North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center
North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center
North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center
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“Technocrats”<br />
The “technocrats,” who tend to have technical backgrounds and who have been exposed<br />
to overseas policy innovations, are traditionally located within the central economic apparatus,<br />
including the Cabinet of Ministers and various central economic ministries, agencies, and<br />
commissions loaded with younger economists. Some of the “chiefs” among technocrats may be<br />
conservative, but most of the “indians” tend to be rather pragmatic and progressive in their<br />
policy views. The “technocrats” also aggregate the views of the new entrepreneurs and corporate<br />
elites, especially the former “red directorate” from about a hundred of the most important<br />
industrial combines and commercial enterprises that constitute the backbone of the DPRK’s<br />
industry, agriculture, and service sector, including banking, construction, and commerce. Table 3<br />
lists the key representatives of the “technocrat” establishment in <strong>North</strong> Korea.<br />
Table IV-3. <strong>North</strong> Korea’s “Technocrats” within the Cabinet of Ministers<br />
Cabinet Posts 10 th SPA 11 th SPA<br />
Premier Hong Song-nam Pak Pong-ju<br />
Vice Premier Cho Ch’ang-dok Kwak Pom-gi<br />
Vice Premier Kwak Pom-gi No Tu-ch’ol<br />
Vice Premier Sin Il-nam Chon Sung-hun<br />
State Planning 41 Pak Nam-gi 42 Kim Kwang-Rin<br />
Electric & Coal Industry 43 O Kwang-hung Chu Tong-il<br />
Mining Industries Son Chong-ho Yi Kwang-nam<br />
Metal Machine Industry Chon Sung-hun 44 Kim Sung-hyon<br />
Electronic Industries<br />
O Su-yong<br />
Construction Materials<br />
Industry<br />
Cho Yun-hui<br />
Cho Yun-hui<br />
41 For instance, in an interview with the “People’s Korea” on April 1, 2003, Choi Hong-kyu, a reformist bureau chief<br />
under the State Planning Commission, discussed the efforts of his bureau to develop an indicative “three-year plan<br />
to solve fuel and energy problems.” If that plan were to succeed in its desired goals, it would open a way for the<br />
resumption of longer-term economic planning of broader economic and social developments in the country.<br />
42 Prior to that, Pak Nam-gi served as the Chairman of the Administrative Committee of Pyongyang City.<br />
43 In 2003, the General Bureau of Coal Industry (referred to as GBCI) under the Ministry of Electric and Coal<br />
Industry implemented a major industry-wide restructuring, including a massive raise in miners’ wages on average<br />
up to 15,000 Won per month, expansion of an individual progressive contract work system, and development of<br />
230 quasi-privatized small and mid-sized mines. It also supervised the restructuring and normalization of mine<br />
output at the large-scale Bukchang and Deokcheon Coal Mining Enterprises and Ranam Coal Mining Union<br />
Enterprise. In sum, due to the GBCI-led restructuring in the mining sector, coal output was reportedly increased<br />
by 257,000 tons in 2003 as compared to 2002, which partially alleviated the shortage of energy resources<br />
exacerbated by the KEDO cutoff of the HFO deliveries to the DPRK in December 2002.<br />
44 Minister Chon Sung-hun led an expert-level ministerial delegation to Russia and China to study the experience of<br />
industry-wide restructuring in the Russian and Chinese machine-building sectors during the market transition and<br />
explore ways to resume inter-industry cooperation between the DPRK’s leading machine-building enterprises,<br />
especially the Ryongsong Machine-building Complex and Huichon Machine-building Combine, and their<br />
traditional Russian and Chinese counterparts in July 2003.<br />
IV-35