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North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

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him that all significant orders and directions issue forth. For the nation in general, and the<br />

military specifically, this flow is vertical. In most militaries in the world, information flows both<br />

up and down the chain of command and horizontally at each level, while orders flow down.<br />

Within the KPA, information flows up the chain of command and only orders flow down. There<br />

is extremely little horizontal flow of information or communications except at the highest levels.<br />

This vertical flow of information is a means of maintaining strict control over the KPA. The<br />

belief is that if major units were allowed to communicate horizontally, they could unite and<br />

possibly stage a coup.<br />

This flow of information is convoluted - almost Byzantine at times - as it moves through<br />

a series of paths controlled by different and competing organizations with diverse agendas and<br />

priorities in a manner that is quite frequently redundant and inefficient. Most notably, the<br />

information and intelligence flowing upward toward Kim Chong-il and the military and powerholding<br />

elites are processed through what might be described as a lens of self deception<br />

composed of four layers: historical world view, political indoctrination, hatred for the U.S., and<br />

authoritarian cultural rules. The net effect of this is that, whether consciously or subconsciously,<br />

information internally processed or transformed into intelligence passes through a lens of selfdeception<br />

and arrives in a fundamentally flawed state. It is through this flawed process, however,<br />

that decisions within the DPRK are made. When combined with Kim Chong-il’s apparent belief<br />

that he “knows better” and can arrive at better decisions than those around him, this process<br />

often leads to ill-advised courses of action and unanticipated outcomes. It should be anticipated<br />

that such a dynamic will be present during any future dealings with the DPRK, especially during<br />

times of crisis.<br />

I-30

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