North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

world events. It might also be assumed that the more power his followers have, the more
knowledge they have as well. The top-most cadres may know more about world events than the
average American.
Another assumption underlying this study is that the loyalty to Kim shown by top cadres
is both genuine and feigned. The elite are proud to have been chosen to serve Kim, and they
enjoy the power and privileges that come with the job. At the same time, they realize that their
positions depend entirely on pleasing Kim, and this puts a lot of pressure on them because the
alternative to working for Kim may be working in a labor camp. All in all, however, they
probably find the benefits of their positions to exceed the costs. Recall that most of Stalin’s
followers remained with him, even though their position was more tenuous than the position of
Kim’s followers.
C. DIVISIONS IN NORTH KOREAN SOCIETY
Depending upon how one defines them, the North Korean elite number anywhere from a
thousand to two million. Whatever their number, as a class they share the characteristics of the
typical communist nomenklatura. 15 The basic division of people in the DPRK - whether the elite
or the masses - is between those who are deemed to be loyal to the Kim regime and those whose
loyalty has been questioned. A secondary division, corresponding somewhat to the first, is
between laborers who depend on state rations for survival, and bureaucrats and officials who can
market their services to petitioners for bribes, thereby supplementing their government rations.
Needless to say, it is difficult to become a bureaucrat or official unless one is a member of the
“loyal” class. The political class division can be viewed in terms of the tripartite classification
system outlined by Kim Il-sung at the 1970 party congress, but operating in some form as early
15 By all accounts, Victor Kuznetsov’s harsh characterization of the typical member of the Soviet nomenklatura
applies to the North Korean cadres as well: “As a rule, it was a man superficially and one-sidedly educated,
cynical, hypocritical, and selfish. A confirmed member of the nomenklatura had no respect for the law; he knew
that Soviet laws were formal and not meant to be enforced or were to be observed only by ordinary citizens. As
long as he followed the unwritten rules common to all members of the ‘ruling upper class,’ his status in the
hierarchy was assured. Breaking a formal law was dangerous for him only because it could be used by other
members of the nomenklatura in their own interests in the course of the unrelenting inner struggle to obtaining a
more prominent post. The real strength of the nomenklatura member consisted not in his professional knowledge,
but in his ability to please his chiefs and, circumstances permitting, to intrigue against them hoping to take their
place.” In the North Korean case, it might be added that the first unwritten rule is not to criticize or disparage Kim
Jong-il. It also seems likely that the North Korean nomenklatura, as well as many commoners, are more motivated
by nationalism than their Soviet counterparts. Passage from Victor Kuznetsov, “The Economic Factors of the
USSR’s Disintegration.” Pages 264-279 in Anne de Tinguy, The Fall of the Soviet Empire. Distributed by
Columbia University Press, New York, 1997. Quotation from p. 270. For an excellent discussion of class conflict
and regime security in the DPRK, see Jae Jean Suh.
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