1 - The Black Vault

THE SON TAY PRISONER OF WAR RAID
security. General Manor vehemently denied both.
He pointed out that every US intelligence agency
had contributed to the mission, including the CIA
and DIA. Although some reports indicated the
CIA had not been consulted (and the CIA did little
to refute this claim), the CIA had been supportive
of the operation from the start. The American
prisoners were probably moved because of summer
flooding of the Black River that ran just outside
the walls of Son Tay Prison. Brig Gen John
P. Flynn, Retired, a former POW released by
North Vietnam in 1973, contends that the prisoners
had been moved from Son Tay because North
Vietnam had begun to upgrade the prison—it had
not originally been built as a prison and had serious
security shortfalls. The Soviet Union and
China had provided grant money, and some of
this money had been used to repair and modify
POW facilities. During the upgrade at Son Tay,
prisoners were moved to an alternate location. Activity
detected by US spy satellites was actually
the construction crew working on the compound.
Since American prisoners and the construction
workers dressed the same in black pajama-like
clothing, the fact that the prisoners had been
moved went undetected. 86 As to the notion that
the raid had been compromised by a breach of
security, General Manor pointed out that the operation
was a complete surprise to North Vietnam.
Had they known the raid was coming, General
Manor surmised, they would have ambushed
the raiders and used the failure for propaganda
purposes.
John Gargus, lead navigator on Cherry 2, recalled
that when the raiders landed back at
Udorn RTAFB after the raid, they were disappointed
in not having rescued the Americans but
felt good about the raid and were satisfied with
the effort they had made. Out of the entire operation,
one US Army soldier was grazed by a bullet
on the inside of his thigh, and a USAF helicopter
crew chief suffered a broken ankle during the controlled
crash of Banana 1. Every aspect of the raid
had been executed as planned. 87 The plan had
worked perfectly. The raiders had penetrated
North Vietnamese defenses, landed, and deployed
troops, and the troops had secured the area and
searched every building. Everyone was recovered,
and the area was safely egressed. There was no
loss of American life, but no Americans were
freed. 88 As the weeks passed after the raid, how -
ever, the US press labeled the entire operation a
failure and accused the raiders of bringing additional
hardship on the prisoners. For many raiders,
years of self-incrimination and doubt ensued.
It was not until the 25th anniversary of the return
of the American prisoners of war in 1998 did
Major Gargus finally accept the raid as the singlemost
positive event of the POWs’ long captivity
and that, indeed, it was a success. 89
Thanks to the pioneering work of Colonel
Blosch and Major Franklin, and their crews, the
Talon community made great strides because of
the raid, both in equipment and in combat tactics.
Before the raid the Talon fleet was scheduled for
extensive modification and upgrades, which werelater
designated as MOD-70. The FLIR system
that was temporarily installed on the Talons was
the most notable addition. It had proven to be effective
in assisting the aircrew during low-level
precision navigation. Jamming of GCI controller
frequencies was also proven quite effective. Although
MOD-70 did not include a standoff jamming
capability, European-assigned Talons did receive
this capability in the late 1970s. 90
For the Combat Talon community, Son Tay was
a resounding success. Lessons learned would be applied
for years to come. The prestige of the entire
Combat Talon community was enhanced by being
part of such a noble endeavor. Ten years later, at a
place called Desert One in Iran, America would
once again question its ability and commitment
to execute another rescue mission—the rescue of
Americans held hostage in Tehran. As it was at Son
Tay, Combat Talon would be an integral part of the
Iranian operation. In failure, however, Desert One
would prove to be the salvation of Combat Talon
and would provide the catalyst for the rebirth of
modern special operations.
Notes
1. USAF oral history interview with Lt Col Keith R. Grimes,
10 September 1992, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 2.
2. W. J. McQuillen, USAFSOF historian, “Son Tay POW
Rescue Attempt Operation,” monograph, Eglin AFB, Fla., 25
February 1971, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1.
3. Grimes, 2.
4. McQuillen, 2.
5. Grimes, 4–5.
6. Ibid., 6–7.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 15–16.
9. Ibid., 14–16.
10. Ibid., 24.
11. Ibid., 32.
12. Benjamin F. Schemmer, The Raid (New York: Harper
& Row, 1976), 67–68.
157