1 - The Black Vault
1 - The Black Vault
1 - The Black Vault
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PRAETORIAN STARSHIP<br />
the 7th SOS faced during this period was a shortfall<br />
of qualified aircrews. <strong>The</strong> unit possessed all<br />
four of its authorized aircraft but only four of its<br />
six authorized crews. <strong>The</strong> aircrew shortfall was<br />
due in part to the loss of Lewis’s crew the previous<br />
April and the domino effect that the loss<br />
caused throughout the Talon community. Several<br />
crew members, who were scheduled to move from<br />
the 8th SOS to Rhein Main AB, were extended at<br />
Hurlburt Field and were unavailable to the<br />
USAFE unit. Although new personnel were selected<br />
and brought into the pipeline, it was not<br />
until mid-1981 that the Combat Talon school at<br />
Hurlburt Field trained enough personnel to make<br />
up for the loss.* 5<br />
At the 8th SOS Honey Badger initiatives continued<br />
to be the focus, even as the possibility of a<br />
second rescue attempt dimmed. On 10 October<br />
1980 8th SOS personnel and one Combat Talon<br />
aircraft deployed to Yuma, Arizona, to test the<br />
feasibility of high-speed personnel and cargo<br />
parachute airdrops. <strong>The</strong> deployment was the first<br />
of a three-phase test to determine if personnel<br />
could survive an airdrop at airspeeds up to 250<br />
knots. <strong>The</strong> existing speed for personnel airdrops<br />
was 125 knots, with 150 knots the maximum acceptable.<br />
Cargo drops were normally made at 130<br />
knots. With an en route airspeed of 250 knots<br />
maximum, the Combat Talon had to decrease its<br />
speed for personnel and cargo drops. This slow -<br />
down could be detected by enemy radar, and it<br />
placed the aircraft in a vulnerable situation close<br />
to the ground for an extended time. <strong>The</strong><br />
HSLLADS had been perfected in the early 1970s<br />
and provided the capability to drop at airspeeds<br />
up to 250 knots, but the system was not designed<br />
to drop personnel, nor could it drop cargo that<br />
exceeded certain size and weight limitations. Both<br />
the USAF and USA wanted a system that would<br />
eliminate the need for a slowdown. A high-speed<br />
sled was developed for personnel drops, which included<br />
special rigging and cushioning to reduce<br />
the shock of parachute opening and the resultant<br />
impact of the load with the ground. Specially instrumented<br />
dummies were used to measure the<br />
forces exerted on the load during the drop sequence.<br />
From 8 to 15 December, the second phase<br />
of the test was conducted. 6 After experiencing system<br />
failures, which would have resulted in fatal<br />
injuries to personnel and the destruction of the<br />
cargo, testing was suspended indefinitely, awaiting<br />
additional engineering.<br />
1981: Combat Talon II<br />
Testing Begins<br />
<strong>The</strong> operations tempo for the 7th SOS continued<br />
at a high rate as 1981 began. <strong>The</strong> squadron<br />
trained for its wartime mission of unconventional<br />
warfare operations as outlined in commander in<br />
chief, US Air Forces Europe, Operations Plan<br />
4102 and COMSOTFE Operations Plan 4304. To<br />
fulfill its tasking under the two war plans, the<br />
squadron was given specific responsibilities. It<br />
maintained liaison with United States Army<br />
Europe (USAREUR) Special Forces units and<br />
conducted joint training in unconventional warfare<br />
operations. <strong>The</strong> squadron was prepared to<br />
deploy all or part of the unit to a forward-operating<br />
base and provide support as required by<br />
SOTFE. <strong>The</strong> 7th SOS was also tasked to train<br />
other special operations supporting units, including<br />
MAC special operations low-level (SOLL)<br />
crews. Once deployed, the 7th SOS provided the<br />
bulk of the command element for the 7575th<br />
SOW and provided mission control of assigned<br />
air resources. To fulfill its responsibilities, the<br />
squadron maintained a Special Operations Combat<br />
Control Team (SOCCT) and a ground communications<br />
flight equipped with radios and communications<br />
gear capable of communicating with the<br />
Combat Talon aircraft during mission execution.<br />
Each crew was required to plan and brief a realworld<br />
mission annually using actual wartime targets<br />
and threats. <strong>The</strong> squadron maintained an<br />
intelligence section that was assigned respon -<br />
sibility (along with contingency response) for<br />
the mission planning exercises. Deployments<br />
throughout the year were designed to provide<br />
training opportunities so that the squadron could<br />
maintain proficiency in its various wartime<br />
skills. 7<br />
<strong>The</strong> annual Combat Talon Management Review<br />
Conference was held at LAS Ontario from 10<br />
to 13 February 1981. Headquarters personnel<br />
from PACAF, USAFE, and TAC attended the conference<br />
along with representatives from each<br />
Combat Talon squadron. <strong>The</strong> conference addressed<br />
personnel, equipment, and other operational<br />
and maintenance issues facing the Combat<br />
__________<br />
*When Kirk’s crew was lost in February 1981, a similar situation arose in the 1st SOS. Two unprogrammed crew losses within a year severely<br />
strained the schoolhouse at Hurlburt Field. An additional problem faced by the 1st SOS was the lack of available aircraft. With 64-0564 lost and<br />
64-0565 at LAS Ontario, only two aircraft were available to the 1st SOS, and one of those two departed for PDM in the spring of 1981. In July 1981<br />
Clamp aircraft 64-0572 was transferred from the 8th SOS to the Pacific until 64-0571 could be recalled from Air Force Systems Command and<br />
modified as a Yank aircraft.<br />
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