North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

interests? Do factions, to the extent that they exist, have a corrosive effect on the leadership? Are
these factions struggling for power or influence? What sources of information are available to the
elite that could have an impact on their political leanings? Finally, what factors affect the lens
through which the leadership receives, assimilates, and interprets information, both internal and
external?
B. SYSTEM DYNAMICS
The generally held view of North Korea as a totalitarian state, characterized by an allpowerful
leader, a unitary ideology, and a subservient ruling apparatus, fails to capture the
idiosyncrasy of the system. Since its inception, the North Korean regime has contained strains of
indirection and informal channels of authority, which at the same time support and weaken the
formal rule of law.
The idiosyncratic nature of the system is best understood in terms of channels of power
and authority. From its inception in 1945, the North Korean regime has undergone numerous
reconfigurations of power. It has been subject to hidden outside influence, intense factionalism,
one-man dictatorship, two-man dictatorship, and quasi-wartime machinations which blur the
lines between authority and dependence. Each period in North Korean history has left its residue
on the system. It has created a body of precedents that the leadership can use either to
consolidate power or guard against resurfacing again. With the exception of a limited time
around the period of the 1972 constitution, this power has lacked a true formal structure
governed by rules that outline the relationship between bureaucracies and define the nature of the
leadership.
In order to understand the Kim Chong-il regime, it is critical to realize that it is a product
of North Korean political history. It is critical to also understand that it is very different from the
Kim Il-sung regime. Whereas Kim Il-sung ruled through charisma and by virtue of his
credentials as a revolutionary leader, Kim Chong-il has no such legitimacy and relies on fear and
secrecy. He is an insider who has been groomed from a very young age to operate within the
Byzantine architecture of the North Korean regime, with all its intrigues and political challenges.
As a result, he prefers informality and compartmentalization when dealing with the leadership.
Formal channels are often ignored — a practice in sharp contrast to the way Kim Il-sung ran the
regime.
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