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Yale Center for the Study of Globalization<br />

in urban and rural areas. Other observers suggest that poorer people in Africa do<br />

not understand what democracy is; that democracy is a foreign, Western concept<br />

that is not widely shared, especially among the non-educated. Here again, the<br />

data from 2011 Afrobarometer surveys indicate that individuals with university degrees<br />

and those with only primary school educations have nearly identical levels<br />

of support for democracy.<br />

Still others think of poverty as a threat to democracy in Africa. However, this is also<br />

not true, as support for the rule of law and rejection of violence among Africans is<br />

consistently strong irrespective of socioeconomic status. These results are consistent<br />

with recent research by Acemoglu and others (2008), indicating that modernization<br />

theories do not work around the world, and that contrary to popular belief<br />

there is no correlation between income and democracy in Africa and elsewhere.<br />

11.2 Origins of democratic values in Africa<br />

Many political scientists have mentioned civil societies and democratic values as<br />

key determinants of democracy; however, it is obvious that civil society’s strength<br />

and democratic values are endogenous. In a paper that I wrote with Omar Garcia<br />

Ponce, a graduate student from NYU (Wantchekon and Garcia Ponce, 2014), we<br />

show that democratic values in Africa can be traced back to the legacy of different<br />

independence movements. Countries that experienced rural social movements,<br />

like Cameroon and Zimbabwe, tend to be autocratic or highly unstable democracies.<br />

Those that experienced urban social movements, like Ghana, Senegal,<br />

and Tanzania, tend to be stable democracies. We checked for causality using instrumental<br />

variable techniques, finding that one potential chain of causality is the<br />

strength of civil society following the Independence movement. Thus, we see that<br />

the big divide in Africa is not between the rich and poor countries, but rather between<br />

those that attained Independence through urban protests and those that<br />

achieved Independence via rural rebellion.<br />

Figure 11.1 shows that countries that experienced rural insurgency tend to have<br />

had lower levels of democracy since Independence, and that this gap has increased<br />

drastically since the Cold War. This result holds whether we use the Polity<br />

or the Freedom House measure of democracy. This surprising finding indicates<br />

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