1 - The Black Vault

COMBAT SPEAR
proper people. Moreover, some of our maritime operations
were being interfered with by friendly aircraft.
Finally, Seventh AF insisted on coordinating all flying
activities, including those of MACSOG. This improved
coordination and control of missions. 35
An AF officer assigned to SOG during the same
period further related difficulties in command and
control and specifically cited problems in the rela -
tionship between SOG and Seventh AF:
We had communications difficulties from our facility in
Saigon in handling air operations, which originated
from bases removed from the Saigon complex. Because
of security requirements and the lack of hot line facilities,
in many cases our hands were tied in coordinating
air operations plans. This resulted in our recommendation
to have an air operations command post, which
would have hot line communications direct to air facilities
and the base camps from which forces would
launch. From an AF standpoint, command relations
were rather tenuous for a while. [Complex] missions
were laid on with very short notice. This caused us a
great deal of anxiety in attempting to get support from
Seventh AF. On many occasions, the Seventh AF frag
for the next day’s combat operations was already cut.
Seventh AF would have to divert air assets from laid-on
strikes. . . . As might be expected, Seventh AF was
constantly badgering us for better advanced planning. 36
To rectify this unsatisfactory situation, a series
of meetings were held between SOG and Seventh
AF, and a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
was signed on 26 October 1967. The MOU was
signed by the chief of staff, Air Force (CSAF), Seventh
AF, and the chief, SOG, and established the
Office of Deputy Commander for Special Operations
(DCSO) under the commander, 14th SOW.
In SOG terminology, the DCSO was designated
the commander, Air Studies Group (later changed
to Air Operations Group). Nha Trang-based C-
130E(I) Combat Talons and 1st Flight UWC-123
Heavy Hook aircraft were OPCON to the DCSO.
In addition, the 20th SOS UH-1 gunships were
under tactical control (TACON) to the DCSO for
SOG special operations missions. 37 The underlying
concept of this structure was to bring the
unique operations performed by the three units
under one authority.
As a result of this MOU, OPCON of Combat
Talon and Heavy Hook flowed from SOG through
the DCSO directly to the units themselves, effectively
placing an intermediate organization between
SOG and the unit commanders. Through
the 14th SOW, the DCSO was also responsible for
all administration and supervision of assigned
personnel, including (1) flying safety, (2) adherence
to AF regulations, directives, and policy, and
(3) performance of such other functions normally
associated with service responsibility. The DCSO
had two 04s (special operations staff officers)
and one airman (administrative supervisor) to
assist him in performing assigned duties, and
he was rated by the 14th SOW commander. A
letter of performance was provided by the SOG
commanding officer for inclusion in the DCSO’s
evaluation report. 38 The first DCSO was Col
David C. Collins, who was previously stationed
at Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley
AFB, Virginia. 39
25 November 1967—Loss of Aircraft 64-0563
In November 1967 the first loss of a Combat
Talon aircraft occurred. Lt Col Thomas F. Hines
was the squadron operations officer and had a
policy of flying with all assigned crews at least on
one combat mission over North Vietnam. On 25
November he was scheduled to fly a combat mission
with one of his crews on aircraft 64-0563. He
and the crew had arrived at the aircraft and had
begun the preflight when he was notified by operations
that the mission had been canceled. By
this time the crew had completed the outside portion
of the preflight and was preparing to start
the cockpit checklist. Hines picked up his helmet
and flight gear and departed the flight line in the
vehicle that had brought the mission cancellation
orders. He wanted to confirm that SOG had canceled
the mission and tried to determine why. The
remaining crew members, along with maintenance
personnel, buttoned-up the aircraft and departed
the flight-line area. Since this was the only
mission scheduled that night, the flight line was
deserted in just a few minutes. As Hines entered
the operations center of 1st Flight Detachment
USAF Photo
Wreckage of aircraft 64-0563 after the mortar attack on
Nha Trang AB, 25 November 1967. Note the absence of
revetments in the parking area.
89