1 - The Black Vault

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSION
shah had embarked on a program to modernize
and to westernize Iran earlier in the decade, and
the resultant “trappings” of the West, from
women’s attire to US weaponry, were identified
by Khomeini and his followers as the source of
evil that was at the root cause of the nation’s
problems.
With political control of Iran diminished due to
the near-disintegration of his military, the shah
fled Iran on 16 January 1979, and two weeks
later, on 1 February, Khomeini returned from exile
in France to a throng of cheering supporters.
Khomeini and his followers portrayed the United
States as the Great Satan. When the Ayatollah
returned to Iran, Americans stationed and living
there were advised to leave immediately. In the
coming weeks 45,000 Americans, most of whom
were employees of American firms doing business
in the country, were evacuated. With mobs roaming
the streets of Tehran chanting “death to
Americans,” the US government still believed
that Tehran would eventually stabilize and establish
normal diplomatic relations. In anticipation
of future normalization of relations with the
Khomeini government, 75 foreign-service personnel
were retained by the US government at their
embassy posts while the remainder were returned
to the United States. 2
As Iran slipped into anarchy, rumors spread
that the United States was harboring SAVAK officers
(Iranian secret police loyal to the shah) inside
the US Embassy, and on 14 February 1979 a
large band of revolutionaries overpowered embassy
guards and took some 70 US personnel hostage.
Two US Marines were wounded, and one
Iranian citizen was killed during the rioting. The
group demanded that the United States return
the shah to Iran to face Islamic justice and punishment
for his crimes against the people. The
Khomeini government, under Prime Minister
Shahpour Bakhtiar, quickly persuaded the revolutionaries
to release the Americans and to leave
the embassy. Over the next two months, Khomeini
continued to focus his anger on the United States
and to demand that the shah be returned to Iran
for trial. In April 1979 Khomeini accused the
United States of meddling in Iranian internal affairs
by setting into motion satanic plans to overthrow
the newly created Islamic Republic. In May
1979 more than 150,000 people marched on the
US Embassy shouting “death to Carter.” Again,
the US government underestimated the seriousness
of the situation but did urge some 2,000
Americans still living in Iran to leave the country. 3
All but approximately 200 took the advice. For
the remainder of 1979, tensions remained high, as
Khomeini continued to focus on the United States
and its relationship with the shah. The United
States maintained a skeletal workforce at its embassy
in Tehran with fewer than 70 personnel
assigned.
As the year progressed, unknown to the United
States, the shah’s medical condition steadily declined.
He was suffering from lymphatic cancer
and had only a short time to live. Disregarding
predictions from the US Embassy in Tehran that
anti-US violence would erupt across the country if
the shah entered the United States, President
Carter allowed the shah to come to the United
States on 20 October 1979 to seek medical treatment
at the Cornell (University) Medical Center
in New York. No other country would allow the
shah entry due to the tense political situation in
Iran. The US government had been assured by
high-ranking Iranian officials that US interest in
Iran would be protected while the shah underwent
medical treatment. While at Cornell, the
shah had a gall bladder operation and had his
cancer treated with radiation therapy. 4
By the time the shah came to the United States
in October 1979, the US Embassy staff in Tehran
had been reduced substantially, yet basic embassy
functions continued. President Carter felt
that by leaving the embassy open, the action
would help shore up Bakhtiar’s government and
would eventually promote better US-Iran rela -
tions. Embassy security had been increased to a
point that the State Department felt the US Ma -
rine guards stationed there could hold out for several
hours against an attack, and by that time the
Iranian military would respond and quell any disturbance.
As had been the case throughout the
demise of the shah and the rise of the Ayatollah,
the United States underestimated the deep anti-US
sentiment prevalent in the Islamic fundamentalistinspired
revolution. 5 On 4 November 1979 a mob
of rabid anti-American rioters scaled the wall of
the US Embassy in Tehran, and thus began the
444-day hostage crisis that resulted in the fall of
an American president and the death of eight
American special operators at Desert One.
Operation Rice Bowl
From the outset of the crisis, few argued
against a military option, except Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance. Vance felt that Khomeini was
using the hostages to consolidate his power over
the Iranian people and that to harm them would
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