North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

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eports that are funneled up through the MPAF to the National Defense Commission and Kim Chong-il. The bureau’s best-known “think tanks” are the Research Institute for Military Sciences and the Strategy Research Institute. These institutes are known to have conducted extensive historical research not only on World War II and the Fatherland Liberation War (i.e., Korean War), but also more significantly on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iran-Iraq War, Operation DESERT STORM, Operation ALLIED FORCE; Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (see below), etc. Additionally, they have conducted an intensive study of the process by which the Nationale Volksarmee (armed forces of the former German Democratic Republic) was dissolved and merged into the Bundeswehr (armed forces of the German Federal Republic). These institutes also conduct research into the development of new weapons (especially ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and precision-guided munitions) by other nations. 30 Information developed within the Military Training Bureau is then used to instruct the KPA and is the foundation for developing new tactics and doctrines. The information channel subordinate to the Cabinet consists of two sub-channels: the Ministry of Public Security and the Foreign Ministry. The Ministry of Public Security functions primarily as the national police and civil defense force for the DPRK. This Ministry plays an important role in preventing the general public from accessing foreign broadcasts and printed media. Like the State Security Department, it also is responsible for conducting political surveillance; however, political suspects are remanded to the State Security Department. In this role, the MPS prepares reports and briefings concerning internal security, civil preparedness, etc. These reports and briefings flow up to the Cabinet and possibly on to Kim Chong-il. The Ministry’s Public Security Bureau is believed to possess a small SIGINT capability. The level of computerization within the Public Security and Prison Bureaus is believed to be moderate. The Foreign Ministry is the DPRK’s principal means by which it presents itself to the world. It also serves as an important asset by which it collects information on foreign nations. Diplomatic personnel stationed around the world are required to submit regular reports concerning their activities and political, cultural, and military developments within their host nations. These reports serve as a check against those produced by the KWP and the State Security Department. Reports from important nations (e.g., Russia, China, U.S.) are routed through the Foreign Ministry to both the National Defense Commission and Kim Chong-il. 30 Author interview data; “Lessons for DPRK From NATO Bombing of Yugoslavia,” Nodong Sinmun, 20 April 1999, p. 1; “DPRK’s Keen Interest in New Weapons Used in Yugoslavia,” Yonhap, 13 May 1999; “DPRK Military Studies Merging of East, West German Armies,” Choson Ilbo, 25 April 1997, p. 2, as cited in FBIS- EAS-97-115; and “Journal Views DPRK’s Military Organization,” pp. 30-31. I-24
A distinct aspect of diplomatic communications through the Foreign Ministry is that they are excruciatingly slow in all countries with the possible exceptions of China and Russia. This results from two factors. First, DPRK diplomats are briefed only on a limited number of subjects and are not allowed to negotiate or communicate freely within their host nations. So, if a DPRK delegation to a conference encounters a situation on which it has not been briefed, it must refer back to P’yongyang for guidance. Second, due to a variety or reasons - including paranoia and lack of technological capabilities - DPRK embassies, missions, and legations have a very limited means to securely and rapidly communicate back to P’yongyang. Therefore, important negotiations require that couriers hand-deliver messages between delegations and P’yongyang. Since events proceed so quickly in the world today, a message sent through official diplomatic channels based upon specific circumstances might be completely superceded by new events by the time it arrives and is processed in P’yongyang. During diplomatic exchanges of a critical nature to the DPRK, it is not unusual for Kim Chong-il to order the diplomat most closely associated with the exchange back to P’yongyang to brief him personally. Probably one of the most disconcerting aspects of DPRK diplomatic communications for foreigners is the distortion or misinterpretation of these communications caused by the manner in which it is processed within the DPRK (see below). It is not unusual for the DPRK to issue a communication to a foreign government believing - quite often incorrectly - that it will be received and interpreted in a certain manner. It is received by the foreign government, but interpreted and responded to in a manner entirely at variance with the DPRK’s intention. The message from the foreign government is then received back in P’yongyang where it is processed and interpreted based on their originally flawed expectations and entirely at variance with the foreign nation’s intention. This cycle then repeats itself, often spiraling out of control. While the entire information flow process described in this section is essentially a “push” system, during periods of crisis Kim Chong-il or the National Defense Commission frequently issues critical requests for information from all branches of the KWP, MPAF, and intelligence services - a “pull” system. Defectors report that during the 1994 nuclear crisis, which was eventually resolved by the signing of the Agreed Framework, all branches of the government were placed on emergency alert and directed to collect information regarding the possibility of a U.S. attack, the likelihood and degree of Chinese assistance should the U.S. attack, and China’s stance concerning the nuclear crisis. Similar emergency requests for the collection of information have been reported during subsequent periods of perceived threat. 31 31 “DPRK Defectors’ News Conference Reviewed,” Sisa Journal, August 11, 1994, pp 6-10, as cited in FBIS; and “Articles by Defector Kang Myong-to Reported,” p. 3. I-25
Page 1 and 2: INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Nort
Page 3: INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES IDA
Page 7: CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & INTROD
Page 11 and 12: To write accurately about North Kor
Page 13: technocrats, provincial and county
Page 17: PREFACE This paper will examine in
Page 21: ABBREVIATIONS AGI CCSKA COMSEC DoD
Page 24 and 25: information streams, and from him t
Page 26 and 27: within the hands of a few individua
Page 28 and 29: and whether or not he will embarras
Page 30 and 31: to the lowest-levels of the KPA. As
Page 32 and 33: strengthening of all armed forces,
Page 34 and 35: esearch institutes and “think tan
Page 36 and 37: The primary missions of the Reconna
Page 38 and 39: communication that generally fall o
Page 40 and 41: of the State Security Department or
Page 42 and 43: maintaining strict control over the
Page 44 and 45: agencies in the ROK and Japan began
Page 46 and 47: The Guard and Security Commands, wh
Page 50 and 51: Complicating the entire “Kim-cent
Page 52 and 53: Within the military, this dynamic c
Page 54 and 55: him that all significant orders and
Page 56 and 57: Until the 1990s, the electronic med
Page 59: II. THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP: SY
Page 62 and 63: TABLES 1. Key Family Members in the
Page 64 and 65: The factional struggles in North Ko
Page 67 and 68: A. INTRODUCTION By definition, a to
Page 69 and 70: C. THE TECHNOLOGY OF POWER A Party
Page 71 and 72: document control bureaus in each mi
Page 73 and 74: Originally implemented in 1994 and
Page 75 and 76: Table II-1. Key Family Members in t
