songun Era”
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IV-30
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Bearing in mind Kim Jong Il’s rec
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Table IV-2. Composition of the Nort
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Cabinet Posts 10 th SPA 11 th SPA R
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Eastern Europe. That was reportedly
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Table IV-5. Leading Ideologues Insi
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Table IV-7. Regional Origins of Top
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“Foreign Wind” The “foreign w
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Table IV-10. Some of the Most Influ
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Table IV-11. The North-South “Han
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Song Sok Hwan Vice-Minister Cha Sun
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Table IV-13. Korean-American “Int
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content and government monitoring.
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Northern security, military, and pa
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APPENDIX B TONGIL STREET FREE MARKE
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V. REACHING INTO NORTH KOREA DAVID
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY North Korea is no
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message right to Kim Jong-il, and m
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isk escape from the hermit kingdom.
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Society is divided into three broad
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contradictions.” 17 This makes se
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Internet is not specifically mentio
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led to a training program for young
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North Korea’s exports from legiti
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een the biggest buyers of ivory ove
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worker who travels throughout North
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If we want to reach into North Kore
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conversations with the correct mix
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Although the future of cellular tel
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There are a host of other things on
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Each of the five papers in this col
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promotions) and punishments (e.g.,
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although presumably all calls are m
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cultural rules.” Given the “str
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Speaking of Kim, whom does he consu
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Terms of Reference: North Korean Po
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Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an intern
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APPENDIX C ASIAN VIEWS OF NORTH KOR
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In any case, the reforms provide a
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View from Seoul The single most imp
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