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1 - The Black Vault

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ESTABLISHMENT OF COMBAT TALON<br />

Precursor to OPLAN 34A<br />

<strong>The</strong> American program of covert and clandes -<br />

tine operations in Laos and North Vietnam began<br />

in late 1960 and early 1961. <strong>The</strong> earlier CIA/SMM<br />

effort to establish a viable stay-behind organiza -<br />

tion in North Vietnam after the Geneva Agreements<br />

of 1954 had been largely unsuccessful. 70 By<br />

the time Lansdale and the SMM began the program<br />

to recruit and train indigenous forces in the<br />

North in the summer of 1954, the Viet Minh had<br />

already established considerable power over the<br />

people there. Although a courageous effort, the program<br />

by Lansdale and the SMM was an example of<br />

too little, too late.<br />

<strong>The</strong>ir program centered on establishing an indigenous<br />

force in North Vietnam and Laos to provide<br />

intelligence concerning North Vietnam military<br />

movements towards the South. From 1961 to<br />

1964 the program underwent several disruptive<br />

changes that impacted upon its effectiveness.<br />

From an initial mission of intelligence collection,<br />

the principle mission migrated to sabotage and<br />

harassment operations, with intelligence collection<br />

becoming a secondary task. <strong>The</strong>se mission<br />

changes, plus the Geneva Accord addressing the<br />

neutrality of Laos in 1962, severely undermined<br />

US unconventional warfare efforts. 71<br />

<strong>The</strong> two primary means of CIA/SMM infiltra tion<br />

were by air and by sea. Twenty-three of 33 agent<br />

team infiltrations were accomplished by way of airdrop.<br />

Acquisition of five C-123 aircraft, specially<br />

configured with electronic countermeasure (ECM)<br />

equipment and manned by non-US crews, considerably<br />

enhanced the delivery capability of agent<br />

teams into North Vietnam. Operations in Laos<br />

and North Vietnam required minimal USAF support;<br />

however, the Air Force provided logistics,<br />

weather forecasting, and aerial reconnaissance<br />

support for the C-123 crews. 72<br />

pressure, resistance operations, and physical destruction<br />

(hit-and-run and aerial attacks). 73<br />

In December 1963 the plan was presented to<br />

President Lyndon B. Johnson , who established a<br />

committee to select from the plan those missions<br />

offering the greatest return with minimal risk.<br />

Maj Gen Victor H. Krulak, the chief of OSACSA,<br />

chaired the committee. (<strong>The</strong> ASTD, formerly<br />

headed by Lansdale, had been disbanded earlier<br />

in the year and was replaced by OSACSA.) <strong>The</strong><br />

committee was less than enthusiastic, but it considered<br />

the advantages of proposed operations to<br />

outweigh the risks. A joint MACV task force was<br />

to implement OPLAN 34A. Operational control<br />

rested with commander, US Military Assistance<br />

Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV); overall political<br />

control rested with the US ambassador to<br />

Vietnam. On 24 January 1964 the task force stood<br />

up as the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam<br />

Special Operations Group, but was soon changed<br />

to MACV Studies and Observations Group for security<br />

purposes. 74 <strong>The</strong> organization came to be<br />

known by its shortened acronym—SOG. Just as<br />

OSS/London, OSS/Algiers, and CCRACK had<br />

done during previous conflicts, SOG was tasked to<br />

execute special operations missions assigned by<br />

the theater commander.<br />

In preparation for execution of the plan, the<br />

secretary of defense had deployed equipment and<br />

personnel to Saigon to begin initial operations.<br />

<strong>The</strong> principal requirement levied on the Air<br />

Force called for six specially modified C-123 aircraft<br />

equipped with ECM, radar detection, and<br />

enhanced navigation equipment. <strong>The</strong> aircraft<br />

were modified under the Duck Hook program<br />

during the first half of 1964 and were delivered<br />

to the USAF at Nha Trang AB, Vietnam, during<br />

the third quarter. 75 <strong>The</strong> now well-defined low-level<br />

OPLAN 34A—<strong>The</strong> Combined<br />

Task Force<br />

Throughout 1963 there emerged a more active<br />

role for the DOD in conducting special operations<br />

in SEA. By the end of the year, the US administra -<br />

tion had made the decision to expand the covert<br />

and clandestine program against North Vietnam.<br />

During November meetings were held by various<br />

divisions within the US government, and OPLAN<br />

34A emerged as the combined US plan. <strong>The</strong><br />

OPLAN specified five types of operations: intelligence<br />

collection, psychological operations, political<br />

Photo courtesy of John R. Lewis<br />

<strong>The</strong> Heavy Hook C-123 was modified for the low-level<br />

penetration mission. Note the outboard jets added in<br />

the late 1960s to improve the aircraft’s performance.<br />

13

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