North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

Originally implemented in 1994 and formalized in 1998 to ostensibly manage a deteriorating
economy and a growing confrontation with the United States over North Korea’s nuclear
program, this system provides a framework for Kim Chong-il to build and isolate his power. It
remains in effect probably to prevent a coup and to cope with the country’s serious internal
problems, thus guarding against internal instability. Operating under a crisis management mode
allows Kim Chong-il, as either the Supreme Commander or chairman of a staunch group of
loyalists who staff the NDC, to easily and legitimately direct the military forces, affect military
personnel changes, mobilize the country to a war footing, and command sectors of the economy.
The informal nature of this system is apparent. Institutions and bureaucracies exist;
elaborate legal procedures and regulations provide the outlines of formal rule. But the formal
legal framework is often violated by a body of secret and unpublished circulars, regulations,
decrees, orders, resolutions, and so on, which supercede published norms. Although various
party and state institutions are invested with certain well-defined formal functions and powers,
identifiable lines of legal responsibility, and specified procedures, the actual process is different.
The North Korean political superstructure is a complicated mosaic of shifting and
interlocking, but relatively simple institutions, resting upon the entrenched foundation of oneman
dictatorship, in which all powers are delegated from Kim Chong-il. The institutions of both
the party and state, in terms of both their relationships with one another and the relationships of
various organs within the party and state structures to each other, are essentially creations of Kim
Chong-il (and his father) and are designed not to limit the Suryong’s power, but to limit that of
his subordinates and potential rivals and to facilitate the consolidation of his own authority.
Conflicting lines of authority between party and state provide an ad hoc system of crosschecks
and balances.
Kim Chong-il, by most accounts, does not subscribe to a deliberative policy-making
process. Inputs from other senior leaders is circumscribed and tailored to fit what they think he
wants to hear. This prevents the regime from devising long-term policies and reacting quickly to
outside stimuli. In addition, the decision-making process is highly personalized. As such,
challenges to the regime, either internal or external, are easily wrapped up in power politics.
The Role of Family and Key Relationships
Power and leadership in the North Korean political system has its own unique
characteristics. It derives from a staunchly traditional Confucian culture, in which the family is
the central socializing element and the father functions as an authoritarian figure in the family.
This culture is reflected in the political system through a curious blend of nepotism, a dominant
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