06.03.2015 Views

1 - The Black Vault

1 - The Black Vault

1 - The Black Vault

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP<br />

experienced with the Vietnam War ending, the<br />

need for access to a simulator for USAFE-assigned<br />

C-130E(I) pilots became even more acute. <strong>The</strong><br />

only C-130 simulators in Europe belonged to the<br />

RAF, and after initial contact with them, tentative<br />

agreement was reached whereby some simulator<br />

time would be provided to 7th SOS crew<br />

members. <strong>The</strong> fuel crisis of 1973 brought a reduction<br />

in available hours for the UK simulator, and<br />

the initial agreement was scrapped. Additional coordination<br />

was accomplished, with the 7th SOS<br />

requesting 12 hours each month in the simulator.<br />

<strong>The</strong> RAF responded that it could only support<br />

four hours each quarter, with the possibility of<br />

four hours every six weeks. A compromise was<br />

reached whereby the RAF would provide two, fourhour<br />

training blocks on consecutive days each<br />

quarter. <strong>The</strong> arrangement would allow the 7th<br />

SOS to accomplish critically needed upgrade and<br />

emergency procedures training. On 1 April 1974 the<br />

7th SOS sent its first crew to RAF Lyneham, UK,<br />

for the first two-day simulator session. During the<br />

two days emergency procedures, engine runs,<br />

aborted takeoffs, and engine-out landings were<br />

practiced. 74 <strong>The</strong> arrangement was good for the<br />

squadron because it provided access to a simula -<br />

tor on a regular basis.<br />

As the simulator program got under way, the<br />

7th SOS faced another challenge with the loss of<br />

its low-level routes in Spain. Although the squadron<br />

supported the Spanish Parachute Brigade on<br />

a regular basis and was well received by the<br />

Spanish military, the general populace objected to<br />

low-level aircraft flights due to the noise that it<br />

created. As a result, the Spanish government established<br />

a policy that no low-level training would<br />

be made available to any foreign forces after 31<br />

December 1974. To compensate for the lost training,<br />

the squadron proposed to shift its training to<br />

Portugal since the terrain there was rugged, and<br />

rural areas were sparsely populated. 75 Although<br />

sporadic approval to fly in Portugal was eventually<br />

given in conjunction with the Flintlock exercise<br />

series, there were many restrictions imposed<br />

by the Portuguese that effectively eliminated the<br />

area as a training site. During Flintlock 74, which<br />

operated out of Rhein Main AB and consisted of<br />

two subexercises, low-level training was accomplished<br />

in Norway and in southern Germany.<br />

Thus, the impact of the loss of routes in Spain at<br />

year’s end was minimized. 76<br />

By the fall of 1974, the 7th SOS had operated<br />

the Combat Talon in Europe for more than six<br />

years. During that period the unit had decreased<br />

in size to four assigned Combat Talon aircraft,<br />

and it had moved from Ramstein AB to Rhein<br />

Main AB. <strong>The</strong> afterglow of the Son Tay raid had<br />

long since faded in the minds of the squadron’s<br />

USAFE bosses. <strong>The</strong> squadron was different from<br />

fighter squadrons of the command, and USAFE<br />

leadership was unsure of how to manage the specialized<br />

SOF asset. <strong>The</strong> cold war was the central<br />

focus in Europe, with tensions remaining high<br />

between East and West. With training areas<br />

dwindling, the future looked bleak for European<br />

SOF. <strong>The</strong> secret to success for any organization,<br />

however, lay in its ability to adapt to the changing<br />

environment. For the 7th SOS to survive, it<br />

had to bring to the table a capability needed by<br />

its USAFE war-fighter boss. <strong>The</strong> requirement for<br />

a standoff jammer platform to provide an operational<br />

capability until the EF-111 was fielded in<br />

the early 1980s was the capability that would<br />

keep the squadron viable in the minds of USAFE<br />

leadership. <strong>The</strong> decision in the mid-1970s to<br />

equip 7th SOS aircraft with an upgraded ECM<br />

capability in lieu of the IFR modification would<br />

ensure the unit remained an integral part of<br />

USAFE’s war plan, but it eliminated the 7th SOS<br />

from participation in the 1980 Iranian rescue<br />

mission.<br />

Notes<br />

1. History, 603d Air Base Wing (USAFE), 25 September–31<br />

December 1966, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., A-<br />

3–18.<br />

2. History, 603d Air Base Wing (USAFE), 1 January–30<br />

June 1967, A-1–5.<br />

3. History, 603d Air Base Wing (USAFE), 1 July–31 December<br />

1967, C-I-15–16.<br />

4. History, 7th Air Commando Squadron (Composite), 1<br />

January–30 June 1968, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., iv–vi.<br />

5. Ibid., vii–viii.<br />

6. Ibid., 1.<br />

7. Ibid., 9.<br />

8. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–31<br />

December 1968, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 2.<br />

9. History, 7th Air Commando Squadron (Composite), 1<br />

January–30 June 1968, 13–14.<br />

10. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–31<br />

December 1968, 3.<br />

11. Ibid., encl. 9, 1.<br />

12. Ibid., 4.<br />

13. Ibid., 8.<br />

14. Ibid., 7.<br />

15. Ibid., 9.<br />

16. History, 7th Operations Squadron, 1 January–30 June<br />

1969, 3.<br />

136

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!