North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

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CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................... IV-S-1 A. Better, Merrier, More Hopeful Life .................................................................. IV-1 B. Path Dependence, Critical Junctures, and Institutional Change ....................... IV-4 C. Kim Jong Il’s Revolution From Above ............................................................ IV-10 D. Who Governs: The Hub-and-Spokes Model of Decision-Making in the DPRK...................................................................................................... IV-13 The North Korean Byzantium Upon the Taedong River ................................. IV-13 “Power Transmission Belts”............................................................................. IV-20 “National Security Establishment” ................................................................... IV-21 “Old Guard”...................................................................................................... IV-33 “Local Elites”.................................................................................................... IV-39 “Foreign Wind”................................................................................................. IV-44 E. The Big Picture: Forward With or Without the Kim Regime?......................... IV-53 Appendix A: Free Market in Rajin (16,000 Sq. meters), October 2003................. IV-A-1 Appendix B: Tongil Street Free Market in East Pyongyang, January 2004........... IV-B-1 Appendix C: Computer Lab at the People’s Study Palace, Internet Café at the Taesong Shopping Mall, and Restaurant in Downtown Pyongyang, December 2003 ................................................................................................. IV-C-1 TABLES 1. Composition of the National Security Establishment (Chiefs Only)................ IV-21 2. Composition of the North Korean “Old Guard”............................................... IV-34 3. North Korea’s “Technocrats” within the Cabinet of Ministers ........................ IV-35 4. Educational Background of the DPRK Elites................................................... IV-38 5. Leading Ideologues Inside the DPRK’s Power Elite........................................ IV-40 6. List of the Most Influential Provincial Administrative and Party Bosses ........ IV-40 7. Regional Origins of Top 54 North Korean Leaders.......................................... IV-41 8. Major National Public Organizations ............................................................... IV-43 9. The Korean-Japanese “Hands” ......................................................................... IV-44 10. Some of the Most Influential Figures Among the Korean-Chinese “Hands”... IV-46 11. The North-South “Hands”................................................................................. IV-47 12. Some of the Most Important Proponents of Russian Ties ................................ IV-51 13. Korean-American “Interface Elements”........................................................... IV-52 IV-iii
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Nort
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES IDA
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CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & INTROD
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To write accurately about North Kor
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technocrats, provincial and county
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PREFACE This paper will examine in
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ABBREVIATIONS AGI CCSKA COMSEC DoD
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information streams, and from him t
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within the hands of a few individua
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and whether or not he will embarras
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to the lowest-levels of the KPA. As
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strengthening of all armed forces,
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esearch institutes and “think tan
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The primary missions of the Reconna
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communication that generally fall o
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of the State Security Department or
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maintaining strict control over the
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agencies in the ROK and Japan began
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The Guard and Security Commands, wh
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eports that are funneled up through
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Complicating the entire “Kim-cent
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Within the military, this dynamic c
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him that all significant orders and
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Until the 1990s, the electronic med
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II. THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP: SY
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TABLES 1. Key Family Members in the
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The factional struggles in North Ko
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A. INTRODUCTION By definition, a to
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C. THE TECHNOLOGY OF POWER A Party
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document control bureaus in each mi
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Originally implemented in 1994 and
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Table II-1. Key Family Members in t
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of associates who trace their relat
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September 9, 2003, showed a change
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Chart II-2: Secretariat 5. Kye Ung-
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Members 1. Yi Ul-sul 4. Yi Yong-mu
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Table II-6. Kim Chong-il’s Princi
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Table II-7. Kim Chong-il’s Person
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chance to unfold. In terms of syste
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domestic policy arena, the split is
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At the second echelon of power, Kim
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D. FLOW OF INFORMATION George Kenna
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about things that affect their care
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(ID) and External Liaison (ELD) dep
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For the rest of the North Korean le
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the focus for not only a significan
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At the 11 th Supreme People’s Ass
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There is little doubt that one of t
Page 109 and 110: decision-making process. Moreover,
Page 111: III. THE WELL-INFORMED CADRE RALPH
Page 115 and 116: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY DEFINITIONS AND A
Page 117: greater access to first-hand inform
Page 120 and 121: The first question addressed by thi
Page 122 and 123: But this lack of enthusiasm is prob
Page 124 and 125: as the 1950s. 16 The security organ
Page 126 and 127: Another way to look at divisions wi
Page 128 and 129: Because the Kim regime governs acco
Page 130 and 131: guess is that anyone who rises in t
Page 132 and 133: But even though the media serve as
Page 134 and 135: Newspapers The DPRK’s premier new
Page 136 and 137: motivation in its readers through m
Page 138 and 139: Page 2: • Kim Jong-suk’s develo
Page 140 and 141: This selection of news items presen
Page 142 and 143: in the wake of the U.S. propaganda
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Page 146 and 147: also countries surrounding the Kore
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Page 150 and 151: and transform us internally through
Page 152 and 153: eceived with little thought and has
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Page 156 and 157: cognitive dissonance, particular ca
Page 159: IV. INSIDE NORTH KOREA’S BLACK BO
Page 164 and 165: The four pillars of the traditional
Page 166 and 167: Life is getting merrier, too (see A
Page 168 and 169: B. PATH DEPENDENCE, CRITICAL JUNCTU
Page 170 and 171: Central People’s Committee (CPC),
Page 172 and 173: National Defense Commission, follow
Page 174 and 175: policy began to loosen up. Party an
Page 176 and 177: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), (7)
Page 178 and 179: on top in the power struggle within
Page 180 and 181: he appears to favor the younger son
Page 182 and 183: Chang Chon Hwan was accused of symp
Page 184 and 185: work, monitor their communications,
Page 186 and 187: Table IV-1. Composition of the Nati
Page 188 and 189: channeling all his decisions throug
Page 190: North Korean regime decided to weat
Page 193 and 194: Kwon Hui Gyong, the DPRK Hero, was
Page 195 and 196: The Operation Command Group of the
Page 197 and 198: for key civilian management positio
Page 199 and 200: “Technocrats” The “technocrat
Page 201 and 202: It is noteworthy that in the past t
Page 203 and 204: Table IV-4. Educational Background
Page 205 and 206: These leaders are very sensitive to
Page 207 and 208: Table IV-8. Major National Public O
Page 209 and 210: Name Jo Ryong Hyon Nam Sung U Table
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Table IV-11. The North-South “Han
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Name Organization Position Ro Tu Ch
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Table IV-12. Some of the Most Impor
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Jong Yun-hyong Flood Damage Reconst
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ombardment and military occupation
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APPENDIX A FREE MARKET IN RAJIN (16
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APPENDIX C COMPUTER LAB AT THE PEOP
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CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........
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interesting developments include a
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The most reliable method of topplin
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The Kims rule with a heavy dose of
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speak of divisions instead of group
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Seoul newspaper goes on to describe
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security agents are peppered among
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more susceptible because they are m
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About 40 percent of the heroin, met
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Like the illicit diplomats, Bureau
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a province of North Korea. “Think
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Other specific sources of informati
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At a time when South Korea is repor
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described by Kongdan Oh. Allied dip
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VI. CONCLUSIONS KONGDAN (KATY) OH H
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Depending upon how the elite are de
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Mansourov refers to the existence o
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Gause, Kim Jong-il, through his per
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E. INSIGHTS FOR U.S. POLICY MAKERS
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APPENDIX A TERMS OF REFERENCE
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APPENDIX B BRIEF BIOGRAPHIES
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Ambassador David J. Smith is Chief
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The author made a trip to Tokyo, Be
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esolution to the North Korean nucle
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and behaviors. A case in point is t
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