North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

cognitive dissonance, particular care must be taken to provide people with a “face-saving” way
to accept the new information. To achieve this acceptance, skillfully crafted messages from
highly credible sources are needed. But it is not necessary to make every message a “knock-out
blow.” Oftentimes, people gradually change their thinking under the onslaught of many
messages, each of which may be hardly noticed.
J. CONCLUSIONS
The first question addressed in this study is what factions or potential factions might exist
among the North Korean elite, and what power each faction might exercise. The second question
is what information sources and channels these different factions could depend upon, especially
to learn about publicly communicated initiatives related to U.S. military planning. The third
question is what contextual factors influence how North Korean elites receive and interpret this
kind of information. Given the constraints imposed by the ambiguity of type of communications
to be examined (“relating to U.S. military planning”) and uncertainty surrounding how to define
the “North Korean elite,” what conclusions can be drawn about communication among the North
Korean elite?
No reliable evidence exists of factions within the North Korean elite. Members of the
elite certainly have different attitudes on many issues. The Kim regime classifies society,
including the elite, in terms of perceived loyalty to the regime. It is important for the elite not to
fall from the regime’s favor; it is also important for them to physically survive in North Korea’s
harsh environment. Consequently, those who have access to foreign currency or any other
resource that can be exchanged for life’s essentials and luxuries are better off than those whose
only asset is loyalty. It seems likely that, in the future, the most important divisions among the
elite will have something to do with this economic factor.
Except for those who fear being cast out of the group, the elite share a common interest
and destiny. With Kim, they are something; without him, they risk being nothing. Their loyalty
in the service of their perceived best interest enables Kim to exercise power over them. Kim’s
power also comes from his ability to watch over and punish individuals and their entire families.
Yet another important source of Kim’s power is Korean nationalism: the proud desire that the
DPRK be recognized as a political equal of the United States.
Communications from the United States to the North Korean elite urge them to change
their policies - the same policies that put them at the top of their society and keep North Korea
independent from other countries. Change may not be in their best interest. When they look at
how U.S. military power has transformed other countries - most recently Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Yugoslavia - they see societies in which many in the ruling class have been displaced. Changes
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