North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

There are several ways of looking at factionalism, as it exists in North Korea today. For
example, it is possible to examine similarities and differences between generations. On the issue
of North Korea’s nuclear program, factions break along several different lines. Much of the
intransigence in the North Korean position is found within the first generation leaders, whose
views are more grounded in the chuche ideology. They feel threatened by superior U.S. military
capabilities and by talk of regime change. On this issue, they are allied with hard line military
leaders, 31 who argue the need for nuclear weapons as a guarantee for regime survival. They are
opposed by technocrats, many western educated, who see the benefit in negotiating away North
Korea’s nuclear and missile programs to pave the way for a new relationship with the United
States and other regional players that will ensure the regime’s survival and create a better
environment for economic reforms. 32
Another way of looking at factionalism is in terms of institutions. While the opacity of
the system does not allow clear insight into the decision-making process, defector accounts and
analysis of the visible orientation of specific leaders suggest that different institutions represent
different views and political leanings. Kim Chong-il promotes a system whereby he is the focal
point for many separate chains of command. This, in turn, leads to a scramble for influence at the
next echelon of power. 33 As a result, this hub-and-spoke approach to regime management has
created a system of checks and balances with regard to the decision-making process.
In the area of foreign affairs, the KWP’s International Department and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs appear to be more moderate and progressive, while the OGD, Propaganda and
Agitation Department, military, and security forces appear to be more conservative. 34 Within the
and militant, appeared to have been drafted by committee. Aidan Foster-Carter, “Guns or Butter,” Pyongyang
Watch (November 5, 2002).
31 The military should not be assumed to be a monolith when it comes to policy debates; there are rumored to be
several factions within the military, breaking down by generation and patronage system. Officers of the third
generation, who make up a major portion of the field commanders, are believed to be a reservoir of hard-line
sentiment within the armed forces. The high command is believed to be split on the issue of reform.
32 This assessment based on discussion with South Korean and Chinese Pyongyang watchers.
33 Under the Kim Il-sung leadership, interdepartmental coordination was stressed, rather than competition.
Influential figures often were appointed to top positions in two or more organizations to facilitate horizontal
coordination among different agencies. Under Kim Chong-il, the strategy has shifted towards inter-agency
competition and away from coordination. Ryoo Kihl-jae, “North Korean Regime Under Kim Chong-il’s
Leadership: Changes in Systems and Politics,” Vantage Point, 20 (5), 1997. This strategy apparently has
heightened Kim’s political autonomy from within. With compartmentalization, power has been dispersed among
various agencies and inter-departmental competition has been intensified. At the apex of national authority, Kim
alone has final and absolute say on major policies.
34 It should be noted, however, that within institutions there can be widely differing viewpoints on policy initiatives.
For example, Chang Song-taek is rumored to be a reformer within the conservative OGD. Within the military, the
senior leadership appears to be more willing to support economic and foreign policy reform efforts than
commanders at lower echelons.
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