North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

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content and government monitoring. Third, there is less elite unity when economic stimulus supplants party loyalty in motivating human behavior, when factionalism and interest group politics re-emerge, and power rivalries, often fuelled by external sources of revenue, intensify with a vengeance. Fourth, there is much less ideology left when the unified Juch’e idea becomes simply what Kim Jong Il says it is, when faith in the infallibility of the semi-divine Dear Leader is broken and cults of personality are disparaged, when traditional religions are revived, and a hope of a new beginning beyond the old Gods begins to glimmer on the horizon. Kim Jong Il took his country on a path of catch-up modernization and national reconciliation with the South, which can be either complimentary or potentially fraught with many contradictions, difficulties, and dangers. The biggest challenge for him is to preserve his personal power and safeguard the throne for his successors, while reforming his country and engaging the South. All signs indicate that Kim Jong Il welcomes creeping privatization of public property by the principal state authorities, including the leaders of the armed forces and security services, senior party functionaries, and the “red directorate.” If such socio-economic transition in a partially de-industrialized, re-ruralized, extremely atomized, and semi-feudal North Korean society were to proceed without civil strife, one may expect the formation of privatized chaebollike economic conglomerates on the ruins of the North Korean socialist economic edifice with substantial government stakes in flagship industries. With time, the latter may well be able to attract South Korean investment in the cheap labor-based export-oriented sectors, which could form the growth poles for the long-term recovery of the North Korean economy. Such gradual economic reforms are unlikely to bring prosperity to the DPRK’s working classes, but they may bring about a more decent life, at least by removing the daily threat of starvation. If in the process of change the absolute power of the Kim monarchy is to be eroded or curtailed, Kim Jong Il is unlikely to halt the process as long as his dynastic rule is assured of continuing survival. In 15 to 20 years from now, Kim Jong Il’s heir (who is being considered for nomination now) is likely to inherit a very different country, possibly embarked on the military governmentsponsored capitalist development road and engulfed in close economic ties with the Republic of Korea. Far from being a bona fide democracy, a post-Kim Jong Il North Korea may well develop into a constitutional monarchy more acceptable to the international community. If dynastic survival is the paramount strategic goal of the Kim family, then nothing can offer the Dear Leader a better model of dynastic perseverance in the face of tremendous adversity than the Chrysanthemum dynasty in Japan, which survived the U.S. nuclear IV-54
ombardment and military occupation in the 1940s and remains one of the symbols of Japanese national power and unity today. It is no wonder that despite traditional Korean-Japanese animosity, Kim Il Sung is said to have advised Kim Jong Il repeatedly to step back from the domestic political arena and economic policy-making and leave both to the party and government officials, while concentrating his energy on cultivating national military power, advancing the international interests of the DPRK, and acting as a symbol of national unity, sovereignty, and dignity before the North Korean people and the world. If Kim Jong Il succeeds in redefining and re-legitimizing the constitutional space for his absolute monarchy through bold constitutional compromises, and insulates it from political and economic processes pressuring the North Korean society from inside and outside through radical administrative reforms without undermining its charismatic legitimacy, then he may be able to extend its life for generations to come. The wild card is the set of pressures and incentives presented by the international community in the years to come and the possible reaction of the North Korean national security establishment to these changing external circumstances. If the continuous survival of the Kim Jong Il clan eventually becomes an obstacle and a serious threat to the preservation of the DPRK’s national sovereignty and independence for whatever reason (for instance, the threat of the use of force against the regime is substantiated and becomes a “clear and present danger,” or the increased possibility of Kim Jong Il’s “sell-out” with a “golden parachute” by striking a behind-the-scenes deal on reunification with the ROK leaders, or the uncontrolled escalation of internal civil and political strife fuelled by foreign penetration), then one cannot exclude the possibility that the national security establishment, the primary guarantors and main beneficiaries of the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the DPRK, may orchestrate a swift palace coup against or another car crash accident involving Kim Jong Il and his clan. They witnessed what the Gorbachev reforms did to the old Soviet Union, which is no more. They observed the chaos and destruction that took place under the liberal democratic Yeltsin regime in the new Russia. Neither alternative is acceptable to them. But, the rise of previously unknown foreign intelligence operative Putin from the bowels of the former Russian KGB monster to unexpectedly take over the helm of the sinking Russian Titanic as a result of the “Grey Colonels coup” inside the Kremlin, and his imposition on Russian chaos of a nationalistic militaristic bureaucratic regime, spear-heading the state-capitalist development and restoring Russia’s great power status may well appeal to their imagination. In order to preserve the national sovereignty against the looming threat of the South-led absorption and abolition of the North Korean state, fraught with the likely decapitation of the IV-55
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Nort
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES IDA
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CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & INTROD
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To write accurately about North Kor
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technocrats, provincial and county
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PREFACE This paper will examine in
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ABBREVIATIONS AGI CCSKA COMSEC DoD
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information streams, and from him t
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within the hands of a few individua
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and whether or not he will embarras
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to the lowest-levels of the KPA. As
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strengthening of all armed forces,
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esearch institutes and “think tan
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The primary missions of the Reconna
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communication that generally fall o
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of the State Security Department or
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maintaining strict control over the
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agencies in the ROK and Japan began
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The Guard and Security Commands, wh
