North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

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state-owned enterprises (SOEs), (7) advancement of plans for the securitization of assets (“chaebolization”) of large state-owned combines, (8) termination of the bulk of state subsidies to the SOEs, introduction of a self-accounting and profit-based system at SOEs, and movement from mandatory to indicative central planning at SOEs, (9) contracting an overseas investment bank to draw up plans for national banking reform, and (10) innovative government debt financing through T-bond issuance, and others. Overall, Kim Jong Il attempted to re-build the North Korean state and implement a relatively ambitious domestic modernization agenda, using the military as the primary driving force in restructuring and modernizing the North Korean economy on the basis of the marketbased approach, re-energizing the North Korean society, and consolidating the ruling elites under the slogans of the army-first policy with the goal of building a “prosperous powerful great nation” (kangsong taeguk). He clearly was driven by the self-preservation instinct, not Marxist- Leninist or Juch’e ideology. His “new thinking” (saesago pangsik) developed within the normative, organizational, and personnel constraints imposed by his father’s legacy against the background of the worsening domestic legitimacy and performance crises during the trial years of the “arduous march” (konanui haenggun). It is very important that the strategic decision to initiate the modernization reforms was a military-backed decision. Without the support of the top military leaders, Kim Jong Il alone could not have made a strategic decision to launch economic reforms. He needed the military support for his catch-up modernization drive, and he got it. Moreover, it is noteworthy that in 2003, the socio-economic reforms and political decompression were not reversed but further advanced, despite an increasingly hostile international environment and the nuclear stalemate with the United States. Such policy continuity can be construed either as a sign that the reforms are generating positive feedback and may be approaching the point of no return, or that the national leadership may not necessarily have complete control over and cannot help but swim along with the new social and macroeconomic processes and micro-economic behaviors originated in the late 1990s and formally legalized in July 2002. In the past five years, the overwhelming process of late modernization began to change the substance of North Korean politics, create new social and political divisions in North Korean society, expand the policy issue areas, and propel new social forces, corporate concerns, and interest groups into the policy-making arena at the expense of the previously ubiquitous faceless class struggle for the construction of socialism with Juch’e characteristics under the WPK party leadership centered on the “party headquarters.” The issues that are the most important for the increasingly pragmatic and nationalistic leadership in Pyongyang today are regime security and power succession, economic reforms and defense modernization, national reconciliation and IV-12
southward expansion, and, last but not least, the anti-U.S. struggle and the peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis. D. WHO GOVERNS: THE HUB-AND-SPOKES MODEL OF DECISION-MAKING IN THE DPRK The North Korean government is neither a monolith nor a “black box.” It is a semiprivatized amorphous collection of rivaling immobile organizations and stove-piped bureaucracies that often act at cross purposes and are pressed hard and corrupted by the individual and group interests of competing clans, social and political forces vying for power, prestige, and wealth invested by the Dear Leader. North Korean policy-makers are rational and very predictable, whether one likes or dislikes their actions. The North Korean Byzantium upon the Taedong River Kim Jong Il is the absolute monarch presiding over the Byzantine Court on the Taedong River. His family clan resides in a modern-day Juch’e Constantinople, the Kim family-built DPRK capital of Pyongyang. The court encompasses at least six immediately related families (1+2+3), all competing for the emperor’s attention, devotion, and favors, and jockeying for position in the event of post-Kim Jong Il succession. Although it may be hard to believe, the race for the successor mantle and the inheritance of the “party center” has already begun among the third-generation “top echelon” of the revolution in North Korea. The year of 2004 has a threefold symbolic meaning in the North Korean political history because it marks the 40th anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s beginning to work at the WPK Central Committee (at the Organizational Guidance Department and Propaganda and Agitation Department), the 30th anniversary of his designation as the heir apparent to his father Kim Il Sung, and the 10th anniversary of his assumption of power after the Great Leader’s death. As potential heirs to Kim Jong Il grow up and mature, they begin to develop their own bureaucratic attachments and personal loyalties. As their distinctive power bases consolidate and expand, their leadership ambitions tend to grow and legitimacy claims solidify. The battle orders of the future “estate fights” between the first-tier, second-tier, and third-tier families within the Kim clan are already shaping up, despite the urgent party calls for the elites to unite behind the “top echelon” of the revolution. As the power succession struggle intensifies, the political regime tends to crack along the lines of personal loyalties and “estate inheritance.” Some power-wielding organizations and interested outside parties may take a risk and choose to take sides up-front, expecting higher returns in the future; others may prefer to explore various alternatives as to who may come out IV-13
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Nort
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES IDA
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CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & INTROD
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To write accurately about North Kor
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technocrats, provincial and county
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PREFACE This paper will examine in
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ABBREVIATIONS AGI CCSKA COMSEC DoD
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information streams, and from him t
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within the hands of a few individua
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and whether or not he will embarras
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to the lowest-levels of the KPA. As
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strengthening of all armed forces,
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esearch institutes and “think tan
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The primary missions of the Reconna
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communication that generally fall o
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of the State Security Department or
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maintaining strict control over the
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agencies in the ROK and Japan began
