REGA – Vol. 1, no. 1, p. 37-46, jan./jun. 2004(continuação)42Sources: Elaborated by the author from newspapers and periodical library, January- April 2000Key factors in successful resistanceAmongst the actions taken during the conflict,the following are considered fundamentalby the author to the outcome described above:Negotiations combined with effectivesocial organisation and pressure. The organizationthat led the demonstrations,the Coordinadora Departamental del Aguay de la Vida, became the legitimate representativeof the demands of the populationof Cochabamba despite the hostilityof the government. The Coordinadoraparticipated through its membersin several negotiations to try to solve theconflict, but when the governmentshowed to be unyielding, it resorted todemonstrations and social pressure.This combination was successful inachieving their aims.Effective technical arguments in negotiations.The social organizations and theCoordinadora were able to effective mobilisetechnical arguments, in contrastwith the political approaches traditionallyemployed by such agencies.Generation of alternative proposals. Afundamental factor was the civil societiescapacity to propose solutions. Not onlydemands were put across, but also alternativesolutions regarding the Contractof Concession, and the changes necessaryto reform the No. 2029 Act. Once
Bustamante, R.The water war: resistance against privatisation of water in Cochabamba, Boliviathe conflict was finished, a propositionon the regulation of the No. 2066 Act wasprepared, whose approval is pending andis part of the current demands of socialorganizations.Technical support of social organisations.The process of generating proposalswas supported by an advisory technicalteam, capable of adequately combiningacademic theory with the demandsmade by social organisations, and basedon a solid knowledge of the water problemsin the country.Alliances and partnership. Another keyelement was the strategic alliance developedbetween urban and rural sectorsthat allowed the consolidation of a strongmovement that was subsequently able toput forward clear and socially legitimatedemands to the government.Direct democracy. This was an importantstrategy that gave legitimacy to theprotest movement. Decisions were takenin open public spaces, where thewhole population without exceptioncould participate. These open meetingsdecided on future steps in a collectiveand inclusive way, thus recovering directforms of democratic participation.Another mechanism employed was thePopular Consultation that put threequestions to the population and obtainedanswers from around 50,000 citizens.IMPACTSPositive achievements of the resistanceThrough an objective assessment, the followingare, in the authors opinion, the mainpositive achievements of the social protests:Restoration of the public character of thewater company SEMAPA, but now with abetter level of social participation andcontrol in its board of directors.Change of the Ley de Servicios de Agua Potabley Alcantarillado Sanitario (Water andSewage Services Act) in 36 of its sections.Among other things the new Act guarantees:respect of small systems for drinkingwater supply; recognition of the rightsof indigenous populations and peasantsto their water sources and drinking watersystems; social control of contractsand charges/tariff reviews.Opening-up of government and internationalfinancial organisations to the processesof dialogue and social consultationthat should be followed in the formulationof laws and regulations on water.This is expressed in the start up of severalconsultation processes, for example,in developing the regulations of the No.2066 Act and Normativa de Riego (set ofregulations on irrigation) as well as thecreation of the Consejo Interinstitucional delAgua or CONIAG (Inter- InstitutionalWater Council) as a “[...] space of dialogueand concertation between the government andthe economic and social organizations to thecurrent legal, institutional and technicalframework on water-related issues, so as to tidyup and regulate the water resources management” (Action Plan, CONIAG).Challenges following the resistanceHowever, there are still many challenges toconfront, since following the water war:The water problem in Cochabamba is notyet resolved and still around 40% of thepopulation has no access to adequateservices. There are extra and easily accessiblewater sources for the short term,except groundwater where large investmentsare needed and not easy to obtain.SEMAPA itself faces some specific challenges.- The Bolivian government has forcedSEMAPA to sign a Contract of Concessionfor 40 years. This Contractbinds the Company to pay the Superintendenciade Saneamiento Basico (BasicSanitation Regulatory Authority)a regulatory rate of 1.5% of its incomeannually.- Additionally, the Contract excludes theCompany from public subsidies availableto the sector. Furthermore, it is43
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