North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
What factions or potential factions exist among the North Korean elite, and what power
do they exercise? What information sources and channels do these different groups depend
upon? What contextual factors influence how they receive and interpret information from outside
sources? Based on the initial guidelines provided for this study, the following definitions frame
the search for answers to these three questions. “Factions” are any divisions among the elite that
respond in their own way to information from outside sources. “Elites” are those who have
political power and who are in a channel of communication leading toward the top of the North
Korean leadership hierarchy. “Information from outside sources” refers to open-source
information about initiatives related to U.S. military planning.
For lack of better information on the DPRK’s internal situation, the following
assumptions are made. Kim Jong-il is the only person with “real power,” although others may
exercise power on his behalf. A useful rule of thumb is that the closer to Kim one is, the more
power one has. It is also assumed that those with more power have greater knowledge about the
domestic and international situations.
DIVISIONS IN NORTH KOREAN SOCIETY
The basic division in North Korean society is between those who are deemed to be loyal
to the Kim regime and those whose loyalty is questioned. Since the North Korean economy
collapsed in the 1990s, a second division has emerged between those who have access to foreign
currency and those who do not. Foreign analysts have often speculated about the existence of
divisions among the elite on a variety of other dimensions, including hardliners versus soft-liners,
military versus party personnel, members of Kim Il-sung’s different families, members of Kim
Jong-il’s different families, older- versus younger-generation elites, technocrats versus
ideologues, economy-first versus military-first policy makers, and nationalists versus
internationalists. No evidence exists that any of these dimensions are the basis for cohesive
groups or factions. In terms of power, the military and security organizations have more power
than do other organizations in North Korean society, but no credible information indicates that
people within the military or security services operate as political groups outside of the party
structure.
What is known about decision making and information flow in North Korea suggests that
on important matters, Kim turns to his subordinates for policy suggestions, encouraging them to
III-S-1