1 - The Black Vault

COMBAT SPEAR
volunteers shortly after they became airborne.
The spinning lasted approximately four minutes.
After the spinning stopped, the recovery continued
uneventfully. Because of the incident, twoman
demonstration recoveries were suspended,
and a hazard report was submitted to Seventh
AF. 57 (No additional two-man live surface-to-air
recoveries were attempted until a 7th SOS crew,
commanded by Capt J. W. Bates, extracted two
personnel from the waters off the coast of RAF
Macrihanish, UK, on 2 December 1981.)
With no combat missions being flown into
North Vietnam in November and December, SOG
tasked the squadron to fly combat support missions
throughout the area of responsibility. Unilateral
training sorties were also flown, and personnel
focused on improving facilities at Nha
Trang AB when not in the air. With already one
of the best enlisted quarters in SEA, personnel
continued to improve their barracks during their
off-duty time. Each enlisted six-man aircrew
shared an air-conditioned room on the top floor of
the barracks. Each room was well insulated and
removed from the normal distractions of a
crowded barracks. By housing each crew in its
own room, crew integrity and proper crew rest
were maintained. Nonaircrew squadron personnel
were billeted on the ground floor, which was also
divided into a reading/game room and a room for
recreational activities. Squadron personnel were
responsible for the design, fabrication, painting,
and continued cleanliness of the barracks facility.
58 The 15th SOS won the 14th SOW/CC
Outstanding Unit Trophy in November 1968.
During the period officers and assigned civilian
contractors continued to reside downtown in the
Anh Hoa Hotel.
Command and Control
Throughout 1968 relations between SOG and
S eventh AF were strained, even after the signing
of the MOU in the fall of 1967. The basic problem
with the MOU was that it was general in nature
and did not specifically address command relationships.
The MOU had created, however, the 14th
SOW DCSO position, and the first incumbent to
fill that position arrived at Nha Trang AB on 2
March 1968. In his end of tour report the following
year, he documented the state of affairs at that
time (as he perceived them).
Both Seventh AF and MACSOG were delighted with
the results after the DCSO office was activated. Problems
that previously had been hashed and rehashed in
conferences were bucked to me for solution. Being located
Photo courtesy of Obie Hill
Six-man enlisted flight crew quarters located on Nha
Trang AB. Note TV monitor in center of rear wall and
air conditioner in right rear corner of room. Special
operations crews were authorized air conditioning because
they flew at night and slept during the day.
a considerable distance from Saigon [Nha Trang], I had
no personality problems with either 7AF or MACSOG.
Consequently, each problem could be examined in light
of facts and mission requirements. Fortunately, most
problems were relatively minor in nature and when isolated
from an atmosphere of mutual hostility, the solu -
tion was fairly obvious. MACSOG was well satisfied
with the air support they received, and all mission requirements
were fulfilled. Seventh Air Force was delighted
because minor problems that had previously
consumed an enormous number of man-hours were now
being handled by my office, and they gradually withdrew
from close supervision of MACSOG activities. 59
Thus, according to the first DCSO, the new arrangement
proved to be satisfactory. Subsequent
appraisal by Seventh AF headquarters, however,
indicated that it was still not highly satisfied with
the working relationship between itself and MAC -
SOG. A Seventh AF staff study conducted in July
1968 pointed out several problem areas. The
study specifically criticized the 1967 MOU insofar
as it addressed only administrative matters and
not the broad spectrum of Seventh AF support of
MACSOG activities. It further noted that Seventh
AF/MACSOG problems frequently could not be resolved
in the absence of mutually agreed upon
directives. As a result of the continued friction
between the two headquarters, MACV was asked
to arbitrate. MACV consequently directed that
Seventh AF, in conjunction with MACSOG, prepare
an MOU to formalize new procedures and to
assure systematic and effective support of SOG
missions. 60 The resultant document was identified
as OPORD 460-68, and it greatly expanded and
clarified the earlier MOU.
105