1 - The Black Vault

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP
Force control the previous fall, it was apparent
that the 90th SOS’s days in SEA were numbered.
The driving force keeping the unit in South Vietnam
was SOG, and SOG was in its last four
months of existence. Air Force leadership was still
convinced that the mission could be performed
from an offshore location. Throughout South Vietnam,
the US military was withdrawing and turn -
ing over facilities to its Vietnamese counterparts.
On 3 January 1972, with three of four authorized
aircraft possessed, the 90th SOS sent aircraft
64-0567 for IRAN at CCK and subsequently on to
the 7th SOS in Germany. In exchange the 90th
received aircraft 64-0551. From January to March
1972, the 90th flew 164 MACSOG-tasked missions,
the majority being PSYOPS leaflet drops
into Cambodia. 121
At the squadron level, rumors continued to
abound regarding the relocation of the squadron.
During the latter part of the quarter, the squadron
was notified that it would move to Kadena
AB, Okinawa, by mid-April. Colonel Pinard and
his staff set about planning the details of the
move. It soon became apparent that there was
insufficient airlift to move the squadron expeditiously,
so squadron loadmasters developed load
plans to move everything by way of organic airlift.
Concurrently, all SOG missions were supported
during the April move. By the end of April, all
90th SOS personnel and equipment had been relocated
to Kadena AB. Although the unit continued
to support SEA operations for another two
years, relocation outside South Vietnam closed a
colorful chapter in Combat Talon history. On 15
May 1972 SOG was deactivated and was redesignated
the Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance
Team. 122
Six years of Combat Talon support to SOG
achieved mixed results, primarily due to various
obstacles endemic to SEA operations. The follow -
ing factors were the major limitations to overall
mission success.
1. North Vietnam, under a strong totalitarian regime,
was a closed society with efficient antisubversion
machinery.
2. High echelon control and mission approval/disapproval
procedures impeded the planning and execu -
tion of operations.
3. Diplomatic restrictions, such as the initial limitation
on overflights of Laotian territory and on the
use of Thai facilities, restricted flexible planning of
missions.
4. Terrain features and climatic conditions imposed
severe difficulties in achieving accurate aerial delivery
of personnel and supplies.
5. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong apparently
had a good intelligence collection system near Long
Thanh training facility and possibly had secured
information sources in the South Vietnamese Strategic
Technical Directorate.
6. There was not full cooperation between the American
Embassy, Vientiane, and MACSOG.
7. The air defense system of North Vietnam prevented
operations in the vicinity of population centers for
both the C-123 Heavy Hook and the C-130 Combat
Talon.
8. A shortage of air assets limited the number of com -
bat operations and training exercises.
9. Navigational aids on SOG fixed-wing aircraft did
not enable pinpoint delivery accuracy in aerial
drops over obscured drop zones.
10. Heavy cloud cover and other missions of higher priority
sometimes denied SOG the necessary aerial
photography for mission planning. 123
The full extent of USAF’s contribution to the
SOG UW program cannot be measured. Statistics
relate only part of the story and do not capture
the color of the SOG mission and the people who
executed it. USAF members participating in SOG
operations were highly dedicated, well trained,
and operated sophisticated aircraft to support unusual
missions. The organization itself was unusual.
It was flexible and divorced from standard
command and control channels. Stringent security
procedures wrapped it in a mantle of secrecy.
124 Combat Talon crews continued to support
US operations in SEA operating from Kadena AB
and from its forward operating location (FOL) in
Thailand.
Redesignation as the 1st SOS
With transfer of the 90th SOS to Kadena AB,
Okinawa, in March 1972, the squadron’s chain of
command also changed. The unit consisted of 38
officers and 44 enlisted men and was assigned to
the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing at Kadena AB.
The 18th TFW reported to the 313th Air Division,
also located at Kadena AB, and the 313th
AD reported to Fifth AF at Yakota AB, Japan.
Above Fifth AF was PACAF at Hickham AFB,
Hawaii, and Headquarters United States Air Force,
at the Pentagon. 125 When the unit deployed to its
FOL location in Thailand, OPCON was exercised
by Thirteenth AF, which was the numbered air
force responsible for all Air Force operations originating
from that country. With the reorganization
of SOG and the end of US combat forces stationed
in Vietnam, both SOG and Seventh AF were no
longer in the 90th SOS’s chain of command.
During the months following relocation, Colonel
Pinard and his staff stayed busy with beddown
requirements at Kadena AB. Building 3433
114