North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

complex tools and a larger staff to open a wider channel of communication to the environment.
In the relatively complex post-Cold War environment, have North Korea’s communication
channels been broadened, as the theory suggests they should have been? Is North Korea
suffering from a widening information gap? If so, are some of the elite motivated to narrow that
gap?
Communication is the means by which groups organize, and by the same token,
communication is used to influence and control group members. The North Korean people are
subjected to a constant stream of communications telling them what to do and what to think. Are
these communications effective, or are they largely ignored? Information also travels in the
opposite direction, as people’s reactions and feedback flow upward, influencing the leaders in
terms of making their job easier or more difficult. One of the managerial problems that the North
Korean elite encounter is that misinformation and disinformation hamper their decision making.
Within a group or society, control is also exercised horizontally, as individuals and groups at the
same level provide or withhold information, and sometimes compete against each other (as
illustrated by the rivalry between different security organizations). A brief summary of
communication flows within North Korea might look like this: communications from outside are
usually blocked; communications among the people are restricted; communications from the
people to their leaders are not to be trusted; and communications from the leaders to the people
are ignored as much as possible.
The simplest way for North Koreans to get information about the outside world is to read,
listen, and watch their domestic media, which provide both news and a context for interpreting
the news. The philosophy of news reporting adhered to by the government-controlled press is the
same as the philosophy found in other communist and former communist states. According to
this view, the purpose of news is not to satisfy the idle curiosity of the audience, but rather to
shape them into the hardworking and loyal citizens their leaders wish them to be. As Lenin said,
“Newspapers are free not for the sake of the circulation of news but for the purpose of educating
and organizing the working masses toward the attainment of goals clearly defined by the
thoroughgoing leadership of the party.” 34
Article 67 of North Korea’s constitution provides for “freedom of press, publication,
assembly, demonstration, and association,” but “freedom” is defined as what is best for the
masses. 35 Of course, what is best for the masses is determined entirely by those who are in power.
34 Quoted in Yu Chae-chon, Pukhanui Ollon [Media in North Korea], December 30, 1990, pp. 45-84. One of a series
of FBIS translated articles on this topic. FBIS KPP20031009000071.
35 According to Kim Pyong-ho, vice director general of KCNA, in an interview with No Kil-nam, editor of Minjok
Tongsin (of Los Angeles), September 8, 2003. FBIS KPP20030930000082.
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