1 - The Black Vault

THE SON TAY PRISONER OF WAR RAID
all phases of flight, including formation rejoins
after an inadvertent weather penetration. During
the training phase, mission aircraft logged 1,017
hours during 368 sorties without a single flyingrelated
incident. By the second week of September,
scarcely three weeks after beginning training,
aircrews were ready to begin joint training
with the ground component force. 34
Because of the need for redundancy, both
crews had to be proficient in each other’s flight
profile, including helicopter formation flying and
napalm/flare drop operations. The A-1 formation
flew a higher airspeed than did the helicopters.
Therefore, the faster formation’s route of flight
was planned to coincide roughly with that of the
slower one, but with timing dog legs built into
the low-level route to compensate for the slower
helicopters. If helo lead had to abort the mission
after launch, the two Combat Talons would conduct
a rotate maneuver. Helo lead would transmit
“rotate, rotate” followed by either “can do” or
“cannot do.” If helo lead transmitted “can do,” A-1
lead would take over as helo lead, and helo lead
would assume A-1 lead. If helo lead transmitted
“cannot do,” he would transfer the helicopter formation
to A-1 lead and return to home base. In
the latter case, the A-1s would be on their own to
navigate to Son Tay without a lead Combat
Talon aircraft. 35
Flight plan timing for the low-level portion of
the flight and the arrival in the objective area had
to be carefully planned for several reasons. First
of all, the inbound routes of the two formations
had to be planned close to each other with numerous
crossing points to permit an expeditious lead
change should it become necessary. Consequently,
once the helicopter formation (lead call sign
Cherry 1) was formed after refueling with the
tanker aircraft, all timing to the target area became
relative to the rotary-wing formation. At
the completion of its refueling operation, the
fixed-wing formation (lead call sign Cherry 2)
planned to be 10 minutes behind the helicopters.
To ensure that the strike formation knew how
the progress of the assault formation was going,
Cherry 1 had to make timing calls at points 4, 7,
and 10 along the route, giving only its estimated
“ahead” or “behind” times in minutes for upcoming
points 7, 10, and the IP, respectively. The
time separation between the two formations at the
IP was to decrease to not less than two minutes.
The two-m inute separation at the IP was also
critical because it was needed to assure sufficient
__________
*Expansion of timing procedures provided by John Gargus.
time, altitude, and track separation between various
aircraft, which were also maneuvering in the
Son Tay area. Cherry 1 and Cherry 2 were to drop
flares, markers, and battle simulators on nearly
head-on tracks. After dropping its four illuminating
flares over Son Tay Prison, Cherry 1 had to
make a right-hand teardrop turn to the south,
dropping markers and battle simulators for the
next three minutes before exiting the area to the
west. As Cherry 1 completed its drops, the helicopters
remained at low level and landed, discharged
their troops, and moved back to their predesignated
holding area. Cherry 2, arriving at the
IP two minutes after Cherry 1, was to split from
its five A-1s. The A-1s then had to climb to their
attack altitudes and establish their orbit patterns
based on the napalm ground markers dropped by
the Talons for their reference points. The plan
assumed that the A-1s would not be needed until
after the ground forces had engaged the enemy.
An early arrival of the A-1s could interfere with
the helicopters and the departing Cherry 1. After
formation breakup, Cherry 2 had to climb to its
drop altitude, slow to 130 KIAS, and drop its assortment
of napalm and flare markers with battle
simulators on a track that turned to the south
four miles short of Son Tay. After its drops
Cherry 2 reversed course and headed west to its
holding area.*
For the raid to be successful, the raiding force
would have to penetrate North Vietnam’s formidable
air defenses. General Manor zeroed in on
the enemy’s SAM, AAA, and MiG aircraft that
could threaten the force. There were eight SAM
sites located northeast, east, and southeast of the
POW camp. Another SAM site, located only three
and one-half kilometers from Son Tay, was being
utilized as a SAM training facility but cou ld possibly
respond in case of an attack. Intelligence
revealed that AAA posed no threat to the raiding
force, except near the SAM sites, and that all
SAM sites could be avoided, except the one near
Son Tay itself. This site had an 85 mm AAA battery
associated with it that had an effective range
above 3,000 feet. To minimize the effect of this
battery, the raiding force would limit its maximum
altitude to 3,000 feet, thus flying under the
effective range of the AAA. 36 There were MiG aircraft
at Phuc Yen AB, which was 10 miles north
of Hanoi, but the MiGs were primarily daylightonly
fighters that needed a ground control intercept
(GCI) controller to direct their air-to-air intercepts.
General Manor reasoned that a diversion
147