North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

But this lack of enthusiasm is probably not a result of any objection to the policies per se, but
rather an indication that the functionaries do not believe their best interests lie in energetically
implementing the policies.
Some evidence exists that Kim might face policy constraints. He himself has claimed that
on some issues, the military has its own opinion. In a meeting with visiting South Korean media
executives, Kim explained that opening a direct flight route between Pyongyang and Seoul was
“no problem at the government level, but it is a problem at the military level. I need to speak
with the military in order for direct flight routes to be opened.” 12 This sounds a bit like a good-
Kim/bad-military routine played out for the benefit of foreigners, but in any case, such flights
have only occasionally been realized. When the media executives raised the issue of the harsh
anti-South Korean tone of the KWP’s charter, Kim said that he would “find it difficult to revise
the platform” because some of the top party officials who had worked with his father would have
to resign, and that would make it look like Kim was purging them! Regarding the armed clash
between North and South Korean patrol boats in 1999, Kim told South Korean delegates at the
2000 June summit that the sailors initiated the attack “without instructions from authorities.” 13
And he informed visiting Prime Minister Koizumi that a recent armed spy boat intrusion into
Japanese waters, and the abductions in the 1970s of Japanese citizens, were conducted without
his knowledge by “radical elements” of North Korea’s spy organizations. 14 If these denials are
true, they suggest that Kim is not always completely in control of the military, but these
examples do not indicate any serious opposition to his authority.
The most convincing evidence that Kim has almost complete power is that the rule of the
Kim dynasty has not been seriously contested since the 1950s. In good times and in bad, Kim
Jong-il’s position appears secure. The people suffer, the economy atrophies, and the military
makes do with less, but Kim sticks to failed policies. If anyone else has power, why haven’t they
tried to use it?
If power in North Korea is largely in the hands of Kim and a few associates, what can be
assumed about how knowledge about the outside world is distributed? We know that Kim, with
his multiple satellite television channels and 24/7 Internet access, is highly knowledgeable about
to be a line that separates functionaries’ devotion from cowardice. Such a way of doing things as putting on an air
of importance and doing nothing but sitting in the office has nothing to do with today’s realities.” Kim Chin-kuk,
“Initiative, Creativity, and Dedication,” Nodong Sinmun, February 23, 2001, p. 2. FBIS KPP20010315000007.
12 Yonhap News Agency of August 13, 2000. FBIS KPP20000813000044.
13 Yonhap, July 4, 2000. FBIS KPP20000704000022.
14 For example, NHK Television, September 17, 2002. FBIS JPP20020917000132. Also, Koichi Kosuge, “Japanese
Abducted So They Could Teach Language to Spies,” Asahi Shimbun, September 19, 2002. FBIS
JPP20020919000045.
III-4