1 - The Black Vault

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP
involved the recovery of two downed crew members
located deep inside North Vietnam. Operation
Gambler, the code name for the recovery operation,
began on 21 May 1967, when F-4 aircraft
dropped recovery kits near the two downed airmen.
Unfortunately, the recovery kits landed
some distance from the survivors and North Viet -
namese security elements recovered the packages,
thus forcing the Combat Talon aircraft to
abort its pick-up mission. Because of this attempt,
SOG expressed the following limitations
of the Fulton system.
The Fulton Recovery System [STARS] has proven to be
of doubtful use in the recovery of aircrews downed in
hostile environments. If SAR forces are unable to recover
downed airmen due to the presence of hostile
troops, automatic weapons, anti-aircraft artillery, etc.,
it is extremely unlikely that the use of the Fulton system
will succeed where others failed. The drop of a
Fulton kit to a downed aircrew may give away their
position, and the amount of time required to retrieve
and activate the kit gives hostile forces ample time to
locate and capture the aircrew, or prepare an ambush
for the Combat Talon C-130 making the pickup. 30
The Combat Spear unit continued to maintain its
high level of proficiency in the STARS, but without
support from SOG, there was little chance
that the system would be used operationally.
On 1 August 1967 Detachment 1, 314th Troop
Carrier Wing, changed to Detachment 1, 314th
Tactical Airlift Wing, when its parent wing
changed designation. The detachment’s relationship
with the 14th ACW did not change at that
time. The 14th ACW continued to function as the
host wing for Detachment 1, a tenant unit, and
SOG continued to exercise OPCON of assigned
Combat Spear assets.
Throughout 1967 Combat Spear and Heavy
Hook aircraft flew PSYOPS/leaflet drops over
North Vietnam in support of the Fact Sheet program.
An average of 60 million leaflets each
month was delivered to North Vietnam targets. In
addition to Talon and Heavy Hook aircraft, F-4s
also dropped leaflets over the North. Only 10 percent
of all leaflets reached the Red River delta,
however, an area that was considered by PSYOPS
planners as the key target for a successful
PSYOPS campaign. An expanded PSYOPS program,
code-named Frantic Goat, was proposed to
Lt Gen William M. Momyer, Seventh AF/CC, by
his director of operations. The goal of the Frantic
Goat program was to increase leaflet delivery to
100 million leaflets each month, with 60 million
reaching targets in the Red River delta area. The
new program permitted Combat Talon to operate
in North Vietnam to 20 degrees north latitude.
Entry into North Vietnam was by way of the
western border, and aircraft were restricted to no
closer than 20 NM from the eastern coast. General
Momyer expressed concern over Talon operations
so close to the coast due to the threat located
there, and in his 10 November 1967 approval of
the program, he directed his staff to “feel our way
into this area.” 31
The issue of command and control of AF assets
committed to SOG operations continued to fester,
and by late 1967 relations between SOG and Seventh
AF were near the breaking point. Since 1965
the level of both special and conventional operations
had risen dramatically throughout SEA. Increasing
numbers and types of USAF aircraft supported
SOG operations. Intense competition
among different activities for a limited number of
air assets became evident. The lack of defined coordination
channels and responsibilities between
Seventh AF and SOG led to distrust and a
strained relationship between the two organiza -
tions. 32 SOG was a joint unit, and its commander
was a US Army Special Forces 06 (Col Richard
Singlaub at the time Combat Spear deployed to
SEA) who was extremely security conscious and
objected to having to explain and justify to Seventh
AF each individual aircraft support request.
On the other hand, Seventh AF suspected that
Combat Talon and 1st Flight aircraft assigned to
support SOG were being misused and that proper
Air Force supervision was not being provided for
critical flight operations, including tactics, flying
safety, and crew protection. 33
The rapid escalation of operations and competition
for air resources was only part of the reasons
for the Seventh AF-SOG rift. The extreme sensitivity
of SOG activities added another complica -
tion. SOG’s requests for air support to Seventh
AF encountered difficulties because few Seventh
AF personnel were SOG-briefed. From the Seventh
AF standpoint, compartmentalization and secrecy
created concern for the proper and efficient use of
AF assets under the OPCON of SOG. 34
Although specific command and control procedures
before 1968 were not documented in official
correspondence, various interviews and official
evaluations indicated where responsibilities rested
and problems existed. A senior Marine officer assigned
to SOG in 1966 and 1967 made the follow -
ing statement:
Early in MACSOG’s operations, the execution of air
missions was controlled almost exclusively by MAC-
SOG. Later we learned that our messages concerning
air operations were not being disseminated to the
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