1 - The Black Vault

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP
Soon after the conference AFSOC sent a wrap-up
message to its field units declaring that Com mando
Vision “is our best course of action to develop experience
and maintain readiness.” When Walter
Mondale, the US ambassador to Japan, informed
Washington later in the spring that it would be
wise to halt Commando Vision implementation
until 1998, Commando Vision was subsequently
put on indefinite hold, and Phase II was never
implemented. 172
From 27 February to 2 March, the 353d SOG
hosted another CT II SATAF. It was the fifth
SATAF since the 353d SOG was programmed to
receive the new aircraft. The SATAF executive
committee assessed the 353d SOG site activa -
tion again as unsatisfactory, based on a shortage
of AN/APQ-170 radar spares, aircraft nose
radomes, and AP-102 spares needed for the CT
II. The group expected to receive those spares
by November 1995. The committee deemed the
group’s facility planning as marginal due to the
ongoing modifications to building 3306, a facility
designed to house the CT II radar test station.*
Plans continued to assign the group’s first CT IIs to
the 1st SOS in the summer of 1995. 173
May marked the first deployment of the CT II
to the Pacific theater during JCS Exercise Cobra
Gold in Thailand. From 1 to 28 May, two MC-
130H CT IIs from the 15th SOS flew missions in
support of the exercise. Talon II aircrew and
maintenance personnel interfaced with 1st SOS
personnel during the exercise, providing hands-on
experience for Pacific-assigned personnel. Follow -
ing Cobra Gold the two CT IIs returned to
Kadena AB and remained there through August.
Newly trained 1st SOS crews and maintenance
personnel were able to fly and maintain the aircraft
during this transition period. The first-ever
deployment to Thailand for the CT II did highlight
to 353d planners the need for additional support
equipment before the group operated the CT
IIs extensively. The hot, humid conditions of
Kadena AB and Southeast Asia required that the
large air-conditioning units designed for the aircraft’s
electronic equipment had to be in place for
the CT II to operate properly. 174
On 11 July 1995 the first CT II (88-0195) was
delivered to the 1st SOS. Over the next three
months, the remaining four aircraft arrived at
Kadena AB and were accepted by the squadron.
From 24 to 26 July, the sixth and final CT II
SATAF was held at Kadena AB. The previous SA-
TAF in February had rated Kadena AB as unsatisfactory,
but this rating was upgraded to marginal
during the final meeting. Major areas of
improvement included facilities planning, which
was assessed as fully capable after completion of
the radar facility in June 1995. Maintenance
training remained at fully capable, as did manpower
and personnel issues. The issues that drove
the marginal rating were those over which the
353d had no control—the continued shortage of
AN/APQ-170 radar and aircraft nose radome
spares. The SATAF assessed that the 1st SOS
should have no problem meeting its future milestones
in bringing the weapons system on-line. 175
August saw a change of command for the 353d
SOG. On 8 August Colonel Thigpen relinquished
command to Colonel Beres, who became the fifth
commander of the 353d SOG since it was activated
as the 353d SOW on 6 April 1989. General
Hobson officiated at the ceremony, which was held
in the newly acquired Commando West hangar
(formerly the Hush House). Beres was a highly
experienced Combat Talon commander who had
participated in both Desert One and in Desert
Shield/Desert Storm. He had followed Thigpen as
the commander of the 8th SOS in 1990 and had
spent a tour assigned to the Joint Staff, J-3 Directorate,
the Pentagon, before coming to the 353d. 176
With the death of Kim Il Sung, Beres’s immediate
concern focused on the Korean peninsula and
on improving the group’s ability to support special
operations there if open hostilities resumed. During
Thigpen’s time as group commander, much of
the organization’s energy had been spent on acquiring
facilities and modifying them to meet the
group’s needs, but for Beres, Korea would be his
central issue. CINCPAC’s Cooperative Engagement
strategy was also viewed by Beres as a key
operational commitment. For the group to continue
to succeed, Beres had to continue to support
Cooperative Engagement, but he also had to increase
the group’s commitment to Korea. During
the latter half of 1995, Beres sought to establish
Taegu AB, Korea, as a periodic SOF training base
for US Army Special Forces and for assigned
group assets. The plan included deploying one to
two aircraft, with associated support personnel, for
two to three days a week. The 1st Battalion, 1st
Special Forces Group, based at Tori Station, Okinawa,
was the primary Army unit included in the
__________
*The renovations to building 3306 were completed on 24 June 1995, and the building was available before the arrival of the first permanently
assigned CT II. A huge amount of work was required by both Headquarters AFSOC/CE and the PACAF/CE staff to quickly get the building on-line.
Without the facility the CT II radar could not have been bench tested, and the sophisticated aircraft could not have been main tained in a mission
ready status.
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