North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

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CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................... II-S-1 A. Introduction....................................................................................................... II-1 B. System Dynamics.............................................................................................. II-2 C. The Technology of Power................................................................................. II-3 A Party within a Party....................................................................................... II-3 Kim Chong-il’s Rise to Power and Leadership Style ....................................... II-5 The Role of Family and Key Relationships...................................................... II-7 Measuring Influence ......................................................................................... II-12 Guidance Inspections........................................................................................ II-13 Access ............................................................................................................... II-17 Factions............................................................................................................. II-22 Hawks vs Doves?.............................................................................................. II-23 Kim Chong-il’s Measures for Neutralizing Factionalism................................. II-25 Implications for North Korean Policy............................................................... II-28 D. Flow of Information.......................................................................................... II-29 Internal Information ......................................................................................... II-29 External Information......................................................................................... II-32 The Leadership’s Access to Foreign Expertise within the Regime .................. II-36 Efforts to Close Down Independent Channels of Information ......................... II-40 E. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ II-41 Legitimacy ........................................................................................................ II-42 System Vulnerabilities...................................................................................... II-43 Warlordism ....................................................................................................... II-44 II-iii
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Nort
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES IDA
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CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & INTROD
Page 11 and 12: To write accurately about North Kor
Page 13: technocrats, provincial and county
Page 17: PREFACE This paper will examine in
Page 21: ABBREVIATIONS AGI CCSKA COMSEC DoD
Page 24 and 25: information streams, and from him t
Page 26 and 27: within the hands of a few individua
Page 28 and 29: and whether or not he will embarras
Page 30 and 31: to the lowest-levels of the KPA. As
Page 32 and 33: strengthening of all armed forces,
Page 34 and 35: esearch institutes and “think tan
Page 36 and 37: The primary missions of the Reconna
Page 38 and 39: communication that generally fall o
Page 40 and 41: of the State Security Department or
Page 42 and 43: maintaining strict control over the
Page 44 and 45: agencies in the ROK and Japan began
Page 46 and 47: The Guard and Security Commands, wh
Page 48 and 49: eports that are funneled up through
Page 50 and 51: Complicating the entire “Kim-cent
Page 52 and 53: Within the military, this dynamic c
Page 54 and 55: him that all significant orders and
Page 56 and 57: Until the 1990s, the electronic med
Page 59: II. THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP: SY
Page 63 and 64: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This study offers
Page 65: Legitimacy Kim Chong-il has already
Page 68 and 69: interests? Do factions, to the exte
Page 70 and 71: odies by organizing meeting agendas
Page 72 and 73: This vision came into conflict with
Page 74 and 75: leader, and an individualized congl
Page 76 and 77: oth in the Politburo and as a vice
Page 78 and 79: Table II-4. Illustrative Relationsh
Page 80 and 81: answer. One method of identifying k
Page 82 and 83: 1. Chang Song-taek 5. Chi Chae-ryon
Page 84 and 85: een severely curtailed. 16 Kim Chon
Page 86 and 87: personal apparatus. The source of m
Page 88 and 89: Factions Providing in depth analysi
Page 90 and 91: There are several ways of looking a
Page 92 and 93: corruption. 38 Table II-8. Factiona
Page 94 and 95: Implications for North Korean Polic
Page 96 and 97: was apparently tapping phones of ot
Page 98 and 99: communications and ensuring his abi
Page 100 and 101: Department Operations Department Un
Page 102 and 103: subject headings, including South K
Page 104 and 105: Name Position Education Remarks Kim
Page 106 and 107: Below are some of the general tradi
Page 108 and 109: Legitimacy From a structural point
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Warlordism While the evidence of ex
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CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........
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discuss and argue among themselves.
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A. BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS As a
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only person with “real power,”
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world events. It might also be assu
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No known political divisions among
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Whatever political power Kim fails
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How is power used to make policy de
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complex tools and a larger staff to
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According to a KCBS scriptwriter wh
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is the environment: “Let’s Buil
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For comparison purposes, here are t
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Korean Central Broadcasting Station
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operates several “gray” radio s
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Chinese who come to gamble in Chine
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appeared regularly in the latter ha
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ilateral discussions on the DPRK’
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the details of their material life
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people from fully processing new in
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with a fool for a president; 102 an
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ationally process it and draw reaso
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in the former Soviet bloc were like
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The four pillars of the traditional
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Life is getting merrier, too (see A
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B. PATH DEPENDENCE, CRITICAL JUNCTU
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Central People’s Committee (CPC),
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National Defense Commission, follow
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policy began to loosen up. Party an
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state-owned enterprises (SOEs), (7)
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on top in the power struggle within
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he appears to favor the younger son
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Chang Chon Hwan was accused of symp
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work, monitor their communications,
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Table IV-1. Composition of the Nati
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channeling all his decisions throug
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North Korean regime decided to weat
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Kwon Hui Gyong, the DPRK Hero, was
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The Operation Command Group of the
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for key civilian management positio
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“Technocrats” The “technocrat
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It is noteworthy that in the past t
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Table IV-4. Educational Background
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These leaders are very sensitive to
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Table IV-8. Major National Public O
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Name Jo Ryong Hyon Nam Sung U Table
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Table IV-11. The North-South “Han
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Name Organization Position Ro Tu Ch
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Table IV-12. Some of the Most Impor
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Jong Yun-hyong Flood Damage Reconst
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ombardment and military occupation
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APPENDIX A FREE MARKET IN RAJIN (16
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APPENDIX C COMPUTER LAB AT THE PEOP
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interesting developments include a
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The most reliable method of topplin
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The Kims rule with a heavy dose of
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speak of divisions instead of group
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Seoul newspaper goes on to describe
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security agents are peppered among
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more susceptible because they are m
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About 40 percent of the heroin, met
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Like the illicit diplomats, Bureau
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a province of North Korea. “Think
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Other specific sources of informati
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At a time when South Korea is repor
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described by Kongdan Oh. Allied dip
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VI. CONCLUSIONS KONGDAN (KATY) OH H
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Depending upon how the elite are de
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Mansourov refers to the existence o
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Gause, Kim Jong-il, through his per
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E. INSIGHTS FOR U.S. POLICY MAKERS
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APPENDIX A TERMS OF REFERENCE
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APPENDIX B BRIEF BIOGRAPHIES
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Ambassador David J. Smith is Chief
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The author made a trip to Tokyo, Be
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esolution to the North Korean nucle
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and behaviors. A case in point is t
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North Korean Policy Elites - Defense Technical Information Center

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