North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

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Implications for North Korean Policy As it exists today, the North Korean leadership is not well positioned to undertake radical reform or react in a timely manner to outside stimuli. Factionalism within institutions and between bureaucracies can delay the convergence of views that is necessary for the system to embark on new paths. Even though he is the preeminent leader, Kim Chong-il appears reticent to firmly back one faction over another on policy and, therefore, risk upsetting the balance of forces that exists within the leadership. For policies such as the nuclear program, leadership dynamics restrict the range of decisions. Four scenarios are often touted with regard to this issue: 1) North Korean leaders have decided that nuclear weapons are essential for security and will not give them up; 2) North Korean leaders are willing to negotiate the program away for a guarantee of security and sovereignty; 3) North Korean leaders will hedge on giving up the nuclear program by pursuing both nuclear weapons and better relations with the United States, Japan, and South Korea; and 4) the North Korean leadership may agree to give up its nuclear program, but will cheat to maintain it covertly. 43 The first two scenarios present stark policy choices, which could leave Kim Chongil exposed politically. Thus, he would likely settle for a hedging or a cheating strategy, which leaves room for ambiguity and, therefore, creates more room for him to maneuver among the factions. North Korean policy-making could be further complicated by succession politics, which appears to have become more prominent in recent years. As various individuals and institutions line up in support of particular candidates for heir apparent, the result could be a galvanizing effect whereby factions are formed from leaders with similar vested interests. It is rumored that the military and security apparatus have thrown their support behind Kim Chong-nam, Kim Chong-il’s oldest son, while Kim’s personal apparatus - through Chang Song-taek - is trying to lay the foundation for anointing one of his two sons (Kim Chong-chol, Kim Chong-un) by his mistress, Ko Yong-hui. 44 If this is true, such a situation could potentially place the most powerful elements of the regime apparatus in opposition, thus diverting the leadership’s attention from anything other than internal politics. 43 These choices are discussed in detail by Phillip C. Saunders, Assessing North Korea’s Nuclear Intentions, North Korea Special Collection (Monterey Institute of International Studies, January 14, 2003). 44 Hwang Chang-yop believes Chang Song-taek is the most likely successor if Kim Chong-il were to become ill or step down in the near term. Chang could also serve as the power behind the throne if one of Ko Yong-hui’s young sons (approximately 22 and 20) is chosen. A very recent rumor posits the possibility of a nephew, the son of Kim Kyong-hui and Chang Song-taek, succeeding Kim. An excellent examination of the various contenders is provided by Yoel Sano, “Happy Birthday, Dear Leader—Who’s Next in Line?” Asia Times (February 14, 2004). II-28
D. FLOW OF INFORMATION George Kennan, the father of Sovietology, once remarked, “A totalitarian dictatorship can overnight turn into a most fragile society.” Because of the brittle nature of totalitarian regimes, the impact of information on them is unpredictable and, therefore, must be managed. Dictators rule by controlling the flow of information, factions garner power/influence by access to information, and the manipulation of public information in the form of ideology ultimately confers legitimacy on the regime. Therefore, more than any other society, totalitarian regimes adhere to the idiom “knowledge is power.” Internal Information Information necessary to run the day-to-day affairs of the North Korean regime is highly compartmentalized and frequently monitored. 45 This leads to a system of half knowledge and an illusion of being informed. Those in top leadership positions have access to more sensitive information about the regime, but even the most senior leaders are restricted in the amount of access they can have on issues related to regime security. Kim Chong-il has taken great steps to ensure that he is the most informed member of the leadership and, at the same time, to restrict access to others. He began to institute an information management plan within the regime in the early 1970s when he assumed responsibility for running the party apparatus. At the heart of this architecture was the “10 principles to establish the party’s monolithic ideological system,” a set of rules that enforced obedience to the established Kim leadership. To guarantee the efficiency of this system, Kim Chong-il ordered that all documents be run through his office before being sent to other organizations, thus creating the informal network of communication and monitoring within the leadership. Because the channels for distributing internal information among the leadership bodies were contained within the KWP Central Committee apparatus, namely the General Affairs Department and the Organization Guidance Department, Kim was able to “sanitize” information to leaders above him and closely guard the amount of information let out to the wider elite. By the 1980s, Kim 45 As the first generation leadership began to step down from leadership posts, there was an increase in the compartmentalization of the ruling elite into functional specialties. Before then, North Korea’s decision-makers rotated between party, government, and military positions. As key positions were monopolized by a core group of Kim loyalists, power was concentrated in a very small elite. After this cadre of elite were thinned out by purges and retirement, they were replaced by military professionals, technical experts, and party specialists. Under Kim Chong-il, these military professionals have begun to assume positions in growing numbers within the party and state apparatuses. For an examination of the restructuring of the North Korean elite, see Lee Chong-sik, “The 1972 Constitution and Top Communist Leaders,” in Suh and Lee (eds.) Political Leadership in Korea. (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1976). II-29
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Nort
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES IDA
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CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & INTROD
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To write accurately about North Kor
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technocrats, provincial and county
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PREFACE This paper will examine in
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ABBREVIATIONS AGI CCSKA COMSEC DoD
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information streams, and from him t
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within the hands of a few individua
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and whether or not he will embarras
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to the lowest-levels of the KPA. As
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strengthening of all armed forces,
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esearch institutes and “think tan
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The primary missions of the Reconna
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communication that generally fall o
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of the State Security Department or
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maintaining strict control over the
Page 44 and 45: agencies in the ROK and Japan began
Page 46 and 47: The Guard and Security Commands, wh
Page 48 and 49: eports that are funneled up through
