1 - The Black Vault

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINES
defenses at Point Salines and Pearls airfields had
been virtually nonexistent. To provide the information
necessary to plan the initial assault, JCS
ordered TF-123 to insert reconnaissance teams
into the objective area before H hour. Consequently,
24 hours before commencement of Operation
Urgent Fury—before dawn on 24 October—
two TF-123 C-130 SOLL aircraft each dropped a
four-man SEAL element and a Boston Whaler
boat off the coast of Grenada near Point Salines
and Pearls. Along with the two airfields, the
SEALs were tasked to reconnoiter the beaches
that landing forces planned to use during the assault.
The Pearls element determined that beach
conditions did not favor the amphibious assault
planned for the Marine battalion landing team
and recommended instead a helicopter airborne
assault on the airfield. The second SEAL element
was to rendezvous with the USS Clifton Sprague
near Point Salines after it reconnoitered the area,
but it did not make the rendezvous. The four
SEALs, along with their support boat, had vanished
in unusually rough seas without reporting
to their headquarters. 119
A few hours later Admiral McDonald conducted
a preinvasion commander’s conference at his
headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia, attended by his
TF commanders, including Gen Richard A.
Scholtes, USA, who was the commander of TF-
123. Scholtes relayed to McDonald and the other
TF commanders the loss of the four-man SEAL
element off Point Salines earlier that morning.
Without adequate intelligence of the defenses at
the airfield, the TF commanders considered postponing
the operation by 24 hours to insert another
element to get the required information.
Representatives from the State Department attending
the conference were opposed to any delay
in the invasion plans, noting that the fragile Caribbean
Peacekeeping Force, made up of regional island
nations, might become nervous and cause
the peacekeeping force to dissolve, thus leaving
the United States in a vulnerable diplomatic position.
Admiral McDonald also was opposed to any
delay in the D-day schedule, but he did agree to
postpone H hour from 0400 to 0500 hours to allow
TF-123 forces time to attempt a second look at
Point Salines. Moving H hour back an hour,
meant the assault force would attack Point Salines
at dawn instead of in the dark as originally
planned. 120 The change would put the Combat
Talons and the SOLL C-130s in a vulnerable position
the following morning.
The 1st SOW Is Alerted and
the 8th SOS Moves Out
At 0900 on the morning of 24 October, 1st
SOW/DOS alerted Hobson and the 8th SOS Combat
Talons to move forward to Hunter AAF, Georgia,
for the positioning phase of Operation Urgent
Fury. Hobson’s crews had been in crew rest
since the previous night in anticipation of the
upcoming 24-hour operation. The five 8th SOS
Combat Talons and the single 7th SOS Talon
spare departed Hurlburt Field at noon en route
to Hunter AAF. Once there, the remainder of the
afternoon and evening was spent coordinating fi -
nal plans with the seven C-130 SOLL aircraft
from the 317th TAW and loading the aircraft before
launch. Still without adequate intelligence
regarding the threat at Point Salines, planners
turned to the three AC-130H gunships to provide
cover for the assault force. 121
The assault at Point Salines was planned for
three waves of MC-130Es and SOLL C-130s,
along with other C-130 tactical aircraft. The first
wave, first element, was made up of two MC-130E
Combat Talons (64-0562 and 64-0572) commanded
by Tindall and Bach, respectively. The
primary means of delivery was to airland the
rangers directly on to the airfield, with an airdrop
scheduled as a backup should the runway be unusable.
The appropriate option would be selected
based upon reports received from a TF-123 CCT
that was scheduled to be inserted into the waters
off Point Salines just before the operation commenced.
(The CCT unit was required after the
original four-man SEAL element was lost on 24
October.) If the CCT was unable to report the runway
status, an AC-130H gunship orbiting above
the airfield would provide the information. The
first wave, second element, was to be led by Jim
Hobson in MC-130E aircraft 64-0568. Along with
Hobson in the second element were four SOLL
C-130s. The five-aircraft package was to airland
its headquarters and communications element 30
minutes after Tindall and Bach completed their
initial infiltration. A second wave consisting of
two MC-130Es (64-0567 and 64-0551), commanded
by Miles and Davenport, and three SOLL
C-130s, would airland additional rangers seven
minutes after Hobson’s arrival. A third wave of 10
C-130s with elements of the 82d Airborne Division
would airland approximately three hours after
the initial assault, depending upon the tactical
situation on the airfield when they arrived in the
Point Salines objective area. 122
281