North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

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as the 1950s. 16 The security organizations classify people according to their presumed loyalty to the regime, with classification based primarily on family history going back several generations. These classifications may be reviewed whenever an individual is considered for occupational promotion. The trusted “core” of society, comprising about 30 percent of the population, comes from families who historically were members of the working class. The elite are a select few from this core class. A few of the historical subgroups in this class are laborers, poor farmers, office clerks, and soldiers - not by any means members of the intellectual class. The 50 percent of North Korea’s society belonging to the “wavering” class are considered to have the potential to become members of the loyal class, given sufficient time and indoctrination. They include those whose families, in pre-communist times, were middle-class merchants, prosperous farmers, or workers who immigrated from South Korea. At the bottom of society is the “hostile” class, constituting at least 20 percent of the population. These are “untrustworthy” people whose ancestors were wealthy landlords or merchants, committed members of religious organizations, officials or collaborators of the Japanese occupation government, or anyone who has a family member guilty of criticizing the Kim regime. Except in highly unusual circumstances, these people never become party members, let alone join the Pyongyang elite. The dregs of this group are tens of thousands of political prisoners serving life-time sentences in an animal-like existence. Beginning in the 1990s, hard times fell on most North Koreans, and party membership no longer guaranteed a privileged life. Instead, access to foreign currency (primarily dollars or yen) became the ticket to success, and sometimes, even to survival. Consequently, a major division in society has emerged between those who have foreign currency (regardless of their political classification) and those who do not. 17 Foreign currency can be acquired through black market activities, border trade with China, and travel abroad (in unusual cases). An inferior alternative to having foreign currency is to have direct access to food, because in the 1990s food became the basic goal of life for many North Koreans. Country life had always been tougher than city life, but when the North Korean economy was knocked back to the stone age, farmers survived better than city dwellers, 18 excepting the higher classes in Pyongyang who could use their political power to extract food from the countryside or help themselves to foreign aid supplies. 16 See for example, White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, 2003. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2003, pp. 111-114. On the web, see the National Intelligence Service’s summary of “Social Elements” in the Society/Controlling People section at http://www.nis.go.kr/eng/north (refresh). 17 Two excellent articles have been published on foreign currency earning in the DPRK. Yi Kyo-Kwan, “North Korea’s Up-and-Coming Influential People,” Chugan Choson, June 19, 2003, pp. 36-37. FBIS KPP20030623000066. And “North Korean Regime’s Mobilization of Residents for Garnering Foreign Currency,” Keys, Vol. 13 (summer 2003), pp. 8-27. 18 Yonhap, December 19, 2003. FBIS KPP20031219000034. III-6
No known political divisions among the elite could fairly be called “factions”: that is, organized or semi-organized groups working against other groups or against the regime. By the time the identity of any such group came to the attention of foreign analysts, the group would already have been exterminated. 19 Kim may appreciate the value of setting one person against another in order to keep people from joining up against him, but he does not seem to relish the idea of independent group formation, perhaps because he realizes they could form a coalition and turn against him. Hence the monolithic nature of North Korean politics. In terms of the ideological themes of Juche and the socio-political organism (a single Confucian-style family), only the “main branch” of the North Korean tree can be tolerated, with all competing branches harshly pruned. This explains why the families of political criminals are punished: their “bad seed” must be completely eliminated from the garden of North Korean socialism. Warnings in the North Korean press that “impure, hostile elements are wriggling inside our country” 20 hint that there may well be aggregations of the elite, not organized as formal or even informal groups, that share ideas and interests at variance with official ideology. Foreign analysts and the press have often speculated about the existence of divisions arrayed on a variety of dimensions, including hardliners versus soft-liners, military versus party personnel, members of Kim Il-sung’s different families (Kim Jong-suk versus Kim Song-ae families), members of Kim Jong-il’s different families (Song Hye-rim, Ko Yong-hi and their three sons as possible successors to Kim Jong-il), older versus younger generation elites, technocrats versus ideologues, economy-first versus military-first policy makers, and nationalists versus internationalists, to name a few. Any of these dimensions could spawn factions, but that is a matter for the future to decide. Other factors may create divisions among the North Korean elite without having the potential to galvanize them into factions. Those who fear impending arrest (for example, because they have engaged in illegal economic activities) may fear the current regime. Some who have been punished or reprimanded by Kim may never forgive him. And those who believe that the Kim regime is an impediment to reunification may be motivated by a higher, nationalistic goal. People with affiliations to foreign countries might also form the basis for political divisions; in the 1950s, the domestic (South Korean), Yenan (Chinese), Soviet, and partisan (Kim Il-sung) groups might be considered factions, but of course their leading members were purged by Kim Il-sung many years ago. 19 Yi Nam-ok had this to say about possible factions: “[Kim] has organizational capabilities, and is always in the know about what is happening. If a bud of a ‘faction’ sprouted, he would not leave it to grow bigger.” Interview of Yi Nam-ok by Bungei Shunju. 20 According to an internal DPRK document published by Tokyo Shimbun (Morning Edition), August 15, 2003, p. 4. FBIS JPP20030817000050. III-7
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Nort
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES IDA
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CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & INTROD
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To write accurately about North Kor
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technocrats, provincial and county
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PREFACE This paper will examine in
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ABBREVIATIONS AGI CCSKA COMSEC DoD
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information streams, and from him t
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within the hands of a few individua
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and whether or not he will embarras
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to the lowest-levels of the KPA. As
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strengthening of all armed forces,
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esearch institutes and “think tan
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The primary missions of the Reconna
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communication that generally fall o
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of the State Security Department or
