North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

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communications and ensuring his ability to link to critical parts of the regime through the “number one” communication lines. Kim Chong-il has identified computer technology as a growth industry for the country. Recent articles tout the advancements in the information technology sector and the proliferation of e-mail, even down to the average citizen. 58 Despite the fanfare surrounding these innovations, information technology is a closely guarded industry in North Korea, available only to the elite. 59 The various bureaucracies are loosely tied together through an intranet, which can be accessed by senior government officials, but it is not linked to an outside server, thus preventing even members of the leadership from surfing the worldwide web. 60 Kim Chong-il’s eldest son, Kim Chong-nam, has been placed in charge of the IT industry. The fact that Kim Chong-nam has close ties to the State Security Department would suggest that sophisticated monitoring techniques are being designed in coordination with advances in the technology. 61 In addition, North Korea has recently established its own server, run out of the International Communications Department of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. 62 This makes monitoring easier than in the past when e-mails between North Korea and third countries were relayed through the Internet site of Sili Bank in Shenyang, China. External Information Kim Chong-il is believed to be the only individual within the North Korean leadership to have unrestricted access to foreign media. 63 According to numerous defector accounts, he monitors foreign news broadcasts, including CNN, NHK (Japanese Broadcasting Corporation), BBC, and KBC (Korean Broadcasting Corporation). He also has access to computer networkbased information, which, as discussed above, is extremely limited to the rest of North Korea. 64 It has been suggested that Kim Chong-il uses the Internet to supplement information available from other media outlets. In addition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which provides intelligence gathered from embassies, Kim Chong-il’s major sources for foreign information are the KWP’s International 58 Kim In, “North Korea Sets Up an International E-mail Server,” Choson Ilbo (November 28, 2003). 59 According to one source, it costs $60 to send a single e-mail from North Korea. Kim Young-su, op. cit. 60 Discussion with various Russian and South Korean sources, November 2003. 61 Because of the Guard Command’s portfolio for communication security, as well as the high level of trust it enjoys from Kim Chong-il, it can be assumed that it most likely also plays a monitoring role. 62 Kim In, op. cit. 63 Discussion with North Korean analysts at the Korean Institute for National Unification, November 2003. 64 According to Chinese sources, who accompanied Kim Chong-il on his last trip to China, “He travels with a laptop computer and surfs the Internet 4-5 hours a day.” Discussion with American scholars who have had contact with these Chinese interlocutors, January 2004. II-32
(ID) and External Liaison (ELD) departments. The ID is responsible for diplomatic affairs, while the ELD oversees South Korean and Japan affairs. 65 The ELD is closely associated with the KWP’s Unification Front Department and answers (until recently) to the Party Secretary for South Korean/Japan Affairs. Both serve as important back channels for Kim Chong-il in his relations with the outside world. Kim Yang-kon, director of the ID, serves as a key adviser on matters related to China, while Kang Kwan-chu serves a similar function on issues related to the United States, Japan, and South Korea. In addition to the traditional sources of information (i.e., diplomatic/intelligence channels), there is a much murkier source of information. Critical to Kim Chong-il’s understanding of the world is his retinue of “correspondents.” These correspondents enjoy Kim Chong-il’s special confidence, and are dispatched overseas to handle Kim Chong-il’s personal affairs. The correspondent’s key duties consist of managing Kim Chong-il’s slush funds, and buying the things Kim Chong-il and his family need. They possess expertise on various parts of the world, critical to their ability to move in and out of countries under false identities. Many eventually end up in his personal secretariat or as part of the “Third Floor” cadre, such as Kwon Yong-nok, who served as Kim Chong-il’s correspondent in charge of Europe, including Germany, beginning in the late 1970s. 66 Kim Chong-il also has a dedicated personal apparatus to assist him in gathering information about the outside world. This apparatus is not consolidated, but spread throughout the regime, with tentacles that reach into a variety of party, state, and military institutions. It is through this apparatus that Kim Chong-il conducts various schemes to sell weapons, drugs, etc., abroad in return for hard currency, goods, and technology. Kim Chong-il and selected members of his inner circle also use this channel to access information that could be used to vet the intelligence coming through traditional channels, as well as open source information included in reports and papers distributed by the Chosun Central News Agency. Kim Chong-il’s conduit to this dedicated intelligence apparatus is his personal secretary, Kim Kang-chol. Kim Kang-chol maintains links to a number of departments that serve as direct channels of un-vetted information. The table that follows represents some of these departments. 65 The ELD is not just an intelligence-gathering organization; it also is closely tied to Kim Chong-il’s personal apparatus. It responds to requests for foreign technology and currency by working through contacts it has developed in pro-North Korean organizations (primarily in Asia), such as Chosen Soren. Kang Kwan-chu is rumored to be one of Kim Chong-il’s cousins. Discussion with South Korean sources. 66 According to some sources, Kwon is still active in the region, serving as the auditor of Golden Star Bank, a North Korean entity in Austria. It is a subsidiary of North Korea’s Taesong Bank, which was founded as a corporation in Austria. U Chong-ch’ang, “ROK Monthly on DPRK Kim Chong-il’s Slush Fund Deposits in Swiss Banks,” Seoul, Wolgan Choson (November 1, 2000), FBIS translation KPP20001019000046. II-33
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Nort
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES IDA
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CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & INTROD
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To write accurately about North Kor
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technocrats, provincial and county
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PREFACE This paper will examine in
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ABBREVIATIONS AGI CCSKA COMSEC DoD
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information streams, and from him t
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within the hands of a few individua
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and whether or not he will embarras
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to the lowest-levels of the KPA. As
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strengthening of all armed forces,
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esearch institutes and “think tan
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The primary missions of the Reconna
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communication that generally fall o
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of the State Security Department or
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maintaining strict control over the
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agencies in the ROK and Japan began
