1 - The Black Vault

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP
from local military forces. Having anticipated
such a tasking, the JCS had developed two force
packages, one consisting of two ranger battalions
augmented with JSOC elements and a second
made up of a Marine battalion landing team with
SEALs totaling about 1,800 men. New intelligence
was received on 22 October that revealed
that the Grenadian army was mobilizing about
2,000 reservists to augment the estimated 1,500-
man regular army. There were also approximately
600 Cubans located on the island, most of
whom were thought to be construction workers at
Point Salines. Facing a force of over 4,000 troops,
the JCS concluded that neither force package alone
was enough to ensure mission success. As a result,
the NSPG directed the JCS to send an execute or -
der to CINCLANT authorizing him to employ a
joint force composed of JSOC, rangers, marines, and
airborne troops into Grenada, commenc-ing on 25
October 1983. 110
As the execute order was being sent by the
JCS, DIA provided a revised estimate of Grenadian
army capabilities. With a 1,500-man regular
army and 3,000 reservists, DIA assessed that
Grenadian forces would put up a sustained resistance
should the United States mount a military
operation against the country. Equipment possessed
by the Grenadian army included six Soviet
APCs (BTR 60s) and four Soviet 23 mm antiaircraft
guns (ZSU-23s), most of which were cited around
the airfield at Point Salines. There were also 50
Cuban military advisors and 600 construction
workers at Point Salines, but DIA assessed a low
probability that they would put up any resistance.
111 This assumption would prove to be invalid
when the Combat Talon force appeared above
Point Salines.
On 23 October the US State Department continued
its negotiations for the evacuation of
Americans and other foreign nationals. Austin
and his RMC vehemently denied that there was
any reason for an evacuation and further stated
that anyone desiring to leave the island could do
so by commercial air. However, all commercial air
service had been suspended after the massacre on
19 October, and the Pearls Airport remained
closed with the strict curfew still in effect. The noevacuation
position enforced by Austin effectively
prohibited any foreign nationals from leaving
the country. 112 As the rescue plan came together,
little hope remained for a peaceful resolution of
the crisis.
The 8th SOS Gets the Call
Hobson and the 8th SOS had participated in
the quarterly joint exercises and had maintained
a rigorous exercise schedule throughout the fall
of 1983. The quarterly exercises had been challenging,
with a complex airfield seizure operation
the climax of each exercise. The squadron flew in
Exercise Night Venture from 26 July to 4 August
but without another opportunity to work with
large numbers of joint forces since that time.
Bright Star 83 had consumed the remainder of
August, and September was spent completing the
squadron’s quarterly training requirements. The
concept of operations that the special operations
planners worked out at USLANTCOM headquarters
(beginning on 21 October) called for five
MC-130E Combat Talons to airland a combination
of USA rangers and other special operations
forces at Point Salines during the early morning
darkness of 25 October. In the event the runway
was blocked, an alternate plan was developed to
air-drop the force. Historically, such complex
contingency operations as Son Tay and Desert
One took six months to plan and to rehearse
before execution. When Hobson received the call
on 22 October to be prepared to launch into Grenada,
he had less than 72 hours to select his
crews, plan the operation from an Air Force perspective,
get his Talons mission ready and his
crews rested, position his force at the onload
location, and then execute the mission. He had
no time to waste.
Since Desert One the Combat Talon force had
been in a state of rebuilding. The loss of two
crews within a 10-month period had taxed the
community’s ability to train and season new replacements.
At the same time, personnel who
had been in special operations and who were
highly experienced were in demand throughout
the Air Force. At MAC headquarters, staff positions
were created along with positions at
Twenty-Third Air Force. At the Pentagon special
operations-experienced personnel were also
highly prized. Many Combat Talon “old timers”
had filled these career-enhancing assignments
by late 1983. With MAC charged with the responsibility
for Air Force special operations and
with the overseas Talon units also part of MAC,
returning personnel remained in special operations
and were not lost to the community. Former
crew members from the 1st SOS and the
7th SOS had rotated back to the 8th SOS and
formed the highly experienced core from which
Hobson chose his crews. To support JSOC tasking
276