1 - The Black Vault

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM
who surrendered. The last leaflet mission for the
8th SOS was mission number 15, which was
flown on 26/27 February. (Leaflet mission numbers
13 and 14 were flown by the 9th SOS during
the nights of 17/18 and 21/22 February. Mission
number 13 serviced the Iraqi 7th Infantry Division
with a follow-up B-52 leaflet. Mission
number 14 serviced the Iraqi 28th Infantry Division
after a B-52 strike and was the last leaflet
mission before commencement of the ground war.
The 9th SOS flew the two missions when the 8th
SOS Combat Talons were tasked to drop the three
BLU-82B bombs on Faylaka Island.) Leaflet mission
number 15 was the last leaflet drop of the
war. The target area was the northernmost regions
of Kuwait and was directed at selected airfields
and elite Republican Guard units. 64
BLU-82B Operations
Not long after he arrived at KFIA, Beres had
approached Gray and had proposed using the BLU-
82B bomb against Iraqi targets. Colonel Gray had
floated the proposal up the chain of command, but
USCENTCOM declined to approve its use at that
time. When President Bush approved the doubling
of US troops committed to Desert Shield in Novem -
ber 1990, Beres again raised the question of BLU-
82B employment. This time there was more interest
in the bomb, but the decision to use it against Iraq
was postponed to a later date. As the air war progressed
after 16 January, intelligence estimates
identified massive troop concentrations, all of which
were defended by elaborate minefields. US planners
feared that combat losses would be high, as Coalition
forces attacked across the Iraqi border into Kuwait
and southern Iraq.
On 20 January 1991 Beres again proposed using
the BLU-82B but this time as a psychologicalwarfare
weapon against Iraqi troops. The proposal
was staffed through the AFSOCCENT and SOC-
CENT headquarters, and on 28 January Colonel
Gray briefed the proposal to General Schwarzkopf
himself. The CINC was familiar with the weapon
from his days in Vietnam, and he saw its application
in clearing minefields ahead of attacking
ground troops. The BLU-82B had never been used
or tested against minefields, and its effectiveness
was unknown. Because of the 28 January briefing,
however, General Schwarzkopf approved the drop -
ping of the first two BLU-82Bs on minefields and on
troop concentrations located in southern Kuwait. 65
On 3 February the two preloaded BLU-82Bs arrived
at KFIA from Hill AFB. In the days that followed,
16 additional bombs were delivered to KFIA
(18 total bombs) by MAC airlift and were stored in
the nearby bomb dump. The standard tactic for
dropping the large bomb was to release it at an
altitude of 6,000 feet above the ground, but that
altitude put the Combat Talon in the threat envelope
of Iraqi AAA and SAMs. To reduce the threat
to the aircraft, squadron planners increased the
drop altitude to a range between 16,000 and 21,000
feet. To increase the psychological effects of the
weapon and to take advantage of tactical surprise,
AFSOCCENT elected to drop multiple bombs on
each mission. To protect the aircraft during their
bombing runs, USAF EF-111 Ravens, F-4 Wild
Weasels, and EC-130 Compass Calls were tasked to
support the drops. During the night of 6/7 February,
the first BLU-82B mission was flown. Davenport’s
crew was assigned the mission of dropping the first
bomb on a minefield in the southwestern corner of
Kuwait, while Henry’s crew simultaneously dropped
on a troop concentration in the same area. Davenport’s
BLU-82B blasted a large gap in the Iraqi minefield
across the border from US Marine positions in
Photo courtesy of Gary Crayne
A BLU-82B rigged for airdrop. The extended nose fuse
has not been installed.
USAF Photo
The BLU-82B dropped by the 8th SOS in conjunction
with leaflets proved to be the ultimate psychological
warfare tool. Note the mushroom cloud and shock wave
created by the explosion.
363