1 - The Black Vault

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP
Air Operations—1968
Figures on aircraft utilization in 1968 reflected
reduced combat operations over North Vietnam
compared to those of 1967. Combat Talon aircraft
successfully executed five of 21 resupply missions.
On the other hand, the percentage of flight time
committed to logistical airlift increased from 65 to
85 percent of total hours flown. Combined cargo
tonnage of Heavy Hook and Combat Spear operations
totaled over 8 million pounds, and more
than 34,000 personnel were transported by the
two units. 61 1969: Tasking Outside
North Vietnam
Colonel Bunn succeeded Colonel Hines as the
second commander of the 15th SOS on 4 September
1968. He remained in command until 27
March 1969, when Lt Col John R. Kummer replaced
him. At that time Bunn became the 14th
SOW/DCSO after the incumbent DCSO was killed
in an aircraft accident. 62 The problems experienced
during the last half of 1968 in personnel
accountability for 1st Flight Detachment was
solved when both 1st Flight and the 15th SOS
moved into their joint operations building during
the week of 13 January 1969. The colocated facility
brought the two units into a closer relationship
than was possible with separate facilities. 63
Relationships between Seventh AF and SOG did
not improve, even after OPORD 460-68 was finalized.
By the first of February 1969, in an apparent
effort to exert its authority over SOG-dedicated assets,
Seventh AF made the decision to task 15th
SOS aircraft to fly missions when not otherwise
employed by SOG. From 3 through 11 February,
Seventh AF tasked the 15th SOS to fly seven
flare-illumination missions, although the aircrew
had neither flare training nor any flare dispersal
equipment aboard the Combat Talon. In 1973, Lt
Col Marlon Banks, then retired, recalled his crew
checkout to drop flares and his first flare mission.
We went out one afternoon and got an hour of training
from an EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] type on how
to set your time delay and everything, and launch a
flare and hook it up so it would pop the string and light.
We put some 200 odd flares on board. Our mission that
night was strictly a delaying tactic. We were to illuminate
a [road] intersection for eight hours. . . . We didn’t
have any FACs with us normally if we saw anything to
call strikes on. We were briefed on the [AAA] threat—
how high the 37 mm and 57 mm could go. Well, it [the
threat] ran me up to 14,000 feet. You couldn’t work
without oxygen. . . . That was probably one of the worst
missions I’ve ever been on. I’ve never seen so much
firepower. It was all there, AAA, and I’m sure none of it
was radar controlled or we wouldn’t be here today. . . .
We would vary our altitude every pass two to three
thousand feet.
It [AAA] would go up above us, sometimes below us. . . . I
would say they had 6 to 9 installations—batteries—and
they would sometimes all fire at the same time, sometimes
three or four at the same time. We used up a lot of
their ammo that night for them. After six hours, we were
out of flares, thank goodness, and left. 64
The continued debate over who had OPCON of
the 15th SOS Talons was temporarily resolved
when Seventh AF discontinued tasking the Combat
Talon for flare missions after the 11 February
mission. SOG adopted the tactic of tasking
the 15th SOS, with its higher-mission priority,
every time Seventh AF tasked the unit. After 11
February the situation was not resolved, but
rather an uneasy truce went into effect. OPORD
460-68 had proven to be inadequate because it
still did not specifically address command rela -
tionships between SOG and Seventh AF.
As was the case in 1968, meetings were again
held throughout 1969 to further resolve command
relationships. On 1 November 1969 an updated
OPORD 460-70 was signed. The stated
purpose of this OPORD was to establish procedures
for command, control, and support of forces
designated to support COMUSMACV Footboy air
operations. 65 It tasked Headquarters Seventh AF,
14th SOW, 314th TAW (CCK, Taiwan), and the
15th SOS at Nha Trang AB. Mission capabilities
of the 15th SOS were allocated in support of SOG
operations. It placed the 15th SOS under the operational
control of the commander, Seventh AF,
administered through DCSO, 14th SOW. 66 The
OPORD established Seventh AF/Director of Operations
as the action agency responsible for
monitoring the SOG Mission Fragmentary Order.
As such, Seventh AF/DO was tasked to keep
abreast of all Combat Spear activities and to
maintain timely coordination with SOG 32 (Air
Studies Branch) on all matters.
The OPORD went on to delineate specific responsibilities
of the 14th SOW/DCSO. The DCSO
was tasked to exercise operational control of the
15th SOS for the commander, Seventh AF, during
all missions operating within Seventh AF’s area
of responsibility. The DCSO was also responsible
for Seventh AF Frag Orders and for direct tasking
by SOG for USAF assets under his control.
He continually informed Seventh AF/DOCO,
314th TAW, and SOG of technical and scheduling
details in support of Footboy air operations and
SOG combat airlift requirements. Mission details
106