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North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

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maintaining strict control over the KPA. The belief is that if major units were allowed to<br />

communicate horizontally, they could unite and possibly stage a coup.<br />

The flow of information moves through a convoluted, almost Byzantine at times, series<br />

of paths controlled by different organizations with diverse agendas and priorities, in a manner<br />

that is quite frequently redundant and inefficient. As information flows upward toward the<br />

military and power-holding elites, it is processed through organizational, political, and cultural<br />

dynamics that distort and misrepresent its nature and reality.<br />

The internal dynamics of the various intelligence and internal security agencies are such<br />

that the agencies are in competition with one another and do not readily share information.<br />

Therefore, each only possesses a “piece of the puzzle” from which to produce reports or<br />

briefings that are presented to the senior leadership. This has often resulted in the duplication of<br />

effort and a waste of precious resources, with operations frequently displaying overlapping and<br />

sometimes conflicting areas of responsibilities. Additionally, there appears to be a political<br />

competition among these agencies to accomplish “feats” in their anti-ROK operations in order to<br />

celebrate important domestic events (e.g., the anniversary of the KWP) or to ingratiate<br />

themselves with Kim Il-song or Kim Chong-il. 25 This situation has arisen because of the manner<br />

in which the intelligence and internal security organizations have evolved over the past fifty<br />

years and the fact that Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il employ the various organizations as a<br />

means of preventing any person or faction from becoming too powerful and threatening their<br />

control.<br />

Viewed in its most simplified form, information flows towards Kim Chong-il through<br />

three principal channels: KWP, the National <strong>Defense</strong> Commission, and the Cabinet. Each<br />

provides a distinctively tailored, often redundant and competitive conduit of processed<br />

information. At the uppermost levels, members of the military and power-holding elite unevenly<br />

overlay these channels.<br />

Within the KWP, internal raw information is gathered from party members and<br />

organizations placed throughout the nation and the government and within the military. It is<br />

forwarded upwards through a dizzying array of departments and bureaus, where it is processed<br />

and refined within stringent guidelines established by the Central Committee. The Central<br />

Military Committee and Organization and Guidance Department are the most powerful entities<br />

within the KWP. Along with the National <strong>Defense</strong> Commission’s General Political Bureau, these<br />

organizations form a triumvirate within the KWP. As the semi-processed information enters<br />

25<br />

Author interview data; and Chon, Shi-yong, “Security Agency Suspects <strong>North</strong> Korea Plotting Terrorism to Strain<br />

Ties,” Korea Herald, July 10, 1998.<br />

I-18

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