North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

eceived with little thought and has little impact, falling well within the latitude of acceptance.
Too different, and the new information is rejected as implausible or incomprehensible, falling in
the latitude of rejection. The width of these latitudes varies for each audience segment and even
for each individual. A plausible hypothesis is that the North Korean people having been for so
long isolated and subjected to anti-American propaganda, have developed a wide latitude of
rejection for foreign (especially American) communications. 100
Resistance to communications outside the latitude of acceptance may be overcome when
the source of the communications is highly credible. 101 One might like to believe that validity
would be judged on the merits of the message, but this is not the case when validation requires
more knowledge, education, and/or cognitive effort than is available to the audience. Consider
the problems juries have in deciding a case based on the evidence - and how they become
susceptible to the persuasive communications of the prosecuting and defense attorneys. North
Koreans may interpret outside communications primarily on the basis of the perceived credibility
and intentions of the communication source. If the source is not credible, whatever it says may
be rejected or misinterpreted.
The Yale group found that credibility is the product of trustworthiness and expertness: a
trustworthy source will speak truthfully; a knowledgeable source will speak accurately. A
trustworthy and knowledgeable source can speak the truth, whereas a trustworthy but
unknowledgeable source may be unintentionally biased, and a knowledgeable but untrustworthy
source may intentionally mislead. Indicators of trustworthiness include personal character,
reputation for trust, confidence and consistency in speech and behavior, and demonstrated lack
of self-interest in the persuasive endeavor. Indicators of expertness include experience,
credentials and titles, public recognition, sometimes age, and volubility (people who say more
are perceived to know more).
Whom do North Koreans consider to be a credible source? In the North Korean press,
Kim Jong-il is depicted as a benevolent genius who sacrifices himself for the welfare of his
people. This portrait may not be believed in its entirety, but to the extent that Kim is seen to be
carrying on the work of his father, who was widely perceived as a benevolent genius, Kim’s
credibility is high. The United States, on the other hand, is depicted as a country of schemers,
100 An interesting case is the North Korean who escaped to China, where he came across an article in a Russian
journal telling about how the Korean War had actually been started by Kim Il-sung. “If the journal had not been
from Russia, I still would have believed the article was fabricated by South Korea. . . . I had not believed in Juche,
but I did believe in Kim Il-sung.” Interview of a North Korean defector, footnote 46 on page 101 of Kongdan Oh
and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea through the Looking Glass, Washington, DC: Brookings, 2000.
101 Again, the Hovland group. A few methods to enhance the credibility of U.S. communications directed at the
DPRK are discussed in Kongdan Oh Hassig. Bringing the News to North Korea. IDA Document D-2519, October
2000, p. 25, pp. 49-51.
III-34