1 - The Black Vault

0428 local, made its tactical landing at Cubi Point
NAS at 0506, onloaded its personnel, and departed
at 0508. The AFSOB ground radio station received
an operational normal call at 0514 local. The last
transmission received from the aircraft was at 0521
and did not indicate that the crew was having any
problems. At 0523, 15 minutes after the second
takeoff, local fishermen near Capones Island, located
northwest of Cubi Point NAS, observed the
aircraft impact the water and explode. After approximately
10 minutes, the wreckage sank in 240
feet of water. Twenty-three people were killed on
impact, with Lieutenant Blohm, the electronic warfare
officer and lone survivor, being thrown from
the aircraft and rescued by local fisherm en. 38
Postaccident investigation could not determine
the exact cause of the crash, but the most probable
explanation was thought to be fatigue brought on by
the stress of the previous year’s activities. The op -
eration’s tempo during preparations for the Iranian
rescue mission coupled with the recent move to
Clark AB had taken its toll on the squadron. The
administrative flight on the 25th of February also
had interrupted the crew’s circadian rhythm cycle,
thus resulting in degraded crew rest before the mission.
A second possible cause of the accident was a
malfunctioning terrain-following radar system. The
system was designed to convert to a “radar override”
condition when the aircraft was over water,
and there were no returns from the water’s surface.
Engineers theorized that if the system did not enter
the override mode, the radar could fly the aircraft
into the water without any radar reference available
to determine the aircraft’s altitude.* One of
several modifications made to the Combat Talon
stemming from the accident provided a warning
light that told the crew when the aircraft was in
radar override. Personnel from the 1st SOS killed in
the 26 February 1981 crash of aircraft 64-0564 were
Maj James M. Kirk, Capt Norman L. Martel, Capt
Thomas D. Patterson, Capt Gregory S. Peppers, TSgt
Stephen A. Blyler, TSgt Barry R. Chumbley, TSgt
Gary W. Logan, and SSgt John T. Felton. 39 **
Post–Desert One
Advancements for Combat Talon
Since the failed Desert One rescue attempt, the
special operations community had made huge advancements
in both hardware procurement and
tactics development. During Honey Badger both
USAF and US Army rotary-wing capabilities
PROJECT HONEY BADGER AND CREDIBLE SPORT
received the most attention, thus resulting in a
much superior helicopter capability than the US
military had in November 1979. For Combat Talon
the advancements made before Desert One continued
during Honey Badger, and important tactics
were developed and refined to allow the weapons
system to better accomplish the difficult counterterrorism
mission.
The tactic of determining if a runway were clear
using the Combat Talon FLIR was perfected early
in the Desert One training period, but the ability
to clear the runway if something heavy were
blocking it still needed to be solved. A solution was
found by developing drop procedures to deliver
either a 15,000-pound or 25,000-pound bulldozer
to be used to remove any runway obstruction. If
the FLIR pass determined that the runway were
blocked, a Combat Talon could air-drop the bulldozer
and a combined team of US Army rangers
and USAF CCT personnel. The rangers would use
the bulldozer to clear runway obstructions. Once
the runway was clear, the CCT would provide air
traffic control for follow-on aircraft to la nd. 40
Another challenge for planners was to airland as
many aircraft as quickly as possible on an airfield
so that the maximum number of soldiers could be
inserted in the shortest time. A tactic known as
dual-runway operations was developed that fulfilled
this requirement. 41 Flying in formation the Combat
Talon lined up on the primary runway in pairs and,
at a preplanned point, would spread apart so that
the wingman was aligned with the parallel runway.
Both aircraft would touch down on each runway at
the same time. Follow-on aircraft would employ the
same tactic, with a 30-second spacing between landings
on the same runway. Thus, within a 60-second
span as many as six aircraft could land on two parallel
runways. To arrive in formation at the prescribed
time and with the proper spacing, proce -
dures were refined that allowed the aircraft to use
its air-to-air TACAN and the SST-181 beacon to
maintain spacing, whether in weather or in the
clear. Complex procedures were also developed to
allow for lead change and formation breakup/rejoin
should the situation arise.
A unique tactic that was also developed during
Honey Badger was the transport of a small helicopter
that was off-loaded from the Combat Talon,
assembled, and flown away to support the ground
force tactical plan. Six OH-58s were originally
modified with short struts to allow rotor-head
__________
*The theory was confirmed two years later when an LAS Ontario test crew observed a continual fly-down command by the TF radar while flying
over water. The test was terminated when the aircraft descended to 100 feet.
**Peppers and Felton flew to Desert One on 24 April 1980.
249