1 - The Black Vault

MOUNT PINATUBO TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR
fully mission ready crews were nearing certifica -
tion, with additional crews following soon afterwards.
Major Norris was the first mission ready
Talon pilot assigned to the squadron. The new
Talon I squadron was commanded by Colonel
Hanson, who had assumed command of the 711th
SOS on 5 December 1994. Much of the early success
of the squadron could be attributed to his
effort to bring the weapons system smoothly online.
The conversion did not come without a price,
however. Growing pains with the Combat Talon I
at Duke Field and unseasonably poor weather reduced
the sortie completion rate, resulting in the
standard 22-week training schedule having to be
extended to 32 weeks. Several lessons were
learned from the initial cadre that were implemented
for future classes. Phase A (ground training)
was separated from Phase B (flying training),
thus allowing a better match to traditional reservist
availability. Training was also later transferred
to Duke Field and was accomplished on
unit-assigned aircraft rather than the operationally
committed aircraft of the 8th SOS. 168 By the
end of 1995, the 711th was well positioned to complete
its transition to Combat Talon I during the
following year.
Combat Talon II Delivered to the 1st SOS
The New Year began for the 353d SOG with the
Headquarters AFSOC IG-administered QAFA.
The group had prepared for the inspection the
previous fall when it completed an in-depth unit
self assessment. Although the whole quality process
was still new to the group, the IG assessment
was designed to gauge the group’s progress
in applying quality principles to improve mission
accomplishment. The assessment focused on
three areas: direct mission accomplishment, strategic
plan support, and compliance with Air
Force special interest items. Inspectors used
Headquarters AFSOC’s quality criteria on a
curved rating scale designed to implement a 60
percent grading scale for the 1995 QAFA, an 80
percent scale for the next QAFA in 1997, and a
100 percent scale for 1999 and each out-year after
that time. Inspectors found the group in compliance
with the two special interest items and
recognized the group’s safety program as outstanding.
The operations and security and intelligence
oversight programs received an excellent
rating. QAFA inspectors also lauded senior leadership
for successfully incorporating quality prin -
ciples into most areas of 353d SOG operations. The
QAFA reinforced the concept that quality was a
journey and that AFSOC units had only begun
their journey in achieving a quality oriented organization.
169
Also in early January Colonel Stevens visited
the 353d SOG to get inputs from group leadership
regarding theater reservations about Commando
Vision. Armed with briefing papers and
data provided by the group staff, Stevens returned
to Hurlburt Field and briefed Headquarters
AFSOC. From 3 to 7 March 1995, Headquarters
AFSOC convened the Commando Vision
Conference, and General Hobson tasked the attendees
to “put the meat on the bones” of Commando
Vision, with a promise that AFSOC would
take the finalized plan to the overseas CINCs to
gain their approval. A great amount of work already
had been accomplished and the conference
built upon that previous work. Colonel Dredla,
commander of the 353d OSS and a Combat Talon
EWO, led a five-person 353d SOG team to the
conference. AFSOC created a multidisciplined tiger
team to focus on issues surfaced during the
conference with the goal of better defining Commando
Vision. 170
Dredla presented a group white paper summarizing
the unit’s proposed concept of operations in
the Pacific under Commando Vision. The primary
purpose of the paper was threefold: (a) to provide
an AFSOF capability that the group believed
would be acceptable to COMSOCPAC, (b) to provide
AFSOC functional managers a baseline of
mission needs against which they could project
resources, and (c) to give AFSOC programmers a
baseline of requirements against which Commando
Vision could be constructed. The main
theme put forth by Colonel Dredla highlighted the
capability that had to be available both during
and after Commando Vision. After discussing several
assumptions made by Commando Vision
planners, Dredla closed his presentation by pointing
out two key flaws in the Commando Vision
concept that made it untenable—the West Coast
wing structure was not sufficiently robust to supply
rotational personnel to the Pacific while at the
same time supporting the national mission and
SOUTHCOM requirements, and Commando Vision
failed to take into account the qualitative ca -
pability brought to USPACOM by having permanently
based forces assigned to the theater. 171
PACOM had become comfortable with its SOFassigned
forces and was not readily willing to give
up its in-place capability for an unproven Commando
Vision.
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