North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

Legitimacy
Kim Chong-il has already eroded much of this legitimacy by not following the pursuit of
power through legally established channels when he assumed the portfolio of General Secretary
in 1997. Up until now, this violation of party procedures has not led to direct challenges to Kim’s
authority. However, if pressure on the system continues to erode the foundation of privileges that
support the elite, opposition to the dynastic succession, which exists beneath the surface, could
erupt into a struggle for power. In such a struggle, the opposition could seize the initiative by
highlighting Kim’s lack of institutional legitimacy.
System Vulnerabilities
Many of the vulnerabilities of the North Korean system reside with the elite. It is a class
that for decades has been insulated from the horrors that are experienced throughout the country.
As the North Korean economy has deteriorated, many elites have opened trading companies to
earn foreign currency. This in turn has led to increasing corruption and weakening of the
cohesion of the privileged class. Since the North Korean system is based on “feudal service
nobility,” where loyalty is ensured through privilege, if the regime loses its ability to placate the
elite through goods and services, factions opposed to the regime could emerge.
Warlordism
While the evidence of existing warlords within the North Korean system is speculative at
best, the possibility for their creation is real. Most likely, they will emerge within Kim Chongil’s
inner core of supporters. As Kim Chong-il continues to isolate his power by narrowing the
channels of communication and transferring lines of authority between bureaucracies, he is not
only causing deep fractures within the leadership, but also bringing the security forces into
conflict with each other. These two outcomes have direct consequences for the elite, who see
their access to the Suryong, and the perks associated with that access, threatened.
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