Page 50 and 51: Complicating the entire “Kim-cent
Page 52 and 53: Within the military, this dynamic c
Page 54 and 55: him that all significant orders and
Page 56 and 57: Until the 1990s, the electronic med
Page 59: II. THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP: SY
Page 62 and 63: TABLES 1. Key Family Members in the
Page 64 and 65: The factional struggles in North Ko
Page 67 and 68: A. INTRODUCTION By definition, a to
Page 69 and 70: C. THE TECHNOLOGY OF POWER A Party
Page 71 and 72: document control bureaus in each mi
Page 73 and 74: Originally implemented in 1994 and
Page 75 and 76: Table II-1. Key Family Members in t
Page 77 and 78: of associates who trace their relat
Page 79 and 80: September 9, 2003, showed a change
Page 81 and 82: Chart II-2: Secretariat 5. Kye Ung-
Page 83 and 84: Members 1. Yi Ul-sul 4. Yi Yong-mu
Page 85 and 86: Table II-6. Kim Chong-il’s Princi
Page 87 and 88: Table II-7. Kim Chong-il’s Person
Page 89 and 90: chance to unfold. In terms of syste
Page 91 and 92: domestic policy arena, the split is
Page 93: At the second echelon of power, Kim
Page 97 and 98: about things that affect their care
Page 99 and 100: (ID) and External Liaison (ELD) dep
Page 101 and 102: For the rest of the North Korean le
Page 103 and 104: the focus for not only a significan
Page 105 and 106: At the 11 th Supreme People’s Ass
Page 107 and 108: There is little doubt that one of t
Page 109 and 110: decision-making process. Moreover,
Page 111: III. THE WELL-INFORMED CADRE RALPH
Page 115 and 116: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY DEFINITIONS AND A
Page 117: greater access to first-hand inform
Page 120 and 121: The first question addressed by thi
Page 122 and 123: But this lack of enthusiasm is prob
Page 124 and 125: as the 1950s. 16 The security organ
Page 126 and 127: Another way to look at divisions wi
Page 128 and 129: Because the Kim regime governs acco
Page 130 and 131: guess is that anyone who rises in t
Page 132 and 133: But even though the media serve as
Page 134 and 135: Newspapers The DPRK’s premier new
Page 136 and 137: motivation in its readers through m
Page 138 and 139: Page 2: • Kim Jong-suk’s develo
Page 140 and 141: This selection of news items presen
Page 142 and 143: in the wake of the U.S. propaganda
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the general audience in a two-step
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also countries surrounding the Kore
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that the war in Iraq was “a test
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and transform us internally through
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eceived with little thought and has
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outside world than the ordinary wor
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cognitive dissonance, particular ca
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IV. INSIDE NORTH KOREA’S BLACK BO
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The North Korean
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A. BETTER, MERRIER, MORE HOPEFUL LI
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In contrast, the optimists believe
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to the throne. The State Council us
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1976-1977, 4 and in 1986-1987 (see
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Bulgarian Trade Unions, after which
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Second, the principal objective of
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southward expansion, and, last but
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controlling some of North Korea’s
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also against the second-tier family
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Kim Sung-ae, who is Kim Il Sung’s
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“National Security Establishment
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October 1980. Many of them (Yon Hyo
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severe draught in 1988 and the dram
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The advent of the “Songun Era”
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IV-30
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Bearing in mind Kim Jong Il’s rec
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Table IV-2. Composition of the Nort
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Cabinet Posts 10 th SPA 11 th SPA R
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Eastern Europe. That was reportedly
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Table IV-5. Leading Ideologues Insi
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Table IV-7. Regional Origins of Top
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“Foreign Wind” The “foreign w
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Table IV-10. Some of the Most Influ
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Table IV-11. The North-South “Han
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Song Sok Hwan Vice-Minister Cha Sun
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Table IV-13. Korean-American “Int
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content and government monitoring.
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Northern security, military, and pa
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APPENDIX B TONGIL STREET FREE MARKE
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V. REACHING INTO NORTH KOREA DAVID
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY North Korea is no
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message right to Kim Jong-il, and m
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isk escape from the hermit kingdom.
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Society is divided into three broad
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contradictions.” 17 This makes se
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Internet is not specifically mentio
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led to a training program for young
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North Korea’s exports from legiti
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een the biggest buyers of ivory ove
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worker who travels throughout North
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If we want to reach into North Kore
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conversations with the correct mix
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Although the future of cellular tel
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There are a host of other things on
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Each of the five papers in this col
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promotions) and punishments (e.g.,
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although presumably all calls are m
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cultural rules.” Given the “str
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Speaking of Kim, whom does he consu
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Terms of Reference: North Korean Po
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Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an intern
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APPENDIX C ASIAN VIEWS OF NORTH KOR
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In any case, the reforms provide a
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View from Seoul The single most imp
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Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION
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