North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

In contrast, the optimists believe that the recent upturn in the economy is the longawaited
result of the socio-economic reforms initiated by Kim Jong Il in the late 1990s. It proves
that the current regime can change for the better and has the political will and the organizational
capacity to steer the country out of its prolonged economic depression and social malaise into a
brighter, more civilized future.
But, some pessimistic critics credit most of the recent surge in the economic activity to
the burgeoning inter-Korean trade. They argue that North Korean nuclear blackmail finally
began to pay off after Pyongyang was able to drive a deep wedge in the U.S.-ROK alliance and
compel Seoul to expand its one-way transfer of resources from the South to the North amidst the
escalating nuclear crisis, despite the U.S.-sponsored international campaign to isolate the
communist regime.
Whatever the origins of domestic social and economic changes unfolding in North Korea
– superficial cosmetics, developmental cycles, government policy adjustments, or stimulus from
the external environment – everyone is affected positively or negatively by its predictable and
unintended consequences, including the elite, the bureaucracy, and the masses. Individuals are
forced to make new personal choices, affecting the group dynamics and generating a new public
context for combined social action. Emerging social chaos undermines the traditional value
system, the rigid ruling ideology, divine personality cults, and previously rock-solid power
hierarchies: they lose legitimacy, credibility, and mass appeal, and become fluid, porous,
malleable, and transient. Incumbent gods and demi-gods enter the twilight zone as the rising
leaders of the future prepare to challenge their rule.
How do various groups inside the “black box” of the Juch’e elite cope with the ongoing
structural transformation of North Korean society? What are their long-term individual and
group interests and corporate objectives, as well as short-term preferences, fears, and
expectations, and how can one shape them? How do they communicate their specific policy
preferences to the top and include them in the government policy planning process? How do they
resolve emerging conflicts of interests and priorities? Is there an “iron curtain” between the
supreme leader and those who attempt to communicate policy matters to him? Who gets ahead in
the inter-bureaucratic rivalries, and why, and how can one benefit from the emerging clashes of
divergent bureaucratic interests and differences of organizational outputs? What forces shape the
transition by determining the pace, directions, and specific advances, and who controls what in
that process, including the veto power over what? What are the productive pressure points, where
one can exploit various sensitivities and vulnerabilities of the North Korean elites? These
questions constitute the subject matter of this study.
IV-3