Page 77 and 78: of associates who trace their relat
Page 79 and 80: September 9, 2003, showed a change
Page 81 and 82: Chart II-2: Secretariat 5. Kye Ung-
Page 83 and 84: Members 1. Yi Ul-sul 4. Yi Yong-mu
Page 85 and 86: Table II-6. Kim Chong-il’s Princi
Page 87 and 88: Table II-7. Kim Chong-il’s Person
Page 89 and 90: chance to unfold. In terms of syste
Page 91 and 92: domestic policy arena, the split is
Page 93 and 94: At the second echelon of power, Kim
Page 95 and 96: D. FLOW OF INFORMATION George Kenna
Page 97 and 98: about things that affect their care
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(ID) and External Liaison (ELD) dep
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For the rest of the North Korean le
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the focus for not only a significan
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At the 11 th Supreme People’s Ass
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There is little doubt that one of t
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decision-making process. Moreover,
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III. THE WELL-INFORMED CADRE RALPH
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY DEFINITIONS AND A
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greater access to first-hand inform
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The first question addressed by thi
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But this lack of enthusiasm is prob
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as the 1950s. 16 The security organ
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Another way to look at divisions wi
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Because the Kim regime governs acco
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guess is that anyone who rises in t
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But even though the media serve as
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Newspapers The DPRK’s premier new
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motivation in its readers through m
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Page 2: • Kim Jong-suk’s develo
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This selection of news items presen
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in the wake of the U.S. propaganda
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the general audience in a two-step
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also countries surrounding the Kore
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that the war in Iraq was “a test
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and transform us internally through
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eceived with little thought and has
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outside world than the ordinary wor
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cognitive dissonance, particular ca
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IV. INSIDE NORTH KOREA’S BLACK BO
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The North Korean
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A. BETTER, MERRIER, MORE HOPEFUL LI
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In contrast, the optimists believe
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to the throne. The State Council us
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1976-1977, 4 and in 1986-1987 (see
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Bulgarian Trade Unions, after which
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Second, the principal objective of
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southward expansion, and, last but
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controlling some of North Korea’s
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also against the second-tier family
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Kim Sung-ae, who is Kim Il Sung’s
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“National Security Establishment
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October 1980. Many of them (Yon Hyo
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severe draught in 1988 and the dram
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The advent of the “Songun Era”
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IV-30
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Bearing in mind Kim Jong Il’s rec
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Table IV-2. Composition of the Nort
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Cabinet Posts 10 th SPA 11 th SPA R
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Eastern Europe. That was reportedly
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Table IV-5. Leading Ideologues Insi
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Table IV-7. Regional Origins of Top
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“Foreign Wind” The “foreign w
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Table IV-10. Some of the Most Influ
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Table IV-11. The North-South “Han
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Song Sok Hwan Vice-Minister Cha Sun
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Table IV-13. Korean-American “Int
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content and government monitoring.
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Northern security, military, and pa
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APPENDIX B TONGIL STREET FREE MARKE
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V. REACHING INTO NORTH KOREA DAVID
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY North Korea is no
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message right to Kim Jong-il, and m
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isk escape from the hermit kingdom.
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Society is divided into three broad
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contradictions.” 17 This makes se
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Internet is not specifically mentio
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led to a training program for young
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North Korea’s exports from legiti
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een the biggest buyers of ivory ove
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worker who travels throughout North
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If we want to reach into North Kore
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conversations with the correct mix
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Although the future of cellular tel
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There are a host of other things on
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Each of the five papers in this col
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promotions) and punishments (e.g.,
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although presumably all calls are m
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cultural rules.” Given the “str
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Speaking of Kim, whom does he consu
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Terms of Reference: North Korean Po
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Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an intern
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APPENDIX C ASIAN VIEWS OF NORTH KOR
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In any case, the reforms provide a
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View from Seoul The single most imp
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