North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center
North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center
North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center
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agencies in the ROK and Japan began to notice the use of commercial encryption software and<br />
Internet email services by CCSKA agents operating in their countries. The websites of the U.S.<br />
Department of <strong>Defense</strong> are heavily visited by users from the DPRK. The Internet also has<br />
provided a means to quickly and easily disseminate propaganda and engage in disinformation<br />
campaigns. The internet, along with foreign broadcasts, appears to be a major source of<br />
information for the CCSKA.<br />
Central Committee members who hold the rank of department director or above and a<br />
limited number of other KWP officials receive the regularly published classified bulletin<br />
“Reference <strong>Information</strong>.” It contains translations of foreign news items with an emphasis on<br />
news from the ROK, Japan, and the U.S. The information is presented in much the same manner<br />
as Foreign Broadcast <strong>Information</strong> Service (FBIS) reports - uncensored and without commentary.<br />
It is unclear if distribution extends outside the KWP; however, members of the National <strong>Defense</strong><br />
Commission undoubtedly have access to it and similar products from other agencies. 27<br />
The information channel subordinate to the National <strong>Defense</strong> Commission consists of<br />
three sub-channels: the General Political Bureau, the State Security Department, and the Ministry<br />
of People’s Armed Forces.<br />
As noted above, the General Political Bureau is primarily concerned with internal<br />
security within the KPA. While institutionally subordinate to the National <strong>Defense</strong> Commission,<br />
it is controlled by the KWP. Although the majority of its reports apparently proceed up through<br />
the KWP channel, some may bypass this and go directly to members of the National <strong>Defense</strong><br />
Commission or Kim Chong-il.<br />
The State Security Department functions both as an intelligence agency engaged in active<br />
operations overseas and a domestic political security force (i.e., secret police). It is most<br />
comparable in function to the former Soviet KGB. It controls both the MPAF’s Guard Command<br />
and Security Command. The information it collects and the reports and briefings it produces<br />
cover the entire spectrum. For internal missions, the State Security Department and the Guard<br />
Command are the agencies most directly responsible for the security of Kim Chong-il. In this<br />
role, the State Security Department collects information on possible threats to Kim Chong-il and<br />
the political reliability of members of the military and power-holding elite. Its counterespionage<br />
and counterintelligence missions allow it collect additional information on anyone within the<br />
DPRK, including foreign residents. Depending upon its nature, the information and intelligence<br />
27<br />
It is unclear whether the “Reference <strong>Information</strong>” publication noted here still exists as such. It is, however,<br />
probable that there are a series of products similar to FBIS available to the military and power-holding elite<br />
today. “<strong>North</strong> <strong>Korean</strong> Defectors 27 July News Conference,” pp. 3-4.<br />
I-20