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maintaining strict control over the
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agencies in the ROK and Japan began
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The Guard and Security Commands, wh
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eports that are funneled up through
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Complicating the entire “Kim-cent
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Within the military, this dynamic c
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him that all significant orders and
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Until the 1990s, the electronic med
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II. THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP: SY
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TABLES 1. Key Family Members in the
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The factional struggles in North Ko
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A. INTRODUCTION By definition, a to
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C. THE TECHNOLOGY OF POWER A Party
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document control bureaus in each mi
Page 73 and 74: Originally implemented in 1994 and
Page 75 and 76: Table II-1. Key Family Members in t
Page 77 and 78: of associates who trace their relat
Page 79 and 80: September 9, 2003, showed a change
Page 81 and 82: Chart II-2: Secretariat 5. Kye Ung-
Page 83 and 84: Members 1. Yi Ul-sul 4. Yi Yong-mu
Page 85 and 86: Table II-6. Kim Chong-il’s Princi
Page 87 and 88: Table II-7. Kim Chong-il’s Person
Page 89 and 90: chance to unfold. In terms of syste
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Page 93 and 94: At the second echelon of power, Kim
Page 95 and 96: D. FLOW OF INFORMATION George Kenna
Page 97 and 98: about things that affect their care
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Page 101 and 102: For the rest of the North Korean le
Page 103 and 104: the focus for not only a significan
Page 105 and 106: At the 11 th Supreme People’s Ass
Page 107 and 108: There is little doubt that one of t
Page 109 and 110: decision-making process. Moreover,
Page 111: III. THE WELL-INFORMED CADRE RALPH
Page 115 and 116: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY DEFINITIONS AND A
Page 117: greater access to first-hand inform
Page 120 and 121: The first question addressed by thi
Page 122 and 123: But this lack of enthusiasm is prob
Page 126 and 127: Another way to look at divisions wi
Page 128 and 129: Because the Kim regime governs acco
Page 130 and 131: guess is that anyone who rises in t
Page 132 and 133: But even though the media serve as
Page 134 and 135: Newspapers The DPRK’s premier new
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Page 138 and 139: Page 2: • Kim Jong-suk’s develo
Page 140 and 141: This selection of news items presen
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Page 146 and 147: also countries surrounding the Kore
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Page 152 and 153: eceived with little thought and has
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Page 156 and 157: cognitive dissonance, particular ca
Page 159: IV. INSIDE NORTH KOREA’S BLACK BO
Page 163 and 164: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The North Korean
Page 165 and 166: A. BETTER, MERRIER, MORE HOPEFUL LI
Page 167 and 168: In contrast, the optimists believe
Page 169 and 170: to the throne. The State Council us
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Page 173 and 174: Bulgarian Trade Unions, after which
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Second, the principal objective of
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southward expansion, and, last but
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controlling some of North Korea’s
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also against the second-tier family
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Kim Sung-ae, who is Kim Il Sung’s
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“National Security Establishment
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October 1980. Many of them (Yon Hyo
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severe draught in 1988 and the dram
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The advent of the “Songun Era”
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IV-30
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Bearing in mind Kim Jong Il’s rec
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Table IV-2. Composition of the Nort
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Cabinet Posts 10 th SPA 11 th SPA R
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Eastern Europe. That was reportedly
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Table IV-5. Leading Ideologues Insi
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Table IV-7. Regional Origins of Top
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“Foreign Wind” The “foreign w
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Table IV-10. Some of the Most Influ
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Table IV-11. The North-South “Han
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Song Sok Hwan Vice-Minister Cha Sun
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Table IV-13. Korean-American “Int
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content and government monitoring.
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Northern security, military, and pa
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APPENDIX B TONGIL STREET FREE MARKE
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V. REACHING INTO NORTH KOREA DAVID
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY North Korea is no
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message right to Kim Jong-il, and m
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isk escape from the hermit kingdom.
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Society is divided into three broad
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contradictions.” 17 This makes se
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Internet is not specifically mentio
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led to a training program for young
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North Korea’s exports from legiti
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een the biggest buyers of ivory ove
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worker who travels throughout North
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If we want to reach into North Kore
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conversations with the correct mix
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Although the future of cellular tel
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There are a host of other things on
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Each of the five papers in this col
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promotions) and punishments (e.g.,
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although presumably all calls are m
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cultural rules.” Given the “str
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Speaking of Kim, whom does he consu
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Terms of Reference: North Korean Po
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Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an intern
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APPENDIX C ASIAN VIEWS OF NORTH KOR
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In any case, the reforms provide a
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View from Seoul The single most imp
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