1 - The Black Vault
1 - The Black Vault
1 - The Black Vault
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PRAETORIAN STARSHIP<br />
OSS had no dedicated aircraft to support its air<br />
requirements, but instead it relied on theater operational<br />
commanders for support. Because of the<br />
high demand placed on the United States Army<br />
Air Force (USAAF) in Europe at the time, and<br />
because of the specialized nature of the mission,<br />
support was not forthcoming. In the fall of 1942,<br />
General Donovan set about to acquire a commitment<br />
from the JCS for dedicated air support of his<br />
operations in France.<br />
In December 1942 the OSS presented a detailed<br />
operations plan (OPLAN), JCS OPLAN<br />
170/1, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval.<br />
<strong>The</strong> document outlined requirements for<br />
OSS clandestine activities in the western Mediterranean,<br />
including the requirement for three<br />
bom ber-type aircraft for each moonlit night of the<br />
month. Sourcing of these aircraft was left to the<br />
discretion of the theater commander. <strong>The</strong> plan<br />
was endorsed by the JCS on 18 December 1942<br />
and forwarded to Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower in<br />
Algiers for his approval. On 7 February 1943 General<br />
Eisenhower gave his approval in principle to<br />
the OSS plan. Aircraft assigned to the region belonged<br />
to the Northwest African Air Forces<br />
(NAAF ) under the leadership of Lt Gen Carl A.<br />
“Tooey” Spaatz. Citing higher priorities for conventional<br />
air operations, General Spaatz deferred<br />
NAAF support for the OSS plan.<br />
Without dedicated air assets, the OSS had to<br />
compete with conventional forces for support. <strong>The</strong><br />
heavy requirements generated by high-altitude<br />
daylight bombing of Germany did not leave any<br />
heavy bomber assets available to support OSS op -<br />
erations. <strong>The</strong> OSS considered the situation intolerable.<br />
In Washington, General Donovan submitted<br />
a letter to the JCS on 13 June 1943 outlining<br />
the need for dedicated special air units for his<br />
overseas OSS bases. He requested that JCS approve<br />
six bomber-type aircraft for OSS/Algiers<br />
and one squadron of 12 aircraft for OSS/London.<br />
<strong>The</strong> JCS disapproved Donovan’s request, again<br />
deferring sourcing of air assets to the overseas<br />
combat theater commanders. JCS reasoned that if<br />
the mission was important to theater commanders,<br />
then they should be willing to provide air<br />
assets out of hide. In August 1943 General Spaatz<br />
finally approved assignment of three NAAF B-17s<br />
to OSS/Algiers. 1<br />
<strong>The</strong> assignment of the three B-17s to OSS/<br />
Algiers gave the OSS a meager air capability<br />
in North Africa for the first time. <strong>The</strong> aircraft<br />
and crews were sourced from the 2d, 99th, and<br />
301st Bomb Groups. On 26 September 1943 three<br />
aircraft and three crews were officially assigned to<br />
the new Special Flight Section of OSS/Algiers. <strong>The</strong><br />
Special Flight Section set up operations at Massicault<br />
Airfield, Tunisia, where the 2d Bombardment<br />
Group was also located. Being an ad hoc organization<br />
with no maintenance of its own,<br />
OSS/Algiers aircraft were maintained by 2d Group<br />
personnel. 2<br />
<strong>The</strong> B-17 training program began with daylight,<br />
low-level, cross-country flights across Tunisia<br />
and Algeria. Aircraft flew as low as 400 feet<br />
above the ground, and aircrews soon transitioned<br />
to night low-level training flights as navigational<br />
skills improved. Unlike their modern-day C-130<br />
Talon cousins, the B-17s were extremely limited<br />
when it came to night low-level operations, having<br />
to rely on visual cues for both terrain avoidance<br />
and navigation. <strong>The</strong> first operational mission<br />
flown by an assigned OSS/Algiers B-17 occurred<br />
on 20 October 1943. A lone B-17F of the Special<br />
Flight Section departed Blida Airfield near Algiers<br />
and headed north towards the southern<br />
coastline of France. After low-altitude penetration<br />
into southern France, the aircraft continued low<br />
level to its drop zone (DZ) near the Swiss border<br />
and air-dropped 10 containers of weapons, ammunition,<br />
and other supplies to a group of French<br />
Maquisards under the supervision of a British<br />
agent. During the return leg of the mission, the<br />
aircraft was hit and badly damaged by enemy antiaircraft<br />
fire, forcing shutdown of two of the aircraft’s<br />
four engines. <strong>The</strong> crew nursed the aircraft<br />
back to Algeria, where it made an emergency<br />
landing. Although suffering combat damage to the<br />
aircraft, the first OSS/Algiers resupply mission<br />
was an operational success. 3<br />
With success came additional support in late<br />
October 1943. Three B-25 medium bombers, followed<br />
a short time later by an additional three,<br />
were assigned to OSS/Algiers by Twelfth Air Force<br />
(AF) to be used for personnel infiltration missions.<br />
Employment of the B-25s proved unsatisfactory<br />
for OSS operations into France—they were<br />
deemed too fast for personnel drops, and they had<br />
neither the range nor the payload to reach France<br />
from North Africa. With six aircraft assigned, the<br />
Special Flight Section was reorganized into two<br />
units—the 122d Liaison Squadron and the 68th<br />
Reconnaissance Group. In late December 1943 the<br />
122d and the 68th redeployed to Manduria, Italy,<br />
where the B-25s could be better utilized. <strong>The</strong> B-<br />
17s were left in North Africa and moved to Blida<br />
Air Base (AB), Algeria, which was located some 20<br />
miles from OSS/Algiers headquarters and was<br />
2