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eports that are funneled up through
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Complicating the entire “Kim-cent
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Within the military, this dynamic c
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him that all significant orders and
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Until the 1990s, the electronic med
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II. THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP: SY
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TABLES 1. Key Family Members in the
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The factional struggles in North Ko
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A. INTRODUCTION By definition, a to
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C. THE TECHNOLOGY OF POWER A Party
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document control bureaus in each mi
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Originally implemented in 1994 and
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Table II-1. Key Family Members in t
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of associates who trace their relat
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September 9, 2003, showed a change
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Chart II-2: Secretariat 5. Kye Ung-
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Members 1. Yi Ul-sul 4. Yi Yong-mu
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Table II-6. Kim Chong-il’s Princi
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Table II-7. Kim Chong-il’s Person
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chance to unfold. In terms of syste
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domestic policy arena, the split is
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At the second echelon of power, Kim
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D. FLOW OF INFORMATION George Kenna
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about things that affect their care
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(ID) and External Liaison (ELD) dep
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For the rest of the North Korean le
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the focus for not only a significan
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At the 11 th Supreme People’s Ass
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There is little doubt that one of t
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decision-making process. Moreover,
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III. THE WELL-INFORMED CADRE RALPH
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY DEFINITIONS AND A
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greater access to first-hand inform
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The first question addressed by thi
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But this lack of enthusiasm is prob
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as the 1950s. 16 The security organ
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Another way to look at divisions wi
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Because the Kim regime governs acco
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guess is that anyone who rises in t
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But even though the media serve as
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Newspapers The DPRK’s premier new
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motivation in its readers through m
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Page 2: • Kim Jong-suk’s develo
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This selection of news items presen
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in the wake of the U.S. propaganda
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the general audience in a two-step
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also countries surrounding the Kore
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that the war in Iraq was “a test
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and transform us internally through
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eceived with little thought and has
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outside world than the ordinary wor
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cognitive dissonance, particular ca
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IV. INSIDE NORTH KOREA’S BLACK BO
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The North Korean
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A. BETTER, MERRIER, MORE HOPEFUL LI
Page 167 and 168: In contrast, the optimists believe
Page 169 and 170: to the throne. The State Council us
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Page 175 and 176: Second, the principal objective of
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Page 181 and 182: also against the second-tier family
Page 183 and 184: Kim Sung-ae, who is Kim Il Sung’s
Page 185 and 186: “National Security Establishment
Page 187 and 188: October 1980. Many of them (Yon Hyo
Page 189 and 190: severe draught in 1988 and the dram
Page 192 and 193: The advent of the “Songun Era”
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Page 196 and 197: Bearing in mind Kim Jong Il’s rec
Page 198 and 199: Table IV-2. Composition of the Nort
Page 200 and 201: Cabinet Posts 10 th SPA 11 th SPA R
Page 202 and 203: Eastern Europe. That was reportedly
Page 204 and 205: Table IV-5. Leading Ideologues Insi
Page 206 and 207: Table IV-7. Regional Origins of Top
Page 208 and 209: “Foreign Wind” The “foreign w
Page 210 and 211: Table IV-10. Some of the Most Influ
Page 212 and 213: Table IV-11. The North-South “Han
Page 214 and 215: Song Sok Hwan Vice-Minister Cha Sun
Page 216 and 217: Table IV-13. Korean-American “Int
Page 220 and 221: Northern security, military, and pa
Page 223: APPENDIX B TONGIL STREET FREE MARKE
Page 227: V. REACHING INTO NORTH KOREA DAVID
Page 231 and 232: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY North Korea is no
Page 233: message right to Kim Jong-il, and m
Page 236 and 237: isk escape from the hermit kingdom.
Page 238 and 239: Society is divided into three broad
Page 240 and 241: contradictions.” 17 This makes se
Page 242 and 243: Internet is not specifically mentio
Page 244 and 245: led to a training program for young
Page 246 and 247: North Korea’s exports from legiti
Page 248 and 249: een the biggest buyers of ivory ove
Page 250 and 251: worker who travels throughout North
Page 252 and 253: If we want to reach into North Kore
Page 254 and 255: conversations with the correct mix
Page 256 and 257: Although the future of cellular tel
Page 258 and 259: There are a host of other things on
Page 261 and 262: Each of the five papers in this col
Page 263 and 264: promotions) and punishments (e.g.,
Page 265 and 266: although presumably all calls are m
Page 267 and 268: cultural rules.” Given the “str
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Speaking of Kim, whom does he consu
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Terms of Reference: North Korean Po
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Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an intern
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APPENDIX C ASIAN VIEWS OF NORTH KOR
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In any case, the reforms provide a
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View from Seoul The single most imp
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