1 - The Black Vault

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP
equipment aboard the aircraft. Numerous boats
were sighted, and crews practiced and improved
methods for identifying them. The second-phase
testing was followed by an interim analysis of the
counterinfiltration operation by the 314th AD,
since the division felt that it had enough data to
complete the Combat Talon test. Three more test
flights were conducted in May 1975, but the later
flights did not change the findings of the interim
314th AD analysis. 14
On 24 April the 314th AD reported to Fifth AF
that the test program, identified as Commando
Talon, was successfully completed on 12 April and
forwarded its conclusion that permanent opera -
tions should be established. The summary, prepared
by USAF Korea’s headquarters, included
comments on limitations discovered during the
test as well as recommendations for making future
operations more effective. The flight tests revealed
that the FLIR system provided high-resolution imagery
“approaching visual photography,” which
was capable of providing not only real-time identification
of vessels detected during open water surveillance
but was also capable of permitting island
survey operations for detecting agent staging
bases. The practical consequences of the testing
confirmed the validity of surveillance techniques
and provided the means for making observations,
which would reveal the nature of North Korean
operations. 15
On the assumption that Commando Talon operations
would continue, the 314th AD expanded
its earlier concept of operations around which
employment plans were drawn. Inbound infiltration
boats would continue to be reported to the
314th AD command advisory function, tracked to
their destinations if possible, tied to specific loca -
tions, and passed to the ROK for appropriate action.
If an outbound boat was detected, the 314th
AD believed that the C-130E(Y) Combat Talon
should follow it out to sea (as far as possible
without violating sensitive area rules) to determine
the operational methodology of North Korean
employment. 16
Two operating limitations were identified during
the test program. First, the system’s operator
found that weather conditions seriously degraded
the FLIR imagery. Clouds, moisture, or dust rendered
the FLIR imagery virtually unusable. Second,
the narrow field of view of the FLIR system
placed restrictions on the method of searching a
large area. Although a large area could be
searched in a three-hour period (the test missions
covered 1,800 square miles), one aircraft could not
scrutinize an area 60 miles in length and 30
miles in breadth in a short time. As a result, an
infiltration craft could penetrate ROK territorial
waters in one portion of a search area while the
Combat Talon examined another. This limitation
could be overcome by using more than one aircraft
in a search area with appropriate altitude
or sector separation. 17 The 314th AD provided a
number of recommendations for improving subsequent
operations:
1. Commando Talon surveillance missions
should not become a part of the peacetime
aerial reconnaissance program.
2. The current 314th AD OPORD 75-27 should
be used for continued operations until a new
one could be written and coordinated.
3. The PACAF daily mission summary, required
of all sorties, should be simplified.
For routine sightings of surface craft, the
mission summary should be brief, while
those for suspicious sightings should be reported
as currently required.
4. The surveillance mission should be fragged
to operate in the area south of 37 degrees
north latitude within the territorial seas of
the Republic of Korea. When operating below
35 degrees north latitude, the sea
boundaries should be expanded to the Korean
air defense identification zone (ADIZ),
as a minimum.
5. The utility of using two C-130E (Y) aircraft
simultaneously should be considered.
6. Since an analysis of the multiple videotape
coverage of islands could not be accomplished
by the 314th AD for the survey and
mapping objectives outlined for the second
phase of the test, the 18th TFW should be
tasked to obtain aerial photography of the
islands covered and to make a comparison of
the photo and FLIR coverage.
7. The limited capability of the 314th AD to
perform a preliminary analysis of videotapes
should be recognized and accepted, at least
for the short term, because of the restrictions
imposed upon the procurement of video
equipment.
8. The development of close coordination between
US and Republic of Korea Navy, Air
Force, and other interested elements for utilizing
the Commando Talon FLIR capability
should be studied.
If the operations were to be continued, the
314th AD recommended that at least five missions
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