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The Guard and Security Commands, wh
Page 48 and 49: eports that are funneled up through
Page 50 and 51: Complicating the entire “Kim-cent
Page 52 and 53: Within the military, this dynamic c
Page 54 and 55: him that all significant orders and
Page 56 and 57: Until the 1990s, the electronic med
Page 59: II. THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP: SY
Page 62 and 63: TABLES 1. Key Family Members in the
Page 64 and 65: The factional struggles in North Ko
Page 67 and 68: A. INTRODUCTION By definition, a to
Page 69 and 70: C. THE TECHNOLOGY OF POWER A Party
Page 71 and 72: document control bureaus in each mi
Page 73 and 74: Originally implemented in 1994 and
Page 75 and 76: Table II-1. Key Family Members in t
Page 77 and 78: of associates who trace their relat
Page 79 and 80: September 9, 2003, showed a change
Page 81 and 82: Chart II-2: Secretariat 5. Kye Ung-
Page 83 and 84: Members 1. Yi Ul-sul 4. Yi Yong-mu
Page 85 and 86: Table II-6. Kim Chong-il’s Princi
Page 87 and 88: Table II-7. Kim Chong-il’s Person
Page 89 and 90: chance to unfold. In terms of syste
Page 91 and 92: domestic policy arena, the split is
Page 93 and 94: At the second echelon of power, Kim
Page 95 and 96: D. FLOW OF INFORMATION George Kenna
Page 97: about things that affect their care
Page 101 and 102: For the rest of the North Korean le
Page 103 and 104: the focus for not only a significan
Page 105 and 106: At the 11 th Supreme People’s Ass
Page 107 and 108: There is little doubt that one of t
Page 109 and 110: decision-making process. Moreover,
Page 111: III. THE WELL-INFORMED CADRE RALPH
Page 115 and 116: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY DEFINITIONS AND A
Page 117: greater access to first-hand inform
Page 120 and 121: The first question addressed by thi
Page 122 and 123: But this lack of enthusiasm is prob
Page 124 and 125: as the 1950s. 16 The security organ
Page 126 and 127: Another way to look at divisions wi
Page 128 and 129: Because the Kim regime governs acco
Page 130 and 131: guess is that anyone who rises in t
Page 132 and 133: But even though the media serve as
Page 134 and 135: Newspapers The DPRK’s premier new
Page 136 and 137: motivation in its readers through m
Page 138 and 139: Page 2: • Kim Jong-suk’s develo
Page 140 and 141: This selection of news items presen
Page 142 and 143: in the wake of the U.S. propaganda
Page 144 and 145: the general audience in a two-step
Page 146 and 147: also countries surrounding the Kore
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that the war in Iraq was “a test
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and transform us internally through
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eceived with little thought and has
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outside world than the ordinary wor
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cognitive dissonance, particular ca
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IV. INSIDE NORTH KOREA’S BLACK BO
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The North Korean
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A. BETTER, MERRIER, MORE HOPEFUL LI
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In contrast, the optimists believe
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to the throne. The State Council us
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1976-1977, 4 and in 1986-1987 (see
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Bulgarian Trade Unions, after which
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Second, the principal objective of
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southward expansion, and, last but
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controlling some of North Korea’s
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also against the second-tier family
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Kim Sung-ae, who is Kim Il Sung’s
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“National Security Establishment
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October 1980. Many of them (Yon Hyo
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severe draught in 1988 and the dram
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The advent of the “Songun Era”
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IV-30
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Bearing in mind Kim Jong Il’s rec
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Table IV-2. Composition of the Nort
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Cabinet Posts 10 th SPA 11 th SPA R
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Eastern Europe. That was reportedly
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Table IV-5. Leading Ideologues Insi
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Table IV-7. Regional Origins of Top
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“Foreign Wind” The “foreign w
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Table IV-10. Some of the Most Influ
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Table IV-11. The North-South “Han
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Song Sok Hwan Vice-Minister Cha Sun
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Table IV-13. Korean-American “Int
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content and government monitoring.
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Northern security, military, and pa
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APPENDIX B TONGIL STREET FREE MARKE
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V. REACHING INTO NORTH KOREA DAVID
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY North Korea is no
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message right to Kim Jong-il, and m
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isk escape from the hermit kingdom.
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Society is divided into three broad
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contradictions.” 17 This makes se
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Internet is not specifically mentio
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led to a training program for young
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North Korea’s exports from legiti
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een the biggest buyers of ivory ove
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worker who travels throughout North
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If we want to reach into North Kore
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conversations with the correct mix
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Although the future of cellular tel
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There are a host of other things on
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Each of the five papers in this col
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promotions) and punishments (e.g.,
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although presumably all calls are m
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cultural rules.” Given the “str
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Speaking of Kim, whom does he consu
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Terms of Reference: North Korean Po
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Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an intern
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APPENDIX C ASIAN VIEWS OF NORTH KOR
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In any case, the reforms provide a
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View from Seoul The single most imp
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Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION
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