1 - The Black Vault
1 - The Black Vault
1 - The Black Vault
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PRAETORIAN STARSHIP<br />
Cherry 2’s EWO actively jammed North Vietnamese<br />
GCI controller frequencies as did the Navy<br />
A-6s over Haiphong. Consequently, MiG pilots<br />
could not receive instructions from their controllers<br />
to complete their air-to-air intercepts. 80<br />
At H+ 10 minutes the assault force commander<br />
advised “negative items [POWs] at this time.” Immediately<br />
after this call, Colonel Simons advised<br />
his force to “prepare to withdraw for LZ extraction.”<br />
<strong>The</strong>re were no prisoners at Son Tay. Apple<br />
1 was called in from its logger location at H+ 14<br />
minutes, and Apple 2 at H+ 22 minutes. As Apple<br />
2 arrived, Colonel Simons directed demolition of<br />
the disabled HH-3 (Banana 1). At H+ 27 minutes<br />
Apple 2 departed Son Tay with all remaining<br />
forces on board. 81<br />
As the assault force headed west, single-ship<br />
Cherry 2 remained in orbit near Mount Ba Vi<br />
jamming GCI controller frequencies. Apples 3, 4,<br />
and 5 departed to the west, followed by the A-1s<br />
and the overhead F-4s and remaining F-105s. As<br />
the force cleared the objective area, Cherry 2 departed<br />
westward following them. Over the Plain<br />
of Jars in northeastern Laos, two survival bea -<br />
cons were picked up from the downed F-105 crew.<br />
Colonel Blosch proceeded to the area at 8,500 feet<br />
and established an orbit while running his Fulton<br />
STARS checklist. He reasoned that there was a<br />
possibility that the two crew members might need<br />
immediate extraction, so he was prepared to get<br />
them. Concurrently, Apple 4 and Apple 5 refueled<br />
from the HC-130P over Laos and established an<br />
orbit over the downed crew members. At first<br />
light, with Colonel Blosch’s Talon orbiting near<br />
the downed crew members, Apple 4 picked up the<br />
front-seat pilot, and Apple 5 picked up the backseat<br />
EWO. <strong>The</strong> two HH-53s, along with Colonel<br />
Blosch’s Combat Talon, then returned to Udorn<br />
RTAFB and landed without further incident. 82<br />
At Udorn RTAFB Major Franklin and the entire<br />
raiding force had landed by the time Colonel<br />
Blosch and the two HH-53s arrived. General<br />
Manor had flown by way of T-39 from Da Nang<br />
AB to meet Colonel Simons and his troops when<br />
they landed. Although everyone was exhausted, a<br />
formal mission debriefing was held, and a detailed<br />
“summary of operations” message was prepared<br />
by General Manor and Colonel Simons for<br />
transmission back to the Pentagon. <strong>The</strong> message<br />
was transmitted at 0915Z, but for unexplained<br />
reasons it was never received by JCS. <strong>The</strong> two<br />
commanders were ordered to fly back to Washington<br />
immediately, and by late morning they were<br />
on their way. At 1500Z on 23 November, they<br />
landed at Andrews AFB, Maryland, aboard an Air<br />
Force KC-135 Looking Glass aircraft. 83 As it turned<br />
out, their immediate return had been directed by<br />
President Nixon, who wanted to personally decorate<br />
the two in a special White House ceremon y.<br />
After the hot wash at Udorn RTAFB, the Talon<br />
crews returned to Takhli RTAFB for much needed<br />
rest. Redeployment to the United States retraced<br />
their deployment route earlier in the month with<br />
departure from Takhli RTAFB on 22 November<br />
and arrival at Norton AFB on 25 November. At<br />
Norton AFB the two Talons were turned over to<br />
LAS Ontario on 26 November for removal of the<br />
FLIR. Aircrew and en route support items were<br />
returned to Pope AFB by way of TAC C-130 on 26<br />
November. 84 Colonel Blosch and Major Franklin<br />
flew on to Eglin AFB to assist in writing the after<br />
action report. Over 90 days had passed since they<br />
had reported to Eglin AFB for training the previous<br />
summer.<br />
Aftermath<br />
After the rescue attempt at Son Tay, the North<br />
Vietnamese consolidated the American prisoners<br />
in the Hanoi area and closely held secret their<br />
exact locations. Although there was some planning<br />
for a follow-on operation, consolidation of<br />
the prisoners in Hanoi effectively eliminated another<br />
rescue attempt. <strong>The</strong> consolidation, however,<br />
had a positive effect on the overall condition<br />
of the prisoners. Before the raid many prisoners<br />
had been held in remote rural areas, under primitive<br />
conditions. Most had been kept in solitary<br />
confinement for years, with no contact with others.<br />
Immediately before the raid, several had died<br />
after years of torture and captivity. Bringing<br />
them all to the Hanoi area caused an overcrowding<br />
of existing facilities. To house all the prison -<br />
ers, North Vietnamese authorities had no choice<br />
but to put them in common cells. <strong>The</strong> American<br />
prisoners were finally able to talk openly with<br />
each other, and they met friends from their old<br />
units. Those in bad shape were nursed back to<br />
health by their fellow prisoners. Morale soared<br />
as word trickled in that the United States had<br />
attempted to rescue some of them from Son<br />
Tay. 85 US fears that the remaining prisoners<br />
would suffer because of the raid did not materialize.<br />
Rather, their overall condition improved<br />
dramatically over time.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re was much speculation by the media regarding<br />
why the prisoners were not at Son Tay.<br />
<strong>The</strong> failure was blamed by most media reports on<br />
poor intelligence and, perhaps, even a breach of<br />
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