North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center
North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center
North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Second, the principal objective of the government<br />
administration reform was to cut down government<br />
expenditures in order to save money and increase<br />
government efficiency through greater centralization of<br />
functionally related government bureaucracies at the center<br />
and through the delegation of responsibilities to local actors.<br />
The solution was to create so-called “super-ministries” and<br />
“super-commissions” under the newly established Cabinet<br />
of Ministers, and to reduce the central government<br />
workforce by almost thirty percent in five years. The<br />
number of party functionaries at the workplace was reduced<br />
drastically (see Figure 1). The result turned out to be a<br />
significant decrease in central government and party control<br />
over local governments and economic actors and a<br />
noticeable reduction in government budget deficits.<br />
Figure 1. Party Functionaries in the Workplace<br />
Third, the army-first policy (songun chongch’i or AFP) expanded dramatically the<br />
military’s role in <strong>North</strong> <strong>Korean</strong> society, economy, and politics. The “military sprawl” under the<br />
army-first politics, army-first policy, army-first leadership, and army-first ideology made the<br />
<strong>Korean</strong> People’s Army not only the military defender of the nation and the principal guarantor of<br />
regime survival, but also an important economic actor in agriculture, infrastructure construction,<br />
R&D, professional education, arms sales and hard currency earning, and the major ideological<br />
educator, socializer of the youth, and general backbone of the society, as well as the principal<br />
veto power in all policy deliberations.<br />
Fourth, in just three years, Kim Jong Il had three summits with Russian President Putin,<br />
two summits with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, a summit with ROK President Kim Dae-Jung,<br />
a summit with Japanese Prime-Minister Koizumi, and hosted visiting U.S. Secretary of State<br />
Albright in Pyongyang.<br />
Fifth, to name just a few of the most important economic reforms, the so-called “July<br />
2002 economic improvement measures” included (1) partial liberalization of prices and wages in<br />
all sectors of the national economy, (2) elimination of rice subsidies and transformation of<br />
farmers’ markets into district markets, as well as the legalization of market sales of agricultural,<br />
industrial, and consumer goods, (3) government blessing for the complete monetarization of the<br />
economy, including the Public Distribution System, various social entitlements, and residential<br />
and industrial utilities services, (4) quasi-privatization of residential housing and farming lots, (5)<br />
official licensing of small private enterprises, (6) growing de-facto privatization of medium-size<br />
IV-11