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The Guard and Security Commands, wh
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eports that are funneled up through
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Complicating the entire “Kim-cent
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Within the military, this dynamic c
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him that all significant orders and
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Until the 1990s, the electronic med
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II. THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP: SY
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TABLES 1. Key Family Members in the
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The factional struggles in North Ko
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A. INTRODUCTION By definition, a to
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C. THE TECHNOLOGY OF POWER A Party
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document control bureaus in each mi
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Originally implemented in 1994 and
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Table II-1. Key Family Members in t
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of associates who trace their relat
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September 9, 2003, showed a change
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Chart II-2: Secretariat 5. Kye Ung-
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Members 1. Yi Ul-sul 4. Yi Yong-mu
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Table II-6. Kim Chong-il’s Princi
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Table II-7. Kim Chong-il’s Person
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chance to unfold. In terms of syste
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domestic policy arena, the split is
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At the second echelon of power, Kim
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D. FLOW OF INFORMATION George Kenna
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about things that affect their care
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(ID) and External Liaison (ELD) dep
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For the rest of the North Korean le
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the focus for not only a significan
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At the 11 th Supreme People’s Ass
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There is little doubt that one of t
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decision-making process. Moreover,
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III. THE WELL-INFORMED CADRE RALPH
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY DEFINITIONS AND A
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greater access to first-hand inform
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The first question addressed by thi
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But this lack of enthusiasm is prob
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as the 1950s. 16 The security organ
Page 126 and 127: Another way to look at divisions wi
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Page 132 and 133: But even though the media serve as
Page 134 and 135: Newspapers The DPRK’s premier new
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Page 138 and 139: Page 2: • Kim Jong-suk’s develo
Page 140 and 141: This selection of news items presen
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Page 146 and 147: also countries surrounding the Kore
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Page 152 and 153: eceived with little thought and has
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Page 156 and 157: cognitive dissonance, particular ca
Page 159: IV. INSIDE NORTH KOREA’S BLACK BO
Page 163 and 164: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The North Korean
Page 165 and 166: A. BETTER, MERRIER, MORE HOPEFUL LI
Page 167 and 168: In contrast, the optimists believe
Page 169 and 170: to the throne. The State Council us
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Page 192 and 193: The advent of the “Songun Era”
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Page 196 and 197: Bearing in mind Kim Jong Il’s rec
Page 198 and 199: Table IV-2. Composition of the Nort
Page 200 and 201: Cabinet Posts 10 th SPA 11 th SPA R
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Page 204 and 205: Table IV-5. Leading Ideologues Insi
Page 206 and 207: Table IV-7. Regional Origins of Top
Page 208 and 209: “Foreign Wind” The “foreign w
Page 210 and 211: Table IV-10. Some of the Most Influ
Page 212 and 213: Table IV-11. The North-South “Han
Page 214 and 215: Song Sok Hwan Vice-Minister Cha Sun
Page 216 and 217: Table IV-13. Korean-American “Int
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Page 220 and 221: Northern security, military, and pa
Page 223: APPENDIX B TONGIL STREET FREE MARKE
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V. REACHING INTO NORTH KOREA DAVID
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY North Korea is no
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message right to Kim Jong-il, and m
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isk escape from the hermit kingdom.
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Society is divided into three broad
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contradictions.” 17 This makes se
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Internet is not specifically mentio
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led to a training program for young
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North Korea’s exports from legiti
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een the biggest buyers of ivory ove
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worker who travels throughout North
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If we want to reach into North Kore
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conversations with the correct mix
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Although the future of cellular tel
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There are a host of other things on
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Each of the five papers in this col
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promotions) and punishments (e.g.,
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although presumably all calls are m
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cultural rules.” Given the “str
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Speaking of Kim, whom does he consu
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Terms of Reference: North Korean Po
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Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an intern
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APPENDIX C ASIAN VIEWS OF NORTH KOR
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In any case, the reforms provide a
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View from Seoul The single most imp
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Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION
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